CPR 46.27 Variation Refused Despite Financial Resources | Objective Unreasonableness Test Applied

Courts will refuse applications to vary Aarhus costs caps upward where increased costs would be objectively unreasonable, even if claimants can afford them, particularly in paradigm environmental protection cases where repeat player viability matters.

Aarhus costs caps CPR 46.27 variation refused environmental judicial review

In R (Badger Trust and Wild Justice) v Natural England [2025] EWHC 2761 (Admin), Fordham J refused Natural England’s application under CPR 46.27 to vary default Aarhus Convention costs caps from £10,000 per claimant to £20,000 (Wild Justice) and £30,000 (Badger Trust). The court analysed the two-limb test for “prohibitively expensive” proceedings under CPR 46.27(3), clarifying that Limb (a) involves a means test of real-world affordability whilst Limb (b) establishes an independent objective reasonableness standard. The court characterised Rule 26 caps as a “soft presumption” representing a principled balance to facilitate environmental justice, not mere placeholders. Even assuming real-world affordability, the variation was held objectively unreasonable given: the claim’s reasonable prospects; its importance for the environment; its paradigm environmental protection nature; and the need for NGO claimants to function as “repeat players”. The application was dismissed with Natural England ordered to pay the claimants’ costs. The judgment provides important guidance on when public authorities may successfully vary Aarhus caps upward.

In my judgment the significance of the Rule 26 Caps of £5k and £10k is as follows. They supply the initial answer in every Aarhus case, unless and until a Court identifies an appropriate variation based on assessing what would avoid the proceedings being prohibitively expensive. … They can be expected generally to provide an answer, at least in a paradigm environmental protection context, where a claimant seeks access to environmental justice, with undiluted public interest motivations. They are in the nature of a soft presumption. They are a basis for parties to be able to get on with environmental judicial review cases. All of which is why there is an onus, as Mr Luckhurst rightly accepts.

Citations

R (Edwards) v Environment Agency (No.2) [2013] UKSC 78 Established that access to environmental justice must not be prohibitively expensive, incorporating both subjective and objective assessments, including the public interest in enabling environmental challenges. R (TPL1) v Secretary of State for the Department of Work and Pensions [2025] EWHC 1729 (Admin) Confirmed that judicial review is intended to deliver a “speedy audit” of public decision-making, cautioning against procedural obstructions that unnecessarily increase costs. Manchester City FC Ltd v FA Premier League Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 1110 Affirmed the court’s duty to scrutinise proposed derogations from open justice, particularly where parties are in agreement, emphasising the independence of judicial assessment regarding transparency. R (MTA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 553 (Admin) Held that parties cannot contract out of their obligations under the principle of open justice, which must be actively considered regardless of party consensus. R (IAB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 66 Clarified that redactions must be justified with specific reasons, and limits on disclosure may be permitted where necessary to protect confidentiality, particularly in national security or safety contexts. R (Dana Astra IOOO) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] EWHC 289 (Admin) Demonstrated that national security considerations and peripheral relevance may justify the redaction of names and identifiers in judicial review proceedings. R (Wilkinson) v Enfield LBC [2024] EWHC 1193 (Admin) Recognised that commercial sensitivities can justify limited redactions provided the redacted material is of minimal relevance to the issues in dispute. R (XY) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWHC 81 (Admin); [2024] 1 WLR 2272 Endorsed the use of witness statements to justify redaction in judicial review proceedings, particularly in fulfilment of the duty to explain limits on openness post-commencement. R (RSPB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWHC 2309 (Admin); [2018] Env LR 13 Confirmed that, in Aarhus Convention claims, arguments for costs cap variations must be heard in a way that avoids a chilling effect and protects the public’s right to environmental justice. Responsible Development for Abaco Ltd v Christie [2023] UKPC 2; [2023] 4 WLR 47 Supported the court’s discretion to cap or waive costs in public interest environmental cases to avoid costs having a prohibitive impact on valid claimants. R (Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2005] EWCA Civ 1656; [2006] Env LR 627 Recognised the availability of “no order as to costs” in environmental judicial reviews where the claim is public interest-driven, irrespective of success. R (Fighting Dirty Ltd) v Environment Agency [2024] EWHC 2029 (Admin) Emphasised that Aarhus Convention cost protections must be applied contextually and are not automatically applicable merely by invocation of environmental terminology. R (CPRE Surrey) v Waverley Borough Council [2018] EWHC 2969 (Admin) Described the applicable Aarhus cost caps as the general or default position, to be varied only upon a clear and reasoned assessment that variation would not result in prohibitively expensive proceedings.

