The Costs Of Forcing Amendments | Strike-Out Applications And The Bellhouse Principle

Fundamentally deficient pleadings that survived strike-out only through comprehensive amendments led to costs against the respondent for the initial application. The court then reversed costs liability for a subsequent hearing where the applicant unreasonably opposed amendments.

NIPROSE INVESTMENTS LIMITED & ORS V VINCENTS SOLICITORS LIMITED [2025] EWHC 2084 (Ch)

In Niprose Investments Limited v Vincents Solicitors Limited [2025] EWHC 2084 (Ch), HHJ Hodge KC determined costs following interim applications in a professional negligence claim by purchasers against their conveyancing solicitors over a failed development. Vincents’ strike-out application failed only because the court permitted wholesale amendments to cure fundamental pleading defects. The court split costs: pre-22 July 2024, Vincents succeeded as the claim would have failed without amendments (Bellhouse v Zurich Insurance [2025] EWHC 1551 (Comm)), recovering 71% of costs (adjusted for settlements). Post-22 July, claimants substantially succeeded (90% of costs) given Vincents’ unreasonable opposition to amendments and failure to engage despite a court order to indicate which amendments were agreed. Summary assessment produced a net payment of £2,064.73 to claimants. The court rejected deferring costs until trial, reinforcing the “pay-as-you-go” philosophy, and separately ordered claimants to pay costs occasioned by amendments.

I agree with Mr Wilton that Vincents’ application to strike out, or summarily determine, the claim would have succeeded had the remaining claimants not produced wholesale amendments to their claim. Where, as here, it is clear that such an application would have succeeded, absent such amendments, the starting point should be that costs are to be paid by the respondent, since it follows that the case was fundamentally defective, and would have been dismissed but for the amendments. If the claim was to survive, then it required comprehensive amendment.

Citations

Bellhouse v Zurich Insurance Plc [2025] EWHC 1551 (Comm) Where a strike-out or summary judgment application fails solely because the respondent is permitted to amend its pleadings, the applicant may still be considered the successful party for costs purposes if the original case was fundamentally defective. Beoco Ltd v Alfa Laval Co Ltd [1995] QB 137 Where a claimant makes late amendments that substantially alter its case and without which the claim would fail, the defendant is entitled to the costs of the action down to the date of the amendment.

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Security for costs refused CPR 25.27 very high probability success excessive estimate King's Bench

IPEC scale costs transfer Patents Court PD 30 para 9.2 costs caps Court of Appeal

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Provisional assessment set aside CPR 3.1(7) points of dispute filing duty PD 47 para 14.3 SCCO

Fixed recoverable costs police claims CPR 26.9(10)(e) intentional tort exemption

Key Points

Where an application to strike out or summarily dismiss a claim would have succeeded on the pleadings as they stood, the applicant may be considered the successful party for the purposes of costs, even if the claim ultimately proceeds only due to amendments permitted by the court. [32]
In determining liability for costs following amendments to a claim, the court may distinguish between costs incurred before and after service of the amended pleadings and can apportion costs accordingly, reflecting both success and failures on each side. [34–35]
An unsuccessful party opposing proposed amendments may be ordered to pay a proportion of the applicant’s costs where the opposition was unreasonable or where the amendments were substantially successful and opposition prolonged proceedings unnecessarily. [35]
The general rule that an amending party should pay the costs of and occasioned by the amendments may be displaced where the opposing party’s conduct is found to have contributed to the need for a contested amendment hearing. [35, 39]
Where appropriate, the court may summarily assess the parties’ costs of interim applications and net off costs awards to reflect the overall outcome, promoting the principle of ‘pay-as-you-go’ in interlocutory litigation. [36–38]

"I do not agree with Mr Wilton that it was reasonable for Vincents to contest the amendment application in its entirety after 22 July 2024. In my judgment, Vincents should, in furtherance of the overriding objective, have engaged with the remaining claimants over the amendments once they had had the opportunity to consider them. Had they done so, I consider that the second hearing might well have proved unnecessary."

