Exaggerated symptoms see claimant lose QOCS protection in first ‘fundamental dishonesty’ decision 


A circuit judge has ruled in Gosling v Screwfix and Anr (unreported, 29 March 2014) that a personal injury claimant who exaggerated the extent of his ongoing symptoms should be denied the protection of qualified one-way costs shifting (QOCS) on the grounds that the claim was “fundamentally dishonest”. See the full Litigation Futures article.

It was appropriate to follow the principle in Lockley v National Blood Transfusion Service (1992) 1 WLR 492 and set off a costs order made against a publicly-funded claimant against costs and damages recoverable elsewhere in the action. That was so even though the financial burden on the Legal Services Commission would be less if a Lockley order was not made; the Commission had decided to fund the action and the successful defendant was entitled to enforce the costs order in its favour.

Under the terms of a Tomlin order which provided that one of three Defendants was only to pay the Claimant’s costs which related exclusively to the action against it, and not those incurred by the Dlaimant in respect of the dispute with the other two Defendants, that Defendant was liable for any common costs which could be attributed to it by division, rather than apportionment.

A master had erred in assessing costs awarded on a preliminary issue at nil on the ground that the receiving party had ultimately failed very badly in its case. The costs order had been intended to deal with the costs of the preliminary issue as a discrete set of costs, irrespective of the overall fate of the action.

Where family had funded a claimant’s litigation, there was a reasonable prospect of success in obtaining a third party costs order where the family were directly concerned with the facts of the claim, had taken an active role and gained a benefit from the litigation, and had sought to control its course.

On the facts, the Judge had been entitled to apportion costs in line with the Claimant’s liability in a road traffic accident as he had had proper regard not only to the Claimant’s claim, but also the Defendant’s notional cross-claim; the exercise of his discretion could not therefore be criticised.