No Presumption Against Summary Assessment Exists for Multi-Day Hearings | Court Retains Full Discretion In Every Case Under PD 44.9.1

, , ,

The King’s Bench Division’s decision in Mew v General Dental Council [2026] EWHC 1116 (Admin) concerned an appeal against erasure from the Dentists’ Register following a Professional Conduct Committee determination that the appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired by reason of misconduct.

Background

Dr Michael Mew, a registered Specialist Orthodontist and the owner and principal practitioner at a private clinic offering treatment under the umbrella term “Orthotropics,” appealed to the Administrative Court against a determination of the Professional Conduct Committee (“PCC”) of the General Dental Council (“GDC”) dated 6 November 2024. By that determination, the PCC found Dr Mew’s fitness to practise impaired by reason of misconduct and ordered the erasure of his name from the Dentists’ Register. The appeal was brought under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984.

The charges before the PCC related to advice and treatment provided to two young patients, referred to as Patient A and Patient B, between September 2013 and May 2019, as well as claims made in a YouTube video posted in September 2017. In broad terms, the GDC alleged that the Orthotropic treatment provided to both patients was not clinically indicated, that misleading claims had been made to the patients’ parents about the aims and benefits of the treatment, and that certain statements made publicly on YouTube were inappropriate and without adequate objective evidential foundation. Thirty charges were brought in total, with admissions made to seventeen of them either in advance or at the hearing.

Orthotropics is not recognised by the GDC as a speciality, nor is it available within the NHS. Its central premise, as advanced by Dr Mew, was that environmental factors rather than genetics were the predominant cause of malocclusion, and that early environmental intervention could prevent or improve malocclusion in growing children. Dr Mew described himself as “probably the world’s expert” in Orthotropics and acknowledged that it remained a controversial approach with a limited evidence base.

The PCC proceedings were substantial. There were no fewer than 46 hearing days spread across a two-year period from November 2022 to November 2024, with the matter having originally been listed in December 2021 but removed at Dr Mew’s request. The determination itself ran to 197 paragraphs across 75 pages. Expert evidence was heard from four experts: Mr Stephen Powell and Mr Keith Smith for the GDC, and Professor Daniele Garcovich and Professor Stephen Sheldon for Dr Mew. Joint expert reports were also prepared. The PCC preferred the evidence of the GDC’s experts, found the charges proved, and concluded that misconduct and impairment were established. Erasure was imposed as the appropriate sanction, together with an immediate order for suspension.

The appeal was heard over three days on 20, 21 and 22 January 2026 before Charles Bagot KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. Further written submissions were received through to 26 February 2026, with email communications continuing to 30 April 2026. A draft judgment was circulated on 8 May 2026, with the parties’ corrections and submissions on costs received on 13, 14 and 15 May 2026. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety. The documents before the court ran to over 8,500 pages, with an authorities bundle of 925 pages.

On the substantive grounds, the Deputy Judge found that the PCC’s determination was correct in all material respects and unassailable. The primary challenge, directed at the PCC’s approach to the competing expert evidence, was rejected. The remaining grounds, including challenges to specific charge findings, the approach to “The Jaw Epidemic” paper, the alleged failure to define “adequate objective evidence,” and the exclusion of open-source internet material from cross-examination, were each dismissed. The fresh evidence application, which sought to adduce the full Harvey Thesis and a cephalometric interpretation guide, was also refused on a notional basis, having been considered at the parties’ joint request to assist with the resolution of costs.

The Legal Framework

CPR 44.2 deals with the court’s discretion about whether to make a costs order and the factors it will take into account. CPR 44.3 guides the court as to the basis of assessment. Where standard basis costs are concerned, the court is to determine any doubt about whether costs were reasonably and proportionately incurred, or were reasonable and proportionate in amount, in favour of the paying party. The considerations which point towards costs being proportionate include whether they bear a reasonable relationship to the factors in CPR 44.3(5), including the value of the non-monetary relief in issue, the complexity, additional work generated by conduct, and wider factors such as reputational issues or public importance.

As for the procedure to adopt for the assessment, CPR 44.6(1) and PD 44.9.1 provide the court’s jurisdiction to conduct either a summary assessment or refer costs for a detailed assessment by a costs officer or judge. PD 44.9.1 provides that the general rule is that the court should make a summary assessment of costs at the conclusion of any hearing which has lasted not more than one day.

The Deputy Judge rejected the Appellant’s submission that it should be implied from that passage that summary assessments should not be made in cases where the hearing has lasted more than one day. The court retains a discretion summarily to assess costs following hearings lasting longer than one day and there is no presumption, let alone rule, against doing so. The Deputy Judge was fortified in that view by the White Book Editors’ guidance at paragraph 44.6.3, which states: “There is no rebuttable presumption against summary assessment in relation to costs where hearings last longer than one day. The exercise of the power to make a summary assessment should be considered in every case.”

The Deputy Judge also noted the guidance at PD 44.9.2 that there may be good reason not to conduct a summary assessment where, for example, the paying party shows substantial grounds for disputing the sum claimed for costs that cannot be dealt with summarily.

Costs Issues Before the Court

Following circulation of the draft judgment, the parties agreed that costs should follow the event in accordance with CPR 44.2(2)(a), with the Appellant to pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal. That much was not in dispute. The costs issues requiring determination by the court were twofold: first, whether the quantum of the Respondent’s appeal costs should be resolved by way of summary assessment or referred to detailed assessment in default of agreement; and second, if summary assessment was the appropriate course, what the correct quantum of those costs should be.

The Respondent’s costs schedule had originally been served in October 2025, when the appeal was first listed but subsequently adjourned. That schedule claimed costs totalling £85,853.20. An updated schedule dated 12 May 2026 increased the sum claimed to £96,248.48. Prior to the costs determination, the Respondent made an open concession of £10,000 against the experts’ fees element of the claim, reducing the sum in issue to £86,248.48. The Appellant raised objections across a range of items within the schedule and opposed the court proceeding to a summary assessment at all.

A procedural issue arose on the morning of handing down, when a dispute emerged between the parties as to whether there had been agreement for the court to be shown recent correspondence containing offers on costs. The Appellant contended that no such agreement had been reached and submitted that the court could not fairly conduct a summary assessment having been exposed to the parties’ respective offers. The Respondent maintained that agreement had been given. The Deputy Judge found it unnecessary to resolve that factual dispute in order to determine the costs issues, holding that judges are routinely required to put matters out of mind (such as documents seen de bene esse or offers disclosed in costs management hearings) and that he was able fairly to conduct a summary assessment notwithstanding his awareness of the offers.