Key Points

  • The default costs caps under CPR 46.26 are not merely a starting point but represent a normal and general position, chosen by the rule-maker on a principled basis to facilitate access to environmental justice while minimising satellite litigation. [26]
  • When considering an application to vary the default Aarhus costs caps, the court is entitled to regard them as embodying a soft presumption, and the onus is on the applicant to clearly demonstrate that a variation is appropriate. [26]
  • The objective unreasonableness test under CPR 46.27(3)(b) operates as a freestanding protection even where costs are real-world affordable for the claimant, establishing a standard to promote access to environmental justice assessed by reference to the six mandatory factors. [35], [37]
  • In assessing objective unreasonableness under CPR 46.27(3)(b), the court must have regard to the need for responsible environmental non-governmental organisations to retain the viability to be repeat players in environmental litigation. [56]
  • The situation of the parties under CPR 46.27(3)(b)(i) can include the resources and access to third-party funding of a claimant, but this cannot be used to subvert the rule by driving a conclusion that real-world affordability alone indicates objective reasonableness. [43]

"It is in the interests of access to environmental justice, with its public interest imperative, that NGOs like Wild Justice and Badger Trust should retain the viability to be “repeat players”. Objective reasonableness does not mean room for one, or even two, more cases. Proper access to environmental justice for a responsible NGO cannot mean a system of limited “credits”, after which the NGO is bust or effectively excluded, with the environment unprotected until someone has the energy to start up a new NGO with a new set of “credits”."

Key Findings In The Case

  • The Claimants, Wild Justice and Badger Trust, each budgeted for and committed to paying their respective £10,000 default caps towards Natural England’s costs, with additional sums allocated for their own legal representation, all of which were funded in part by a successful public crowdfunding campaign totalling £57,180 [47], [48], [55].
  • The Claimants’ financial circumstances demonstrated that although they may have been technically able to afford increased adverse cost caps, doing so would have significantly compromised their financial stability, reserves policies, and operational viability, potentially preventing them from proceeding with the claim [47], [48].
  • The claim advanced by the Claimants was a viable environmental protection judicial review with a reasonable prospect of success, undiluted by individual economic interests, and therefore engaged the full public interest imperative underlying the Aarhus Convention costs regime [50], [53].
  • Natural England’s annual legal budget of £2.32 million and broader operating budget of £350 million, as well as their role as a public environmental regulator, did not justify varying the default costs caps where doing so might deter responsible NGOs from continuing or initiating environmental litigation in the future [54].
  • The judge found that raising the caps to £20,000 and £30,000 respectively would be objectively unreasonable under CPR 46.27(3)(b), even if affordable in real-world terms, as it would chill access to environmental justice by jeopardising the Claimants’ future ability to litigate as “repeat players” in public interest environmental cases [45], [56].

"The court room during this hearing would, I think, have been a chilling place for responsible environmental NGOs, contemplating viable environmental protection judicial review claims. As I see it, the whole point of Rule 26 Caps is to have a degree of appropriate prospective reassurance... I was left feeling that it was particularly appropriate that the Court should respond as robustly, straightforwardly and clearly as it legitimately could."

The High Court’s decision in R (The Badger Trust and Wild Justice) v Natural England [2025] EWHC 2761 (Admin) provides detailed guidance on when courts may vary Aarhus Convention costs caps under CPR 46.27, establishing that objective unreasonableness operates as a freestanding protection even where increased costs are real-world affordable for claimants.

Background

The case involved a judicial review claim brought by two environmental non-governmental organisations, The Badger Trust and Wild Justice, against Natural England. The claim challenged a decision made on 3 May 2024 to issue or renew 26 supplementary badger cull licences, authorising the killing of badgers between 1 June 2024 and 30 November 2024 [§3]. The Interested Party was the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. Permission for judicial review was granted by Fordham J at an oral renewal hearing on 15 May 2025 [§3], with a two-day substantive hearing scheduled for December 2025 [§3].

The case was recognised as an Aarhus Convention claim, engaging the costs protection provisions of CPR Part 46 Section IX [§20]. The default costs caps under CPR 46.26 were therefore applicable, limiting the claimants’ potential costs liability to £10,000 each and the defendant’s liability to £35,000 [§22]. Natural England subsequently applied for a variation of these caps under CPR 46.27, seeking to increase the claimants’ caps to £20,000 for Wild Justice and £30,000 for Badger Trust [§58].

The hearing before Fordham J on 16 October 2025 dealt with two distinct applications: Natural England’s application for redaction of certain decision-making documents, and its application to vary the Aarhus costs caps [§1, §7]. Judgment was handed down on 28 October 2025 [title page].