Key Findings In The Case

Vincents’ strike out and summary judgment application would have succeeded as the Claimants’ original pleadings were fundamentally defective; the only reason the claim survived was due to substantial amendments permitted by the court after the first hearing, making Vincents the successful party with respect to the first hearing on costs. [32]
The Claimants were ordered to pay 71% of Vincents’ costs incurred up to 22 July 2024, to reflect the settlement of several claims and because Vincents was successful in demonstrating that the unamended claim was unsustainable. [34]
The court found that Vincents unreasonably failed to engage constructively with the process of amending the pleadings after receiving the draft amendments on 8 July 2024, thereby contributing to the necessity of a second contested hearing; as a result, the Claimants were deemed substantially successful from 22 July 2024 onwards. [35]
The court summarily assessed the Claimants’ costs after 22 July 2024, applying a 10% reduction to reflect both their partial failure on two aspects of the amendments and Vincents’ unreasonable conduct, resulting in a net award in the Claimants’ favour after set-off. [36–38]
Notwithstanding success on certain discrete issues, the Claimants were ordered to pay Vincents’ costs of and occasioned by the amendments themselves, consistent with general practice unless displaced by exceptional circumstances, which were not made out in this regard. [39]

“The summary assessment, and the award, of the costs of interim applications has had the welcome effect (and intended) effect of acting as a restraint upon the initiation, and the pursuit, of unnecessary, and inappropriate, interlocutory applications by introducing the salutary concept into civil litigation of ‘pay-as-you-go’. Mr Scher’s suggestion would run counter to that beneficial philosophy.”

The High Court’s decision in Niprose Investments Limited & Ors v Vincents Solicitors Limited [2025] EWHC 2084 (Ch) establishes that parties with fundamentally deficient pleadings must pay their opponent’s costs of strike-out applications, even where amendments ultimately save the claim from dismissal — but unreasonable opposition to amendments may reverse costs liability for subsequent hearings.

The Bellhouse Principle

In Bellhouse v Zurich Insurance Plc [2025] EWHC 1551 (Comm), the High Court established that where a party’s pleaded case contains serious deficiencies that would lead to strike-out or summary judgment, but the court instead permits that party to amend their pleadings to remedy those defects, the party with the deficient pleading should ordinarily pay the costs of the strike-out application. This applies even though the application did not formally succeed.

The principle recognises that the application was only resisted because the court granted an indulgence—the opportunity to cure fundamental flaws that should never have been present. The respondent is therefore treated as the unsuccessful party because their case, as originally pleaded, could not withstand the challenge. The fact that they subsequently cured the defects through amendment does not alter the reality that the application was meritorious and necessary.

In Bellhouse, the court described the applicant’s conduct as “extraordinary” and awarded indemnity costs. However, the core principle—that deficient pleadings which survive only through remedial amendments should bear the costs of the application that exposed those deficiencies—applies on the standard basis in the absence of unreasonable conduct. The principle reflects the courts’ expectation that parties will plead their cases properly from the outset, and imposes a costs sanction where they fail to do so.

Background

The costs determination in Niprose Investments Limited v Vincents Solicitors Limited [2025] EWHC 2084 (Ch) arose from a professional negligence claim brought by 31 property purchasers against their former conveyancing solicitors. The case provides important guidance on applying the Bellhouse principle where defective pleadings are salvaged by amendments..

The claim arose from a professional negligence claim brought by 31 property purchasers against their former conveyancing solicitors. The purchasers had each lost substantial upfront payments when a buyer-funded, off-plan residential development scheme in Liverpool failed.

On 21 February 2024, Vincents applied to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment, arguing that the purchasers’ case was fundamentally flawed. The application was heard on 20 March 2024 before His Honour Judge Hodge KC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court. Rather than striking out the claim entirely, the judge afforded the claimants an opportunity to amend their particulars of claim, expressly reserving costs to be determined when the matter was finally disposed of.

What followed illustrates the perils of taking an uncompromising stance on amendments. Despite the court ordering Vincents to indicate which amendments they agreed to, they failed to engage substantively. The matter returned for a second hearing on 5 December 2024, by which time more than six years had elapsed since the purchasers had exchanged contracts, raising potential limitation issues.