An additional procedural point arose from the Appellant’s submission that, because the draft judgment had been embargoed, its content had not been communicated to Dr Mew by his legal representatives, and it had therefore not been possible to take instructions from him on costs. The Deputy Judge rejected the premise of that submission, noting that the embargo expressly permitted disclosure of the draft and its substance to the parties themselves and their legal representatives, and that there was accordingly no bar on sharing the draft with Dr Mew or taking his instructions.

The Parties’ Positions

Summary assessment versus detailed assessment

The Appellant opposed summary assessment on a number of grounds. It was submitted that, as the appeal hearing had lasted more than one day, the general rule in PD 44.9.1 pointed away from summary assessment. The Appellant also contended that there were multiple areas of the costs schedule requiring further interrogation and the provision of additional detail, and that the objections raised could not fairly be dealt with summarily. A further submission was advanced to the effect that, because the draft judgment had been embargoed and instructions had not been taken from Dr Mew, a summary assessment was procedurally inappropriate. Finally, the Appellant argued that the court’s exposure to the parties’ offers on costs meant that a fair summary assessment could not be conducted.

The Respondent’s position was that the court retained a discretion to conduct a summary assessment regardless of the duration of the hearing, and that the overriding objective supported resolving the costs of the appeal within the judgment rather than deferring them to detailed assessment. The Respondent pointed to the fact that the updated schedule of 12 May 2026 represented only a modest increase on the October 2025 schedule, of which the Appellant had had considerable notice, and that the schedule itself provided the expected level of detail and breakdown. The Respondent had also made an open concession of £10,000 on the experts’ fees, which was characterised as a realistic and sensible approach rather than an acknowledgement that the remaining costs were disproportionate.

Quantum

The Appellant challenged a range of items within the Respondent’s schedule, including the level of experts’ fees, the time costs associated with the experts and their reports, the time spent on producing the costs schedule, and the overall number of items detailed in the schedule of work done on documents (95 separate items being said to be indicative of excess). The Appellant declined to file or serve a schedule of his own costs and declined an invitation from the Respondent to do so for the purpose of contextualising the objections raised.

The Respondent maintained that the costs claimed were reasonable and proportionate having regard to the relevant factors under CPR 44.3(5), including the value of the non-monetary relief in issue, the complexity of the underlying proceedings, the additional work generated by the conduct of the litigation, and the wider reputational and public interest considerations. Particular emphasis was placed on the reasonableness of Counsel’s fees, given the nature and duration of the underlying PCC proceedings, the complexity of the appeal, and the need for complete mastery of 46 days of hearings and over 8,500 pages of documents.

The Decision

The Deputy Judge determined that the appropriate exercise of his discretion was to proceed summarily to assess the costs of the appeal, rather than deferring them to detailed assessment in default of agreement. Whilst he recognised that a referral to detailed assessment would be the normal order following a hearing of more than one day, it was not an invariable rule or presumption. Applying the rules and the overriding objective, several factors pointed in favour of summary assessment.

First, the Deputy Judge was well placed, having heard and determined the appeal via a detailed judgment, to conduct a summary assessment. He had considerable experience of costs and summary assessment, both as a Deputy High Court Judge and when sitting as a Deputy King’s Bench Master. The scale of the costs pointed towards summary assessment, given the amount claimed by the Respondent for the appeal was in five figures, not a substantial six-figure sum or more.

Second, whilst the Appellant complained that he had only about one day to review the Respondent’s updated costs schedule dated 12 May 2026, this had to be seen in the context that this was an update to a schedule served in October 2025, when the appeal was previously listed but adjourned. That earlier schedule already particularised almost 90 per cent of the costs claimed. The October 2025 schedule claimed costs totalling £85,853.20 whereas the May 2026 schedule increased that sum to £96,248.48 (before the £10,000 concession). The Appellant had therefore had an appropriate time period to consider the costs and could reasonably have anticipated that the adjourned hearing would produce a modest increase to the sum claimed.

Third, the Deputy Judge did not accept the Appellant’s assertion that there were multiple areas of the Respondent’s costs schedule which required interrogation and the provision of additional detail. The whole ethos of summary assessment is to avoid that sort of process and the attendant costs and delay, when this can fairly be done. Having scrutinised the Respondent’s schedule, it provided the expected detail and breakdown and, subject to certain adjustments, there was nothing in it which the Deputy Judge considered on the face of it to be disproportionate or unreasonable.

Fourth, and most fundamentally, the Deputy Judge bore in mind that these proceedings related to conduct between 2013 and 2019, now between 7 and 13 years ago. It was in accordance with the overriding objective to resolve all consequential matters within the judgment, rather than deferring the resolution of the appeal costs to further negotiation or, more likely, detailed assessment. The parties’ positions on costs were far apart. The Deputy Judge was pessimistic that simply allowing further time would result in an agreement on the amount of costs. It was probable that further costs would be incurred in proceeding at least part way towards a detailed assessment, which would swiftly become disproportionate to the sums involved, generate additional costs, and entrench the parties’ polarised positions further.

The Deputy Judge also noted that, notwithstanding the importance of the matter to the parties and the public interest in professional regulation, the underlying disciplinary proceedings had already taken up more than their fair share of the tribunal and court system’s limited resources. The PCC proceedings had occupied 46 hearing days spread across a two-year period. The Deputy Judge observed that this duration was manifestly disproportionate and that, with hindsight, the PCC should have exercised considerably more active case management, evidential control, and trial timetabling. Whilst the Appellant opposed the court proceeding to a summary assessment, it was in the Appellant’s interests, as much as the Respondent’s, to draw this protracted matter to a close. It would be doing the Appellant no kindness to permit him to spend further time, energy and money in disputing the appeal costs which he was to pay.

Quantum

As for the quantum of costs, with the Respondent’s open concession against the experts’ fees claimed of £10,000, the sum claimed totalled £86,248.48. The Deputy Judge bore in mind the Appellant’s various objections across a range of the amounts claimed. The Appellant had chosen not to file or serve a schedule of his costs and had declined an invitation by the Respondent to do so in order to contextualise the objections made. The Deputy Judge inferred that the Appellant’s costs of the appeal were greater than those claimed by the Respondent (the Appellant’s experts having, as the Deputy Judge understood it, worked pro bono), which would not be surprising assuming he was privately paying and as he was advancing the appeal, rather than responding to it.

The Deputy Judge noted that the Respondent’s solicitors’ blended hourly rate claimed of £138 for all fee earners involved was below the guideline rate, even for a Grade D fee earner of £146 (London Band 3), let alone that for Grade A of £319. This no doubt reflected negotiations around lower agreed panel rates in return for a regular flow of GDC work. This relatively modest hourly rate mitigated areas where, had the rates been significantly higher, the numbers of hours claimed would have pushed the overall costs claimed in differing categories up to amounts which would potentially have been disproportionate and unreasonable.