Costs Issues Before the Court

The primary costs issue for determination was Natural England’s application under CPR 46.27 to vary the default Aarhus Convention costs caps [§17]. The application required the court to consider whether increasing the caps would make the costs of the proceedings prohibitively expensive for the claimants, applying the two-limb test set out in CPR 46.27(3) [§23]. The court had to analyse both whether likely costs exceeded the claimants’ financial resources (Limb (a)) [§§29-33] and whether the likely costs were objectively unreasonable (Limb (b)) [§§34-44], having regard to the specific mandatory factors listed in the rule. A secondary costs issue concerned the allocation of costs for the redactions application and the variation application itself [§§62-64].

The Parties’ Positions

Natural England, represented by Paul Luckhurst and Sean Butler, contended that the default £10,000 caps should be increased to £20,000 for Wild Justice and £30,000 for Badger Trust [§58]. They argued this represented a fairer balance, producing a total potential recovery of £50,000 if successful [§58]. Their submissions emphasised that the claimants had real-world affordability, pointing to Wild Justice’s cash reserves of £57,576 (as at 8 October 2025) [§47] and Badger Trust’s reserves of approximately £326,000 (as at 31 December 2024) [§48]. They noted the claimants’ successful crowdfunding campaign which raised £57,180 against a target of £52,486 [§55], suggesting further fundraising was possible. Natural England also highlighted the backward-looking nature of the claim and current government policy favouring curtailed culling, suggesting limited environmental importance [§58].

The Claimants, represented by David Wolfe KC and Barney McCay, opposed the variation. They characterised the default Rule 26 caps as a carefully considered balance struck by the rule-maker, not merely a starting point [§§25-26]. They submitted that even if real-world affordability could be demonstrated (Limb (a)), the increase sought was objectively unreasonable under Limb (b) [§45]. They emphasised the public interest imperative in facilitating access to environmental justice and the need for environmental NGOs to function as repeat players [§56]. Witness evidence indicated both claimants would reluctantly withdraw their claim if faced with a materially increased cap, demonstrating the chilling effect such a variation would have [§§47-48]. They contended that the claim had a reasonable prospect of success, involved important environmental issues, and was a paradigm environmental protection case undiluted by private economic interests [§§50, 52-53].

The Court’s Decision

Fordham J refused Natural England’s application to vary the costs caps [§62]. He held that even assuming the claimants could real-world afford the increased caps (Limb (a)), Natural England had failed to demonstrate that the increase would not be objectively unreasonable (Limb (b)) [§45].

The Legal Framework: Rule 26 Caps as More Than Placeholders

The court provided significant analysis of the legal framework, characterising the Rule 26 default caps (£5,000 for individuals, £10,000 for organisations) as more than mere placeholders [§26]. They were described as representing a “normal” and “general” position [§§25-26], chosen by the rule-maker on a principled basis to facilitate access to environmental justice while minimising satellite litigation [§26]. The caps were said to constitute a “soft presumption” [§26], providing clear signalling to avoid chilling effects [§27]. The court emphasised the onus on any party seeking variation to clearly demonstrate its appropriateness [§§25-26].

The Two-Limb Test for Prohibitive Expensiveness

Fordham J provided detailed guidance on the meaning of “prohibitively expensive” under CPR 46.27(3), explaining that it comprises two independent bases [§§29-44]:

Limb (a): Real-World Affordability (§§29-33)

The court found this limb involves a means test focusing on the claimant’s actual financial resources and practical ability to pay [§§30-31], having regard to any third-party financial support under CPR 46.27(4) [§29]. This is about whether likely costs exceed the claimant’s financial resources in CPR 46.27(3)(a). The judge explained this is “really a kind of means test” [§30], concerned with “real-world unaffordability of the actual case for the actual claimant, in light of the money which the claimant has or can access” [§30]. Money in the bank does not automatically equal practical ability to pay if needed for essential purposes [§31].

Limb (b): Objective Unreasonableness (§§34-44)

The court clarified this operates as a freestanding protection even where costs are real-world affordable [§35]. Limb (b) is “a second way to protect a claimant for whom the proceedings are real-world affordable” [§35]. It establishes an objective standard of reasonableness to promote access to environmental justice [§34], assessed by reference to the six mandatory factors in CPR 46.27(3)(b): (i) the situation of the parties; (ii) reasonable prospect of success; (iii) importance for the claimant; (iv) importance for the environment; (v) complexity; and (vi) whether frivolous [§34].

Fordham J emphasised that “real-world affordability cannot drive a conclusion of objective reasonableness” as “that would subvert the rule and undermine the public interest aims” [§43]. The question is not affordability but reasonableness [§38], informed by the facilitative purpose in paradigm environmental protection cases [§§37-38].

