Entries by Toby Moreton

Security for Costs Refused Where Claimant Shows Very High Probability of Success and Defendant’s Estimate Demonstrably Excessive

In Yuen v Li & Ors, Mr Justice Cotter determined a contested application for security for costs brought by the first defendant against a claimant resident in Thailand who alleged misappropriation of Bitcoin worth £160-£180 million. The first defendant invoked CPR 25.27(b)(i), but Cotter J, applying principles from Porzelack v Porzelack [1987] 1 WLR 420, held it was not just to order security. First, the claimant demonstrated a very high probability of success based on compelling evidence, including damning audio recordings and the first defendant’s bare denial. Second, the first defendant’s costs estimate of £678,715.80 was demonstrably excessive and unsustainable, containing unrealistic figures for disclosure and preparation that failed the “eyebrow test”. Third, alternative security existed within the jurisdiction via valuable watches seized by police and claimed by the claimant, with an estimated value exceeding £250,000. The court found no evidence of substantial enforcement obstacles in Thailand or Dubai, where the claimant held assets. Consequently, the application was dismissed in its entirety.

Interpreter Fees Through Related Companies Require No Breakdown Absent Abuse

In Motor Insurers’ Bureau v Santiago [2026] EWHC 513 (KB), the High Court dismissed an appeal concerning the assessment of an interpreter’s fee as a disbursement in fixed costs proceedings. Following the claimant’s £20,000 settlement for injuries caused by an uninsured driver, his solicitors claimed £924 for interpretation services provided by PALS, a related company. After the Court of Appeal determined such fees were recoverable under CPR 45.29I, HHJ Dight assessed the reasonable sum at £794.40 on remission. The MIB argued that a breakdown was required to exclude any agency profit element, that without it the fee should be nil, and that the assessment was excessive. Moody J rejected these contentions, holding that interpretation services constituted classic disbursements under Crane v Cannons Leisure Centre for which solicitors bore no personal responsibility. Providing services through a related company was permissible under the Legal Services Act 2007 and did not mandate a breakdown absent evidence of abuse. The Judge correctly assessed reasonableness and proportionality under CPR 44.3 using a market-based approach endorsed in Callery v Gray, setting the fee at the mean of comparative quotes, an evaluative judgment disclosing no error of law.

Late Acceptance of Part 36 Offer | Fixed Costs Apply at Relevant Period Expiry Despite Later Multi-Track Allocation

In Attersley v UK Insurance Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 217, the Court of Appeal determined the costs consequences of a claimant’s late acceptance of a defendant’s Part 36 offer in a personal injury claim that had started under the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents. The claim had exited the Protocol, was issued under Part 7 CPR, and was later allocated to the multi-track. The defendant’s Part 36 offer was accepted after its 21-day relevant period had expired. The issue was whether the claimant’s costs were governed by the fixed costs regime in CPR 36.20 and Section IIIA of Part 45, or by the standard basis assessment under CPR 36.13. Overturning the High Court, the Court of Appeal held that CPR 36.20 applied. Lord Justice Miles, with whom Lady Justice Falk and Lord Justice Lewison agreed, reasoned that the claim fell within the scope of Section IIIA of Part 45 when the relevant period expired, as allocation to the multi-track occurred later. Following Qader v Esure Services Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1109, the phrase “for so long as the case is not allocated to the multi-track” in rule 45.29B operated prospectively, not retrospectively. The court found the defendant’s construction promoted certainty and the Part 36 objective of encouraging early settlement, preventing a claimant from improving their costs position via a later, uncontrollable event. The appeal was allowed, restoring the first-instance order that the claimant was entitled only to fixed costs under Table 6B of Part 45 for the stage applicable when the relevant period ended.
**HEADNOTE APPROVED — no changes needed.**

Court of Appeal Limits Pre-Transfer Costs To IPEC Scale Where No Good Reason to Depart From Transferring Judge’s Indication

In Salts Healthcare Ltd v Pelican Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 93, the Court of Appeal determined a costs issue arising from the transfer of a patent infringement claim from the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC) to the Patents Court. The claim was dismissed at first instance. The appeal concerned whether costs incurred during the IPEC phase, prior to transfer, were subject to IPEC’s scale costs caps under Section VII of Part 46 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. The Court held that paragraph 9.2(1) of Practice Direction 30 provided the transferring court with a discretion to set terms, including that pre-transfer costs be assessed on the IPEC scale, approving Comic Enterprises Ltd v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp [2012] EWPCC 13. As HHJ Hacon’s transfer order had indicated that such costs “should” be assessed under the IPEC caps, the trial judge erred by not treating this as the starting point and by offering no good reason to depart from it. Re-exercising the discretion, the Court of Appeal varied the costs order to limit Pelican’s recoverable pre-transfer costs to the IPEC scale.

Promptness Matters | The Peril Of Delay | Three-Year Wait To Revise Costs Budget Proves Fatal Under CPR 3.15A

In Rudan Business Holding SA v Tridan Trusted Advisors AG & Ors (Re Leo Services Holding Ltd) [2025] EWHC 3565 (Ch), Deputy ICC Judge Kyriakides determined applications by both parties to revise their costs budgets under CPR 3.15A. The underlying unfair prejudice petition had been substantially expanded by the Respondents’ Amended Defence in May 2022, introducing new issues which increased the trial estimate from 8 to 16 days. Applying Persimmon Homes Ltd v Osbourne Clark LLP and Sharp v Blanks, the court held that while several events constituted significant developments — including the amended pleadings, the expanded disclosure exercise, and the extended trial — most proposed variations failed the mandatory requirement of promptness. The parties had delayed submitting revised budgets until April 2025, long after the relevant costs for statements of case, disclosure, and witness evidence had been incurred, undermining the prospective purpose of costs management. Promptness was satisfied only for the Further CCMC, trial preparation, and trial phases. Variations were allowed in principle for those three phases alone, with quantum to be agreed or assessed later.