After making what he considered to be an appropriate further overall adjustment downwards for experts’ fees consequential on the Appellant’s application to admit fresh evidence, as well as reducing somewhat the solicitors’ time costs relating to the experts and producing the costs schedule, the Deputy Judge reached an overall figure of £75,000 (inclusive of VAT), before examining the other categories of costs further.

Nearly half of that amount related to Counsel’s fees for the appeal inclusive of VAT. The Deputy Judge disagreed with the Appellant’s contention that Counsel’s fees of £30,450 before VAT for appearing at this three-day appeal as well as preparing for it and drafting the written documents, even before factoring in the adjournment of the original listing in October 2025, were disproportionate and unreasonable. Those fees consisted of a brief fee of £28,000, plus two refreshers at £1,000 each, with a modest uplift of £450 which, whilst not explicitly broken down, may have reflected the adjournment of the original listing and a modest amount of time reading back in.

The Deputy Judge considered that no realistic objection could be taken to such fees in the circumstances. Counsel for the Respondent was a leading junior of considerable experience specialising in regulatory work. The underlying proceedings were complex, very lengthy, hard fought and document heavy. All of those factors applied to the appeal, save that at three days, it was not particularly lengthy. That said, the parties had suggested that four days of pre-reading time for the court were necessary (although in the event the necessities of listing meant that it only had one day). Extensive and diligent preparation had plainly been carried out by both parties’ Counsel. That had to be seen in the context that it was necessary for Counsel to have a complete mastery of all the issues, the extensive documents and of 46 days of hearings before the PCC. It was also necessary to distil those lengthy proceedings, the wide-ranging grounds of appeal and the Appellant’s painstakingly detailed submissions into a detailed and convincing written and oral response on behalf of the Respondent. Much was at stake for both parties and there were the wider interests of reputation and the public importance in the proper pursuit of regulatory proceedings. Counsel’s fees claimed were eminently reasonable and proportionate.

As for the Respondent’s solicitors’ time costs, a number of the same considerations also applied in justifying detailed and time-intensive preparation. Other than in relation to expert evidence and time on producing the costs schedule, the Deputy Judge did not consider that the sums incurred were disproportionate or unreasonable, whether standing back and looking at the global amount or considering the breakdown.

The Appellant had complained about the 95 separate items detailed in the schedule of work done on documents, as indicative of excess. In the Deputy Judge’s view, one needed to delve beyond the mere number of items to see that this reflected an admirable attempt at transparency in breaking down tasks into individual components, many of which were less than an hour in duration and reflecting appropriate delegation most (but not all) of the time. The overall total number of hours spent on documents by all fee earners combined was 179.5. Given the relevant factors in relation to the appeal, subject to the points around time on expert evidence being somewhat too high, there was nothing notable or objectionable about the time spent. This reflected work over a period of more than a year from the Appellant’s Notice being served to the substantive hearing, with additional work on consequential matters when the draft judgment was received.

The Deputy Judge made a further downward adjustment, beyond the concession of £10,000 made by the Respondent, to the experts’ fees and solicitors’ time costs on dealing with the experts and their reports, as well as a reduction to the time costs in relation to preparation of the costs schedule which, whilst a complex exercise, appeared on the high side.

For all those reasons, the reasonable and proportionate costs of the appeal were summarily assessed at £75,000. This sum included VAT of £6,090 on the Counsel fee element only (VAT was not claimed on any other aspect), with the Counsel fee before VAT being £30,450. The Appellant was ordered to pay to the Respondent the total sum of £75,000 for the appeal costs.

Whilst CPR 44.7(1) provides that the standard period for the payment of a costs order is 14 days from the date of the order, the Deputy Judge allowed an additional 14 days (28 days in total) for the Appellant to pay the sum ordered, to ensure fairness to the Appellant in making arrangements to pay. The sum was ordered to be paid by 4pm on 12 June 2026.

YouTube player

 

The Correct Approach To Summary Assessment | Guideline Hourly Rates Up By 35%?

Costs On Indemnity Basis For Wasted Hearing Due To Unreasonable Adjournment Application

The Duty Of Cooperation Under CPR 1.3 | Opportunism And Aggression Result In Fractional Costs Recovery

N260 Statement Of Costs | Form Matters

CPR 44.2 And The Courts’ Discretion As To Costs

Successful Defendant’s Costs In Judicial Review Claim Reduced by 15% for Partial Failure On Discreet Issue

 

Summary Assessment Reduced by 20% On Broad-Brush Proportionality Grounds Despite Rejecting Specific Challenges

, , , ,

The High Court’s decision in Garden House Software Ltd v Marsh & Ors [2026] EWHC 568 (Ch) illustrates how a court may reject itemised costs challenges yet still impose a substantial global reduction on broad-brush proportionality grounds.

Background

HHJ Cadwallader had dismissed an application by the First, Second, Sixth and Seventh Defendants (collectively, “THD”) for reverse summary judgment and to strike out the Claimant’s claims. The parties agreed that costs should follow the event and be summarily assessed on the standard basis. The dispute concerned quantum alone. The Claimant sought £87,698.30 (solicitors’ fees £37,698.30; counsel’s fees £50,000). THD contended this was disproportionate and proposed £39,460.40, achieved through reductions to hourly rates, disallowing one senior fee earner’s time entirely, halving counsel’s fees, and cutting time spent preparing the statement of costs.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The court was required to conduct a summary assessment, determining what was reasonable and proportionate under CPR 44.3. The judge addressed each of THD’s specific challenges before applying a final, broad-brush assessment of overall proportionality. Specific issues arose concerning: (i) whether hourly rates should be reduced to London 2 Guideline Hourly Rates; (ii) whether the deployment of both a Partner and a Grade-A Legal Director was justified; (iii) whether instructing both leading and junior counsel at a combined fee of £50,000 was excessive; and (iv) whether 5.1 hours spent preparing the statement of costs (costing £2,549.70) was disproportionate.

The Parties’ Positions

The Claimant argued its costs were reasonable and proportionate. The application was a heavy one, listed for a full day with half a day’s judicial pre-reading, in a high-value specialist commercial and insolvency claim. THD had shifted the basis of their application following detailed correspondence from the Claimant’s lawyers before the hearing, advancing new points under time pressure, which necessitated preparation to address both the original and revised arguments. The application was brought only three months before a 12-day trial where substantial security for costs had been provided.