Application to the Facts

Applying these principles, Fordham J found the variation objectively unreasonable because [§§46-57]:

      • The court held that the claim had a reasonable prospect of success, having crossed the permission threshold despite Natural England’s resistance [§50]
      • The court found the issues were important both for the claimants and “for the environment” under CPR 46.27(3)(b)(iv), involving an environmental protection case with backward-looking legal audit value [§52]
      • The court characterised the case as representing undiluted environmental protection without “individual economic interests” or mixed purposes [§53], distinguishing it from the CPRE case where local property owners funded the challenge [§53]
      • The claimants’ crowdfunding and legal arrangements (discounted rates, specialist lawyers) were eminently reasonable and could not be criticised [§55]
      • Increased caps would undermine their capacity to function as repeat players in future environmental litigation, and “space to be a repeat player” is essential for proper access to environmental justice [§56]
      • The existing caps already represented a doubling of protection due to two claimants being involved under CPR 46.26(4) [§51]
      • Natural England as a public authority with a £350m annual budget and £2.32m legal budget must accept practical implications of legal audits and irrecoverable costs [§54]

A Warning About Financial Scrutiny

Fordham J added pointed observations about the nature of Natural England’s application [§§60-61]. He noted that the claimants’ accounts, reserves policies, and fundraising arrangements had been subjected to “close scrutiny” during a “considerable portion of a 3-hour hearing“. While acknowledging this was permitted by the CPR 46.27 mechanism, the judge expressed concern that “the court room during this hearing would, I think, have been a chilling place for responsible environmental NGOs, contemplating viable environmental protection judicial review claims” [§61]. He concluded: “it was particularly appropriate that the Court should respond as robustly, straightforwardly and clearly as it legitimately could” [§61].

Orders Made

The court ordered [§§62-64]:

      • The variation application was dismissed [§64]
      • Natural England must pay the claimants’ costs of the variation application on the standard basis, to be assessed if not agreed [§64]
      • The costs of the redactions application were ordered to be the Claimants’ costs in the case [§64]
      • Confidential versions of certain decision-making documents were to be filed, with tailored restrictions requiring any press or public application for access to trigger notice to Natural England and a right to be heard [§§12-15]

Key Takeaway

This decision establishes that Aarhus Convention costs cap variations under CPR 46.27 must satisfy a rigorous two-limb test, with objective unreasonableness operating as an independent protection even where claimants can afford increased costs. Courts will scrutinise applications closely in paradigm environmental protection cases, recognising the need for environmental NGOs to function as repeat players and the chilling effect that detailed financial scrutiny can have on access to environmental justice.

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R (BADGER TRUST AND WILD JUSTICE) V NATURAL ENGLAND [2025] EWHC 2761 (ADMIN) | FORDHAM J | CPR 46.26 | CPR 46.27 | AARHUS COSTS CAPS | PROHIBITIVELY EXPENSIVE | RULE 26 CAPS | RULE 27 VARIATIONS | OBJECTIVE UNREASONABLENESS | REAL-WORLD AFFORDABILITY | PUBLIC INTEREST IMPERATIVE | ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE | COSTS LIMITS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW | PARADIGM ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CASE | REPEAT PLAYER DOCTRINE | CPR 46.27(3)(A) | CPR 46.27(3)(B) | CROWDFUNDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL JR | SOFT PRESUMPTION | NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS | CPR 46.26(4) | CPR 5.4C | OPEN JUSTICE PRINCIPLE | REDACTIONS APPLICATION | CONFIDENTIALITY RING | R (EDWARDS) V ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (NO.2) [2013] UKSC 78 | R (IAB) V SSHD [2024] EWCA CIV 66 | R (MTA) V SSHD [2024] EWHC 553 (ADMIN) | R (CPRE SURREY) V WAVERLEY BC [2018] EWHC 2969 (ADMIN) | R (FIGHTING DIRTY LTD) V ENVIRONMENT AGENCY [2024] EWHC 2029 (ADMIN) | R (GREENPEACE LTD) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ENVIRONMENT [2005] EWCA CIV 1656 | R (RSPB) V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE [2017] EWHC 2309 (ADMIN) | RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT FOR ABACO LTD V CHRISTIE [2023] UKPC 2 | R (XY) V SSHD [2024] EWHC 81 (ADMIN) | MANCHESTER CITY FC LTD V FA PREMIER LEAGUE LTD [2021] EWCA CIV 1110 | CPR 39.2(3)(C) | ONUS OF VARIATION | SATELLITE LITIGATION IN COSTS PROCEEDINGS | ENVIRONMENTAL NGO LITIGATION VIABILITY | FACILITATORY COSTS REGIME | CANDOUR OBLIGATIONS IN REDACTIONS | LEGAL STEWARDSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES | BALANCING ACT IN COSTS CAP VARIATIONS | UNDILUTED PUBLIC INTEREST CLAIMS | COSTS DETERRENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL JR | INTERIM RELIEF RISK CONSIDERATIONS | CPR 54.14 | ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT THROUGH JUDICIAL REVIEW