A “statement of resources” should set out the details of the financial resources and expectations of the maker of the statement and of his “partner” (the person with whom he or she lives as a couple). The resources of a partner are not treated as the legally aided party’s resources if the partner has a contrary interest in the proceedings.
When dealing with the request, the court has a discretion as to whether the costs of the request or application are payable by one party to another, the amount of those costs and (if relevant) when they are to be paid.
Following the decision of Birss J in J P Finnegan v Spiers (t/a Frank Spiers Licensed Conveyancers) [2018] EWHC 3064 (Ch) which we reported on last year, HHJ Rawlings has found that the court has no power to award a payment on account of costs in circumstances where the substantive action has settled by way of acceptance of a Part 36 Offer.
Following our recent report on the case of Hossaini v EDS Recruitment Ltd in which the Employment Tribunal had wrongly considered and taken into a “Without Prejudice” (as opposed to a “Without Prejudice Save As To Costs” offer) when determining costs, the First Tier Tribunal has fallen into the same error. Upholding the appeal, Judge Elizabeth Cooke found that the offer should not have been disclosed and the decision on costs insofar as it turned on the fact of this offer could not stand.
The appellants in this case are former clients of the respondent firm of solicitors. They alleged that in the course of a contentious probate dispute concerning the will and estate of their late father, an oral agreement had been reached to cap their legal costs to those set out in their Precedent H costs budget. At first instance Master Whalan found that there had been no such agreement. This was upheld on appeal by Mr Justice Stewart. The decision provides a useful round up and examination of the law and principles related to both an appellate court’s approach to findings of fact and contractual interpretation.
This was the first appeal in which the recoverability of inquest costs in civil claims has fallen to be considered since introduction of the Jackson reforms. It followed an assessment of costs by Deputy Master Keens in the SCCO when he allowed the sum of £88,356.22 as a against an original claim of £122,000 excl VAT. The claim was for damages for breach of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, negligence and misfeasance in public office following the death of Ms Jones who became ill at a police station.
In Fullick & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2019] EWHC 1941 (QB), the High Court (Slade J) partially allowed an appeal from Deputy Master Keens’ costs order awarding £88,356.22 after settlement of a claim for £18,798 arising from the death of Susan Sian Jones, who became ill while voluntarily attending a police station and died days later in hospital. Protective proceedings were stayed pending a seven-day inquest, which returned a narrative verdict of methadone and alcohol intoxication coupled with inadequate police policies, procedures and training. The Defendant accepted that some inquest participation costs could be recoverable but challenged proportionality and argued the Deputy Master treated the inquest as the civil trial. Mrs Justice Slade reaffirmed the Gibson and Roach principles within the CPR 44 proportionality regime, holding that inquest costs are recoverable where relevant to civil claim issues and proportionate to their utility. The appeal succeeded only on items 68–69 (civil claim documents work), where the Deputy Master failed to identify which parts advanced the civil claim; those items and the overall award were remitted for reassessment applying granular relevance and proportionality analysis. The court confirmed that proportionality under CPR 44.4(3)(c) must reflect the importance of institutional accountability and public interest beyond financial value.
We reported recently on HHJ Klein’s dismissal of the appeal in this Solicitors Act dispute between Stewarts Law (“the Respondent”) and their former client, Mr Ainsworth (“the Appellant”). Two weeks prior to that decision Mr Justice Roth determined applications by the Respondent: to set aside the order granting the Appellant permission to appeal on grounds that it was out of time pursuant to CPR 52.18(1)(b); and if the appeal was allowed to proceed, an order under CPR r.52.18(1)(c) that it be conditional on payment of the full amount ordered by the costs judge.
The Lord Chancellor or his representative may appear at any hearing at which a costs order may be made against him.
When the legally aided party files a statement of resources the court will fix a hearing date and give the relevant parties at least 14 days’ notice. If the application is made only against the Lord Chancellor, the court may fix a hearing date at the time of issue of the request.