THD characterised the hearing as involving short points of law, not heavy or complex, justifying only modest costs. They advanced several specific challenges:

  • Hourly Rates: All rates should be reduced to London 2 GHR on the basis the matter was straightforward.
  • Team Composition: All time recorded by the Grade-A Legal Director (Mr Abdul) should be disallowed; the work of the Partner should have sufficed.
  • Counsel’s Fees: Instructing both a King’s Counsel and a junior was excessive; their combined fees should be capped at £25,000, half the amount claimed.
  • Statement of Costs: The 5.1 hours spent (1.1 hours by a Grade C fee earner and 4 hours by a Senior Costs Lawyer) was excessive and should be reduced to 2 hours total.

THD also pointed to their own costs of approximately £44,228 as a comparator, suggesting the Claimant’s higher spend demonstrated disproportionality.

The Court’s Decision

HHJ Cadwallader awarded the Claimant £70,158.64, representing a 20% reduction from the sum claimed. The judge addressed each of THD’s challenges in turn before applying a global reduction.

Character of the Application

The court rejected THD’s characterisation of the hearing as involving short, simple points of law. The application was listed for a day with half a day’s judicial pre-reading and was a heavy application, albeit the judge’s judgment was terse. THD had shifted the basis of their application following detailed correspondence from the Claimant’s lawyers before the hearing, advancing new points, so that under time pressure the Claimant had to deal with both the original and new points, which increased the preparation required. The application was brought only three months before a 12-day trial where very substantial security for costs had been provided.

Hourly Rates

The judge declined to reduce rates to London 2 GHR. This was a heavy application in a high-value, specialist commercial and insolvency claim, for which London 1 rates were not inappropriate. GHR are a starting point, not a cap. The judge noted that THD’s own Grade-A rate of £595 per hour (Birmingham) exceeded National 1 GHR and indeed the London 1 Grade-A GHR. Having regard to the application’s complexity and importance and the nature of the underlying issues, London 1-level rates were justified.

Team Composition

The court rejected THD’s submission that all time recorded by the Grade-A Legal Director should be disallowed. The Claimant’s explanation—that two senior fee earners were appropriate to manage a complex, high-stakes application with evolving arguments, and to ensure efficient division of labour—was persuasive. The deployment of a Partner and a Grade-A Legal Director was reasonable. The total time taken by both was also reasonable, and THD identified no duplication.

Counsel’s Fees

The instruction of both leading and junior counsel was held to be reasonable. Leading counsel had familiarity with the case and its history and had drafted statements of case; the use of junior counsel to support him should have allowed costs to be kept down. The combined fees of £50,000 were considered reasonable and proportionate, given the factors already identified.

Time Spent on the Statement of Costs

The time spent on the statement of costs (1.1 hours by a Grade C fee earner plus 4 hours by a Senior Costs Lawyer, totalling £2,549.70) was found to be in context neither unreasonable nor disproportionate.

Comparative Spend

The judge acknowledged that THD’s own costs for the application were approximately £44,228, roughly half of the Claimant’s figure. However, comparative spend can be a cross-check; it is not determinative. The question is what was reasonable and proportionate on the part of the Claimant. Given the points already made, it was unsurprising that the Claimant incurred a higher figure than THD.

Overall Proportionality

While THD’s proposed global reduction to £39,460.40 was not a fair reflection of what it reasonably cost the Claimant to oppose the application, and the specific challenges did not warrant the sweeping reductions sought, the judge nevertheless stepped back and looked at the matter in the round. He considered that the overall figure of £87,698.30 must be reduced, for reasons of proportionality, by 20%, to £70,158.64, which he considered to be reasonable and proportionate.

Analysis

The decision demonstrates the two-stage nature of summary assessment under CPR 44.3. A court may find that individual elements of a costs claim—hourly rates, team composition, counsel’s fees—withstand specific challenge when tested against the reasonableness criterion, yet still conclude that the aggregate figure requires reduction when assessed against the proportionality criterion.

The judgment confirms that Guideline Hourly Rates remain a starting point, not a cap, and that the nature, complexity and importance of the matter may justify rates at the higher end of the spectrum. The judge’s observation that THD’s own rates exceeded certain GHR benchmarks provided a useful comparative point that undermined their argument for strict application of lower guideline rates.

On team composition, the decision illustrates that deploying multiple senior fee earners is not inherently unreasonable where the matter is complex, high-stakes, and involves evolving arguments requiring efficient division of labour. The absence of identified duplication was significant.

The instruction of both leading and junior counsel was justified by leading counsel’s existing familiarity with the case and the judge’s finding that the use of junior counsel should have allowed costs to be kept down. The combined fee of £50,000 was assessed in the context of a full-day hearing with substantial pre-reading in a high-value specialist claim.

The most significant aspect of the decision is the application of a 20% global reduction after rejecting the specific challenges. The judge gave limited reasoning for this reduction beyond stating it was required “for reasons of proportionality” when looking at the matter “in the round”. This broad-brush approach reflects the court’s residual discretion to stand back from the detail and assess whether the total figure is proportionate to the matter in issue, even where individual components are reasonable.

The decision serves as a reminder that success in defending itemised challenges to a costs claim does not guarantee recovery of the full sum claimed. Proportionality operates as an independent control mechanism, and a receiving party should anticipate that a court conducting summary assessment may apply a global reduction even where specific criticisms are rejected.

The Correct Approach To Summary Assessment | Guideline Hourly Rates Up By 35%?

Proportionality: a view from the High Court

Summary Assessment Indemnity Costs | Century Property v Aldiss

N260 Statement Of Costs | Form Matters

Proportionality Appeal – May v Wavell Group Ltd

The Applicability Of The Guideline Hourly Rates On A Detailed Assessment

 

CPR PD 47 Para 8.2 | Costs Judge’s “Hands Tied” By Non-Compliant Points Of Dispute

, , , ,

The Senior Courts Costs Office’s decision in Aareal Bank AG v Lumineau [2025] EWHC 3299 (SCCO) demonstrates the practical consequences of Ainsworth-non-compliant points of dispute and provides guidance on hourly rates above guidelines and leading counsel instruction where prior involvement exists.