High Hourly Rates Do Not Of Themselves Render Budgeted Costs Disproportionate | Costs Budgeting In Parsons v Convatec

In Parsons v Convatec Limited [2026] EWHC 300 (Pat), Mr Justice Richards conducted a costs budgeting exercise in a claim under section 40 of the Patents Act 1977 valued at up to £366 million. Applying the principles from Various Shared Appreciation Mortgage Borrowers v BOS [2022] EWHC 254 (Ch), the court assessed budgets on an inter partes basis, seeking figures within a reasonable and proportionate range rather than the lowest possible. The court held that high hourly rates do not of themselves render budgeted costs disproportionate, but made reductions across multiple phases of the defendant’s budget to reflect top-heavy solicitor teams, excessive senior fee-earner time, and an element of luxury in the deployment of an expensive firm. The court rejected a general assertion that AI should reduce disclosure costs, holding that the party seeking a reduction must identify specific steps not being taken. The claimant’s disclosure budget was also reduced to reflect the lesser scale of its exercise. Expert report budgets were approved on an agreed single-expert assumption.

s71(3) | Beneficiaries Who Pursued Unreasonable Solicitors Act Assessments Bear the Costs Personally

In Tucker v Howe, Costs Judge Leonard determined two consequential issues following a nine-day detailed assessment under section 71(3) of the Solicitors Act 1974 of costs billed by an estate administrator. The first was whether the claimant beneficiaries or the insolvent estate should bear the costs of the assessment, ordered on an indemnity basis and summarily assessed at £132,400 exclusive of VAT. The second was whether VAT was recoverable on those costs. On the burden of costs, the judge held the claimants were personally liable as beneficiaries who had applied for and pursued the assessment, not as executrices. The jurisdiction under section 71(3) is invoked by persons interested in the property, not by executors. He confirmed the exercise of discretion under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, noting the claimants’ unreasonable conduct and rejection of three settlement offers. On VAT, the court declined under CPR 47.14(6) to permit a new challenge to the main bill, but held substantively that VAT was recoverable on the assessment costs, rejecting the self-supply argument on the basis that the solicitor and his firm were separate legal entities.

Summary Assessment Without Opposition | Court Applies Independent Scrutiny to Unopposed Costs Claims

In United Kingdom Hydrographic Office v Samyung ENC Co Limited the court determined costs following an unless order application against a defendant that had persistently failed to comply with disclosure obligations and did not attend the hearing or file submissions. On the unless order application, the court awarded indemnity costs but declined to accept the claimant’s proposed summary assessment figures. It applied a 20% reduction to the Statement of Costs to reflect the adjourned summary judgment element, then assessed the balance at 80% rather than the 90% proposed, producing a summarily assessed figure of £73,000. The court awarded standard basis costs for the alternative service application, summarily assessed at £11,000 rather than the full £13,248.09 claimed. On the inquiry costs, the court ordered a payment on account of £235,000 conditional on the unless order being triggered, observing that a detailed assessment was unlikely ever to occur and that this reinforced the importance of a realistic payment on account figure.

Provisional Assessment Set Aside Under CPR 3.1(7) For Material Breach Of Filing Duty

In MH v CH (By Her Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor), Deputy Costs Judge Bedford determined an application to set aside a Provisional Assessment Order (PA Order) under CPR 3.1(7). The underlying costs order, made by HHJ Hilder in the Court of Protection on 15 December 2023, required MH to pay 50% of CH’s costs. During provisional assessment proceedings, CH’s solicitors failed to file MH’s complete Points of Dispute and an open offer with the N258 bundle as mandated by PD 47 para 14.3. The judge, unaware of the omission, conducted a provisional assessment on 29 April 2025. MH applied to set the order aside within seven days rather than seek an oral hearing under CPR 47.15(7). The judge held CPR 3.1(7) remained available for jurisdictional challenges, distinct from reviewing assessment items under CPR 47.15(7). The failure to file core documents meant the decision was not a provisional assessment in the sense contemplated by CPR 47.15(7) and the 21-day period never commenced. Applying Tibbles v SIG plc [2012] EWCA Civ 518, the facts were misstated and circumstances exceptional. The PA Order was set aside and the matter directed to detailed assessment under CPR 47.15(6).

When A Judicial Review Claim Is Discontinued | Can The Defendant Recover Costs Beyond The Acknowledgment Of Service Stage?

In KXO and OYW v Devon County Council, two children challenged by judicial review the Council’s decisions to amend their Education, Health and Care Plans under regulation 28 of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Regulations 2014. Their mother acted as litigation friend. Following a protracted procedural history involving applications certified as totally without merit and repeated complaints about reasonable adjustments despite court-ordered special measures, the litigation friend filed a Notice of Discontinuance on 5 January 2026. At the hearing before Paul Bowen KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, the court held that no permission was required under CPR 38.2 or CPR 21.10, as the discontinuance was unilateral. Applying CPR 38.6(1), the court ordered the litigation friend to pay all the Defendant’s costs — expressly declining to limit recovery to the acknowledgment of service stage on a Mount Cook basis. The litigation friend was held personally liable under CPR 21.12 pursuant to her signed certificate of suitability. Enforcement required the court’s permission.