Four claimants (the 79th, 91st, 93rd and 94th) had by this stage settled their claims against Vincents, reducing the claimant group from 35 to 31.

Three Costs Issues Before the Court

The court was required to determine three principal costs issues:

First, who should bear the costs of Vincents’ strike-out and summary judgment application, including both hearings. This raised the fundamental question of identifying which party had been “successful” within the meaning of CPR 44.2(2)(a).
Second, who should bear the costs of the claimants’ informal application to amend their particulars of claim. This required the court to consider whether Vincents’ opposition to the amendments was reasonable.
Third, the court needed to determine the appropriate apportionment of costs to reflect both the settlement of claims by four claimants after the first judgment and the claimants’ partial failure on certain amendments.

The Bellhouse Principle Applied

The court applied the Bellhouse principle from Bellhouse v Zurich Insurance Plc [2025] EWHC 1551 (Comm). Where a party’s case is fundamentally deficient, they should expect to pay the costs of a strike-out or summary judgment application where the claim only proceeds due to comprehensive amendments necessary to advance a viable claim.

HHJ Hodge KC found this principle directly applicable. The claimants had not accepted their case was defective at the first hearing, had filed evidence seeking dismissal with indemnity costs, and had not prepared draft amendments in advance. Crucially, the judge expressly found that “Vincents’ application to strike out, or summarily determine, the claim would have succeeded had the remaining claimants not produced wholesale amendments”. The judge concluded that Vincents were the successful party for the period up to 22 July 2024.

However, for the period after 22 July 2024, the court preferred the claimants’ submissions. The court found that Vincents should have engaged constructively with the proposed amendments in furtherance of the overriding objective. Had they done so, the second hearing might have been unnecessary.

Vincents’ Failure to Engage

The judgment reveals a catalogue of missed opportunities by Vincents to resolve the amendment issue without a second hearing. On 16 July 2024, Vincents requested information to assess the amendments. They received a detailed response on 30 July 2024 but then failed to engage substantively. Instead, they opposed all amendments in witness evidence served shortly before the second hearing.

The judge found considerable force in the claimants’ criticisms of Vincents’ approach. Whilst not accepting the characterisation of Vincents’ conduct as “heavy-handed”, the court concluded that the claimants were substantially the successful party after 22 July 2024, applying a 10% discount to reflect both the claimants’ failure on certain amendments and Vincents’ conduct in refusing to engage.

The “Pay-As-You-Go” Philosophy Reinforced

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the judgment for costs practitioners is the court’s emphatic rejection of the claimants’ submission that any costs award against them should be deferred until after trial. HHJ Hodge KC stated that this would run counter to the beneficial “pay-as-you-go” philosophy of summary assessment of interim application costs, which acts as a restraint on unnecessary interlocutory applications.

This sends a clear message that parties cannot escape the immediate costs consequences of interim applications by pleading impecuniosity or tactical disadvantage. The discipline of immediate payment remains a cornerstone of costs management in modern litigation.

Summary Assessment in Practice

The court’s approach to summary assessment provides useful guidance. Vincents’ recoverable costs up to 22 July 2024 were assessed at £29,713.73 (71% of £41,850.32, with no VAT), with the work found reasonable and proportionate and hourly rates within guidelines.

For the claimants’ costs from 15 July 2024, the court made two significant adjustments. Attendance rates at the second hearing were reduced from £570 to £400 per hour, reflecting that the upgrade from Grade C/D to Grade A/B attendance was both unreasonable and disproportionate. Counsel’s fee was reduced from £24,000 to £18,000, particularly when compared with opposing leading counsel’s fee of £12,500.

The court took a pragmatic approach to procedural compliance, accepting that the claimants’ costs statement, whilst not using the prescribed Precedent U form, substantially complied with CPR 45.63(2) and caused the appellants no disadvantage.

After setting off the respective awards, the court ordered Vincents to pay a net sum of £2,064.73 to the claimants’ solicitors. The court also confirmed that the claimants must pay Vincents’ costs of and occasioned by the amendments.

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