Background

This was a detailed assessment of costs before Deputy Costs Judge Lightman, delivered as an approved transcript. The receiving party, Aareal Bank AG, was a third party in the underlying litigation who was awarded its costs by order dated 12 September 2024 [§3]. The underlying proceedings concerned an application by the paying parties to stay a liquidation and bring the company back under their control, with a later change of position seeking the removal of directors [§19, §30]. The proceedings took place over a relatively short but intense period between June and September 2024 [§2]. The detailed assessment concerned a bill of costs submitted by Aareal, against which the paying parties, Emmanuel Lumineau and Thomas Schneider, served points of dispute. The central matters in dispute related to the level of solicitors’ hourly rates, the instruction and fees of leading counsel, and the adequacy of the paying party’s points of dispute.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The court was required to determine three principal costs issues. First, whether the hourly rates claimed by the receiving party’s solicitors were reasonable, given that some exceeded the applicable guideline rates for London 2 (Grade A £398, Grade B £308, Grade C £260, Grade D £148 from 1 January 2024) [§2]. Second, whether it was reasonable and proportionate for the receiving party to have instructed leading counsel for the application and, if so, whether the level of his fees and the work done in conjunction with junior counsel were recoverable. Third, whether the paying party’s points of dispute complied with the requirements of CPR Practice Direction 47, paragraph 8.2, and the consequences of any non-compliance, particularly in light of the Court of Appeal decision in Ainsworth v Stewarts Law LLP [2020] EWCA Civ 178.

The Parties’ Positions

The paying party contended that the solicitors’ hourly rates should be reduced to the SCCO guideline rates for London 2 effective from 1 January 2024. They relied on the principle from Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v LG Display Co Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 466 that a “clear and compelling justification” is needed to exceed guideline rates [§4]. On counsel’s fees, the paying party argued that instructing counsel at all was unnecessary, as a senior fee earner should have been capable of handling the work [§13]. In the alternative, they submitted that the instruction of leading counsel was an extravagance, relying on the decision in Coram v DR Dunthorn & Son Ltd [2024] EWHC 672 (KB), which the judge noted was a fact-specific decision [§15, §20]. They also challenged numerous specific items of counsel’s work and associated solicitor time.

The receiving party argued that the complexity and importance of the matter, including insolvency issues and urgent interim applications, justified rates above the guidelines [§19]. Regarding counsel, they submitted that the instruction of leading counsel was necessary due to the case’s complexity and his prior involvement in the matter dating back several years before his appointment as KC in 2020 [§11–12, §17]. They defended the concurrent instruction of junior counsel as a proportionate measure to cover whilst leading counsel was on holiday and to assist in the preparation of the skeleton argument [§31, §34]. In response to the points of dispute, the receiving party argued that they failed to comply with CPR PD 47, paragraph 8.2, as interpreted in Ainsworth, because they did not state concisely the nature and grounds of dispute for individual items, instead relying on generic objections [§21–26]. They argued that the points of dispute were non-compliant with PD 47 and should be struck out; however, the judge did not formally strike them out and instead assessed the items within the constraints identified in Ainsworth [§30, §37].

The Court’s Decision

On the issue of solicitors’ hourly rates, the judge acknowledged his general reluctance to depart from the guidelines but found the case to be “unusual” and of sufficient complexity to justify a modest uplift [§8]. He stated that he had “seen enough to say to anyone that this is an unusual case”, warranting a modest departure, without expressly endorsing all aspects of the receiving party’s characterisation of the case’s complexity [§8]. He did not, however, allow the full rates claimed. He reduced a claimed partner rate of £433.50 to £410 (against a guideline of £398) [§9]. For the associate rate claimed at £306, he allowed £275 [§9]. Other rates at or below the guidelines were left undisturbed.

Concerning the instruction of leading counsel, the judge found it was not unreasonable to instruct Mr Fisher, given his significant prior involvement in the matter dating back several years and predating his appointment as KC in 2020 [§11–12, §17]. The judge noted that it was “not unreasonable at all to instruct Mr Fisher, who had previous experience of this case” [§12]. This represents an important distinction from the scenario in Coram, where leading counsel was newly instructed; the judge treated Coram as a fact-specific decision of no direct application [§20]. However, he questioned whether the matter was sufficiently complex to justify leading counsel charging leading counsel’s rates throughout the whole period, stating that he was “not convinced” on this point [§31]. The judge therefore approached the specific items of counsel’s work on the basis that while leading counsel’s involvement was reasonable, his fees should be moderated to reflect a more junior level for much of the work. He reduced a number of leading counsel items on an item-by-item basis, often by reference to a junior counsel rate: item 49 was reduced from £2,550 to £1,125 [§41]; item 51 from £1,195 to £862.50 [§42]; and item 53 to £1,275 [§42]. Items solely relating to junior counsel’s reading in (items 15 and 16) and initial advice (item 17) were allowed in full, as the points of dispute did not adequately challenge them on an item-by-item basis [§37–38].

On the procedural issue, the judge applied the Ainsworth principles. He held that the paying party’s points of dispute, while identifying a general point of principle (satisfying CPR PD 47 para 8.2(a)), failed to “state concisely the nature and grounds of dispute” for individual items as required by CPR PD 47 para 8.2(b) [§23, §29]. The generic objection to counsel’s fees did not specify why each challenged item was unreasonable. The judge’s frustration with the outcome was palpable: he stated that his “hands are tied” and that he “do[es] not like it” [§37]. As a matter of principle, he refused to entertain reductions based on these non-compliant objections for several items, including approximately three hours of solicitors’ attendance at the hearing [§44]. This procedural failure prevented the paying party from advancing item-specific challenges in respect of a number of entries.

Are Courts Bound By Summary Assessment Principles When Ordering Pro Bono Costs Under Section 194?

, , ,

The High Court’s decision in EJW Builders Ltd v Marshall [2025] EWHC 2898 (Ch) illustrates the court’s cautious and discretionary approach to assessing pro bono costs under section 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007 — emphasising proportionality, adherence to guideline rates as a benchmark, and the need for clear justification where claimed figures exceed them.

Background

The claim was commenced by claim form on 27 June 2023 by EJW Builders Limited and Eammon Joseph Wynne against Audrey Elizabeth Marshall, Edward Joseph Marshall, and their joint trustees in bankruptcy. Though the trustees were named as defendants, they played no part in the trial [§1]. The claimants alleged the existence of a partnership or joint venture agreement with the first and second defendants concerning the redevelopment of a former hotel in Trowbridge, Wiltshire, into four townhouses. They sought a one-third share of the profits, which they valued at up to £3.2 million. The properties ultimately sold for a total of £2,540,000, with £438,000 transferred to the defendants, though the defendants contended these funds were used to pay other debts and that no profits existed.

The matter proceeded to trial before HHJ Paul Matthews on 30 September and 1 October 2025. In an earlier ex tempore judgment ([2025] EWHC 2765 (Ch)), the court dismissed the claim, finding no partnership or joint venture agreement. The court determined in that trial judgment that the claimants’ only entitlement was to £825,000 under a JCT contract. Consequently, an order was made for the claimants to pay costs in respect of the first and second defendants’ pro bono representation to the Access to Justice Foundation, pursuant to section 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007. These costs were to be summarily assessed on the standard basis if not agreed. As the parties failed to agree, this subsequent judgment ([2025] EWHC 2898 (Ch)) concerns the costs assessment. The costs judgment was handed down at 10:30 am on 3 November 2025. The court conducted a paper assessment applying a broad brush approach rather than a detailed or summary assessment [§1, §24].

Costs Issues Before the Court

The primary issue for determination was the assessment of the sum payable to the Access to Justice Foundation under the pro bono costs order. This involved applying CPR rule 46.7, which requires the court to assess a sum equivalent to the costs that would have been payable had the representation not been provided free of charge. Under CPR 46.7(3)(b), the court applies Parts 44-47 with modifications to reflect that the costs are notional [§4, §7]. The judge stressed this was not a line-by-line scrutiny but a broad brush assessment [§24]. The assessment necessitated consideration of the reasonableness of the notional costs, including the solicitors’ hourly rates, the time claimed for various categories of work, and counsel’s fees. Specific challenges were raised by the claimants regarding the application of London guideline hourly rates, the exceedance of those guidelines, alleged excessive attendances, and disproportionate time claimed for document work.

The Parties’ Positions

The defendants, through their solicitors, submitted a costs schedule claiming notional profit costs of £334,829 and counsel’s fees of £58,500, totalling £393,329 (no VAT being payable) [§12]. The solicitors’ fees were based on hourly rates of £1,205 and £860 for grade A fee-earners, £860 for a grade B fee-earner, and £350 for a grade D fee-earner. All claimed rates exceeded the applicable London band 2 guideline hourly rates [§19]. The work included 89.3 hours for attendances on the defendants, 31.9 hours for attendances on opponents, and 263 hours for work on documents.

The claimants challenged the schedule on several grounds. They argued that London guideline hourly rates should not apply, as the case had no connection to London and could have been handled by a provincial firm, relying on Truscott v Truscott [1998] 1 WLR 132. They contended that the claimed rates exceeded the applicable guideline rates for London band 2 without justification, citing Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v LG Display Co Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 466. The claimants also submitted that the attendances on the defendants and opponents were excessive and that the time claimed for document work, including reviewing core documents and preparing witness statements, was disproportionately high given the case’s straightforward nature.

The Court’s Decision

The court, applying a broad brush approach as endorsed in Manolete Partners plc v White (No 2) [2025] 1 WLR 1094, exercised its discretion under section 194, assessing £117,000 as the appropriate payment to the Access to Justice Foundation. In doing so, the court considered the discretionary nature of pro bono costs orders under section 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007 and the dual legislative purposes: levelling the litigation playing field by exposing both parties to costs risks, and providing funding to support organisations offering free legal help to those in need (citing Manolete at §20) [§9, §17, §20]. Applying Manolete, the court emphasised it should “err on the side of caution” when determining the amount payable [§9, §25-26].

On the issue of guideline hourly rates, the court treated a Truscott reasonableness test as artificial in this case because representation was allocated by the legal charities Advocate and Law Works [§10, §17]. The court found it reasonable for the defendants to accept pro bono representation given the potential costs liability evidenced by the claimants’ budget of £182,848.65 [§18]. The court applied London band 2 rates but reduced the solicitors’ notional profit costs to reflect the guideline rates for London band 2, as no justification was provided for the exceedance. The allowed rates were the 2025 London band 2 guideline hourly rates: £413 for grade A, £319 for grade B, and £153 for grade D fee-earners [§19].

The court found the claimed attendances excessive and reduced them to 60 hours for attendances on the defendants, 20 hours for attendances on opponents, and 17 hours for attendance at the hearing [§20, §24]. It also significantly reduced the time for work on documents from 263 hours to 117 hours, criticising the lack of delegation to junior fee-earners, noting that both partners did all the document work with none by the two junior associates [§21-22], and the disproportionate time spent on tasks such as reviewing core documents and preparing witness statements.

Counsel’s fees of £58,500 were allowed in full, as the court accepted that this sum covered advisory work, interlocutory hearings, and trial preparation, and no specific challenge was made to the trial fee [§23].

Ultimately, the court assessed the notional costs at £58,500 for solicitors’ work and £58,500 for counsel’s fees, resulting in a total of £117,000 [§24]. Emphasising the discretionary nature of pro bono costs orders and the need to err on the side of caution, the court concluded this sum was appropriate for the payment to the Access to Justice Foundation [§25-26].

YouTube player

CPR 3.15(8) | £870 Hourly Rate And £90,000 Brief Fee For Leading Counsel Deemed Disproportionate In £1.2m Claim

, , , ,

The High Court’s decision in Pontis Finance LLP v Karam, Missick & Traube LLP [2025] EWHC 2298 (Ch) demonstrates how courts can address excessive hourly rates through broad-brush phase reductions without breaching CPR 3.15(8)’s prohibition on fixing rates.

The case concerned a professional negligence claim brought by Pontis Finance LLP, a lender, against the defendant firm of solicitors, Karam, Missick & Traube LLP. Pontis had agreed to lend approximately £812,500 to an individual purporting to be Stefano Brugnolo, secured by a charge on a Mayfair property. The defendant firm acted for the borrower. Pontis’s case was that the defendant’s client was an impostor and that the firm had failed to perform adequate identity checks. Having advanced the loan monies, which were then paid to the impostor, Pontis claimed it had no prospect of recovery. The claim was for the return of the loan monies, interest, and associated fees, totalling approximately £1.2 million.

Following a Costs and Case Management Hearing (CCMC) on 21 February 2025, the court ordered the parties to file updated costs budgets. The intention was for the court to rule on these budgets promptly on the papers. Due to an administrative oversight, this ruling was significantly delayed from March to September 2025 [§6-8]. Consequently, costs for several phases of the litigation, most notably the Disclosure phase, transitioned from being future costs to incurred costs, thereby limiting the court’s ability to budget for them effectively [§9, §11.1].

Costs Issues Before the Court

The court was required to determine the reasonable and proportionate budgeted costs for the phases where it retained jurisdiction, specifically the Trial Preparation and Trial phases. The court could not set budgets for the Disclosure phase (as costs were now incurred), nor for Witness Statements and Settlement/ADR phases (due to uncertainty about what work had been completed) [§11]. The central issue was whether the overall figures claimed were proportionate, with a particular focus on the Claimant’s use of solicitors’ hourly rates that substantially exceeded the applicable guideline rates and the instruction of both a King’s Counsel and a junior barrister. The court had to assess proportionality by reference to the factors in CPR 44.3(5), primarily the sums in issue (£800,000 to £1.2 million) and the complexity of the litigation [§15].

The Parties’ Positions

The Claimant argued that the case involved complex legal issues concerning whether a duty of care was assumed to a non-client, the nature of any undertakings given, and potential breaches of trust. It submitted that the majority of the budgeted work was appropriately focused on the Trial Preparation and Trial phases and that the use of both leading and junior counsel was justified. The solicitors’ high hourly rates were presented as a reflection of the firm’s expertise.

The Defendant contended that the claim, valued at approximately £1.2 million, was towards the lower end of the scale for Chancery Division litigation and was not sufficiently complex to be categorised as “very heavy commercial work.” It argued that the case would substantially turn on its facts. The Defendant submitted that the Claimant’s solicitors’ hourly rates were excessive and unjustified, and that instructing both leading and junior counsel was disproportionate, particularly as a managing associate was also budgeted to attend trial.

The Court’s Decision

The court found that the Claimant’s overall incurred and budgeted costs of £489,891.31 were disproportionate for a claim of this nature and value [§31]. The case was assessed as being of moderate complexity, turning largely on its facts, and not qualifying as “very heavy commercial work” [§22]. Consequently, the appropriate guideline band for assessing solicitors’ hourly rates was London Band 2, not Band 1 [§35].

The court acknowledged that its role under CPR 3.15(8) was to approve phase totals, not to fix or approve specific hourly rates [§23]. However, following the approach in GS Woodland Court GP1 Ltd v GRCM Ltd [§26], it held that the combination of excessive rates and the number of hours billed could render a phase total disproportionate. The court therefore made broad, downward adjustments to the phase totals to reflect this.

For the Trial Preparation phase, the Claimant sought £136,550. The court found the number of solicitors’ hours (110) to be reasonable but the rates charged were substantially above the London Band 2 guidelines [§39]. It also found the aggregate counsel brief fees of £90,000 to be disproportionate [§44]. Applying a broad-brush approach, the court approved a budget of £115,000 for this phase [§48].

For the Trial phase, the Claimant sought £88,700. The court identified that the Claimant had erroneously budgeted for four days of counsel refreshers for a four-day trial; only three days were permissible, as the brief fee covers the first day [§51]. Furthermore, the solicitors’ rates were again deemed excessive. The court also disallowed most of the costs for an unexplained Grade D fee earner charged at £400 per hour [§58]. Considering all elements, the court approved a budget of £50,000 for this phase [§60].

The court declined to set budgets for the Witness Statements and Settlement/ADR phases due to the uncertainty over how much work had been incurred during the delay, rendering it impossible to distinguish between incurred and future costs [§11.2, §11.5]. The parties were advised to apply for a further costs management hearing if they wished to budget for these phases.

GS Woodland Court GP1 Ltd v GRCM Ltd [2025] EWHC 285 (TCC)

Key authority on how courts apply downward adjustments to phase totals where excessive hourly rates render them disproportionate

CPR 3.18(b) | Underspend Does Not Constitute Good Reason To Depart From An Approved Budget

Explores the interplay between budgeting and detailed assessment, relevant to understanding how courts control costs through budgeting

CPR 3.15A | Costs Budget Revisions | Significant Developments And The Need To Act Promptly

Details the requirements for varying costs budgets, relevant given the administrative delays that affected budgeting in Pontis Finance

2021 Guideline Hourly Rates, Use of Counsel And Division Of Common Costs

Discusses the application of guideline hourly rates and the use of both leading and junior counsel, directly relevant to the excessive rates and counsel fees issues

How Relevant Are The Guideline Hourly Rates?

Examines judicial attitudes to guideline rates being exceeded, providing context for understanding when rates significantly above guidelines may be justified

CPR 3.14 | Late Costs Budget | Relief From Sanctions Denied

Illustrates the consequences of failing to comply with budgeting requirements, contrasting with the administrative issues in Pontis Finance

 

YouTube player

PD57AD | Costs Consequences Of Disclosure Guidance Applications | When Matters Become Formal And Contested

, , , ,

In Voltaire Capital Holdings Limited & Ors v Watson & Ors [2025] EWHC 1948 (Comm), Nigel Cooper KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge) departed from the default costs position for disclosure guidance applications under PD57AD, ordering the unsuccessful applicant to pay £63,267 in costs. This decision provides valuable guidance on when courts will treat supposedly informal disclosure guidance hearings as contested applications warranting inter partes costs orders.

The Default Costs Position Under PD57AD

Paragraph 11.5 of Practice Direction 57AD establishes a clear default position: costs of disclosure guidance applications are costs in the case unless otherwise ordered. This reflects the intended informal and cooperative nature of the disclosure guidance procedure, which envisages:

    • Maximum 60-minute hearings with 30 minutes pre-reading
    • Legal representatives with direct disclosure responsibility rather than counsel
    • Resolution through guidance rather than formal determination

The Practice Direction aims to foster a “new culture of disclosure stressing the imperative nature of party cooperation” – an aspiration that carries direct costs implications.

When Guidance Becomes Litigation | The Costs Turning Point

The judge identified several factors that transformed this disclosure guidance application into something warranting departure from the default costs position:

Scale and Complexity

    • 2.5+ hour hearing (versus standard 60 minutes)
    • 900-page hearing bundle including 261 pages of correspondence
    • Substantial skeleton arguments (16 and 39 pages)
    • Instruction of counsel, including leading counsel for the claimants

Nature of Contest The judge found the application was “conducted in a manner consistent with a heavily contested disclosure application rather than an application for informal guidance envisaged by PD57AD.” This characterisation proved crucial to the costs decision.

Relative Success The court conducted a detailed analysis of success:

    • Claimants substantially succeeded on the main issues
    • More hearing time spent on issues where claimants succeeded
    • Volume of documents from ordered searches significantly smaller than sought
    • Second Defendant’s limited success occupied minimal hearing time

The Costs Assessment | Significant Reductions Applied

The summary assessment demonstrates the court’s rigorous approach to costs recovery even for successful parties:

Solicitors’ Costs

    • Claimed: £59,862.75
    • Assessed: £46,000
    • Key reductions:
      • Hourly rates exceeding guideline rates without sufficient justification
      • £4,000 specific reduction for excessive time on witness statement preparation

Counsel’s Fees

    • Claimed: £34,297 (including leading counsel)
    • Assessed: £24,000
    • £10,000 reduction reflecting that leading counsel was unnecessary for the hearing

Final Calculation

    • Total assessed: £70,297
    • 10% reduction for opponent’s limited success: £63,267
    • Overall reduction: approximately 33% from amount claimed

Key Costs Principles Emerging

Procedural Defaults and Costs

The court dismissed the respondent’s reliance on the claimants’ failure to serve a statement of costs before the hearing (contrary to PD44 paragraph 9.5(4)(b)). The judge found:

    • Both parties could foresee costs applications would follow
    • The default caused no difficulty to either party or the court
    • Late submission did not prevent the claimants seeking costs

This pragmatic approach suggests procedural defaults in costs procedure may not defeat otherwise meritorious costs applications.

Attribution of Delay

The court rejected arguments that claimants’ delays necessitated the hearing, finding it “impossible to assign any responsibility for any delay.” This reinforces the difficulty of establishing causation for costs purposes where both parties contribute to procedural history.

Proportionality in Success

The 10% reduction for the opponent’s limited success demonstrates the court’s nuanced approach to “relative success” – even substantially successful parties may face reductions where opponents achieve discrete wins.

Implications for Costs Practice

This decision reinforces several important costs principles:

For Disclosure Applications

    • Courts will look beyond labels to substance when determining costs
    • Default positions are starting points, not immutable rules
    • The scale and manner of conduct matters more than the procedural vehicle

For Summary Assessment

    • Guideline rates remain starting points requiring justification for departure
    • Courts will scrutinise time spent on specific tasks
    • Necessity of leading counsel must be demonstrable, not assumed

Strategic Considerations

    • Parties escalating “informal” procedures risk adverse costs consequences
    • Providing hit counts and engaging cooperatively may influence costs outcomes
    • Limited success on discrete issues can reduce costs recovery even for substantially successful parties

The Broader Context | Costs and Cooperation

This judgment sits within the broader framework of disclosure reform emphasising cooperation and proportionality. The costs consequences here serve as a reminder that parties who transform cooperative procedures into adversarial contests may face financial penalties.

The decision also demonstrates the interplay between different costs regimes – whilst PD57AD creates specific defaults for disclosure guidance, the court retains discretion to apply general costs principles where the nature of proceedings warrants it.

Conclusion

Voltaire Capital Holdings provides clear guidance on when courts will depart from default costs positions in disclosure contexts. The message for practitioners is straightforward: approach disclosure guidance as intended – cooperatively and proportionately – or risk bearing the costs consequences of unnecessary escalation. The 33% reduction in assessed costs further reinforces that even successful parties must demonstrate both necessity and proportionality in their costs claims.

CPR 46.4 | Protected Parties | Court Rejects ‘Light Touch’ Approach To Assessement Of Solicitor-Client Costs Shortfall

, , , , , ,

Background

In CFB v AXA Insurance UK PLC the Claimant, CFB, a protected party represented by a litigation friend due to a severe brain injury sustained from a fall at a construction site on 12 March 2019, succeeded in obtaining a £1 million settlement from AXA Insurance under the Third Party (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010.

During the proceedings, complex issues arose, including the denial of employment by the employer and AXA’s attempt to avoid the insurance cover based on non-disclosure of the Claimant’s immigration status.

The settlement precipitated two claims for costs: one inter partes claim (the Claimant’s costs against the Defendant) and one solicitor-client claim for costs (Prince Evans Solicitors LLP’s costs against the Claimant). The hearing for the costs determination took place over multiple dates: 7 August 2024, 12 December 2024, and 24 January 2025.

The settlement of inter partes costs stood at £378,000 (inclusive of interest and assessment costs) against a claim of £439,167.62. The solicitor-client costs included additional liabilities such as a success fee of £31,413.80 and an ATE premium of £1,680, along with a shortfall in costs recovered from the Defendant and a separate sum for “pure” solicitor-client costs amounting to over £23,000.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The costs issues before the court involved two primary claims. The inter partes claim needed approval for the settlement reached, involving a recovery percentage of approximately 85%. The more contentious issue was the solicitor-client claim.

Prince Evans Solicitors LLP (PE) sought recovery for additional liabilities, a shortfall in costs not recovered from AXA, and separate “pure” solicitor-client costs. These claims encompassed work related to the solicitor-client relationship beyond the settlement proceedings, specifically covering issues such as immigration advice and costs related to the Claimant’s appointment of a deputy under the Court of Protection.

The Parties’ Positions

Regarding the inter partes costs, the parties agreed on a settlement of £378,000 against a claim of £439,167.62. The negotiations for settlement appeared to have considered various vulnerabilities and potential deductions on assessment.

In addressing the solicitor-client costs, Prince Evans Solicitors LLP, through Mr. Roy KC, advocated for the court to take a “light touch” approach to approval, heavily relying on counsel’s advice. The solicitors argued that the current procedure for determining these claims was flawed, suggesting that a more lenient process aligned with the treatment of damages claims be adopted. They highlighted potential conflicts of interest given the litigation friend’s dual role as the solicitor’s spouse and the solicitor’s preference for a senior fee earner allaying concerns on the firm’s behalf.

The Court’s Decision

Costs Judge Brown scrutinised both the procedural aspects and the substantive costs claims put forward by Prince Evans Solicitors LLP.

In his decision, Costs Judge Brown addressed several criticisms raised by Mr Roy KC and Mr Smith, particularly regarding the scrutiny of solicitor-client cost claims. The Judge rejected the notion of a heavy presumption against approving settlements and underscored the necessity of detailed scrutiny in such cost matters given the potential conflicts of interest and the need to protect the interests of the protected party.

The court dismissed the suggested “light touch” approach, explaining that the existing rules mandated a meticulous examination of the costs claimed to ensure they were reasonable and in the interest of the protected party. Key to the judgment was the necessity to consider the merits of the costs claimed, not merely rely on the advice of learned counsel without further interrogation.

Concerns were raised over the high hourly rates charged, the substantial reliance on counsel, and the lack of delegation, which all contributed to an inflated costs claim. Furthermore, the claims for “pure” solicitor-client costs, including immigration advice and the appointment of a deputy, were considered highly unusual and possibly outside the scope of what could reasonably be charged under the CFA.

Ultimately, while the court approved the inter partes costs settlement, it refused to approve the solicitor-client cost deductions without a detailed assessment. The judgment emphasised that proper scrutiny and assessment were indispensable to safeguarding the interests of vulnerable parties and ensuring fair and reasonable solicitor remuneration.`

Impact Of Counsel Involvment On Hourly Rates

, , ,

When solicitors possess and demonstrate the necessary skill, effort, and specialized knowledge in a case, their hourly rates should not be reduced merely because counsel is also involved. The court should evaluate if there was an excessive involvement of counsel, which could influence the division of charges between solicitors and counsel, but this does not automatically justify a reduction in the solicitors’ hourly rates.

Read more

Advocacy And “Documentary or Procedural” Rates For Costs Lawyers

, , ,

Different rates for advocacy and other costs-related work are justifiable based on the nature of the work involved. Advocacy, requiring a higher level of expertise and experience, can command a higher hourly rate compared to documentary or procedural work in legal proceedings. A rate of £200 per hour is reasonable for advocacy by any experienced, qualified costs advocate.

Read more