The High Court’s decision in Teixeira v Moaven [2026] EWHC 1542 (Ch) addresses the costs consequences where professional parties were found complicit in creating sham declarations of trust intended to deceive the court.
Background
This judgment, handed down by Master Bowles (sitting in retirement) on 30 June 2026, concerns the costs consequences following a five-day trial in which certain declarations of trust were found to be sham documents. The substantive judgment, reported at [2026] EWHC 1215 (Ch), had been handed down on 22 May 2026.
The underlying dispute centred on four properties held in the sole name of Amir Abbas Moaven (Abbas). On 19 April 2012, at a time when Abbas was gravely ill, he executed a series of documents described as declarations of trust (the Declarations of Trust). Those documents purported to confirm the existence of informal trust arrangements between Abbas, his brother Amir Ahmed Moaven (Amir), and their mother Shokouh Nazemi Tehran (Mrs Nazemi), whereby all three were said to have pooled their assets and to hold them in equal one-third shares. The purpose of the Declarations of Trust was to reduce the apparent size of Abbas’ estate, so as to diminish the claims of his wife, the Claimant Gabriela Mozerle Teixeira (Gabriela), their two children, Elis Teixeira Moaven (Elis) and Amir Aryan Moaven (Aryan), and to avoid taxation on the full value of his estate.
Following trial, Master Bowles determined that no such informal pooling arrangement had ever existed, that the Declarations of Trust were sham documents with no legal or equitable effect, and that the extensive evidence given by Amir at trial was a fiction designed to support the false narrative contained in the recitals to those documents. The Second Defendant, Behzad Faiz (Mr Faiz), was Abbas and Amir’s longstanding accountant. The Third Defendant, Marios Robert Pittalis (Mr Pittalis), was their longstanding conveyancing solicitor. All three, together with Abbas, were found to have been complicit in the creation and execution of the sham Declarations of Trust.
The procedural history leading to the trial was set out in detail at paragraphs 18 to 53 of the substantive judgment. In brief, Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis had originally been named as executors of Abbas’ will. By order dated 23 July 2020, they were removed as executors and directed to account for the assets of the estate in their hands. They had failed to account properly, including in respect of rents accruing to the estate that had been paid instead to Mellcraft Ltd, a company controlled by Amir and incorporated by Mr Faiz as a receptacle for those rents. Simon Treherne (Mr Treherne) and Helen Bunker (Ms Bunker) were appointed by the court in 2020 as independent administrators of the estate in substitution for the removed executors.
By order of 2 May 2025, permission was granted to the independent administrators to bring proceedings as to the validity and effectiveness of the Declarations of Trust and as to the beneficial interests of Abbas’ estate, Amir and Mrs Nazemi in the properties (the Declarations of Trust claim). By the same order, Gabriela was given permission, later extended to Elis and Aryan, to bring proceedings under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (the 1975 Act), with the validity of the Declarations of Trust and the beneficial ownership of the properties to be determined within the context of both sets of proceedings. By order of 11 November 2025, the issues as to validity and beneficial ownership arising in both sets of proceedings were directed to be determined together, with Gabriela, Elis and Aryan acting as claimant in respect of those issues across both sets of proceedings.
By order of 3 June 2026, consequential upon the substantive judgment, the 1975 Act proceedings brought by Gabriela, Elis and Aryan were brought to a conclusion by way of settlement with the independent administrators. The costs application was heard on 3 June 2026, with the costs judgment handed down on 30 June 2026.
The Personal Interest of the Removed Executors
As accounting parties, Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis each had a direct interest in the outcome of the trial. The extent of their accounting obligations as removed executors was necessarily dictated by the true extent of Abbas’ estate. If the Declarations of Trust had been upheld, their liability would have been substantially reduced.
By the court’s order of 11 November 2025, the independent administrators had been given permission to prosecute an account against the removed executors on the basis of wilful default. Amir had been in rent-free occupation of one of the properties (Holland Park) throughout his eight-year executorship. If Holland Park formed part of Abbas’ estate, all three removed executors were accountable for occupation rent. If the Declaration of Trust in respect of Holland Park had been valid, no such accountability would arise. Similarly, rents from another property (Harrow Road) had been diverted to Mellcraft Ltd. Had the relevant Declaration of Trust been upheld, the removed executors would have been accountable for only one third of the diverted rents rather than the whole.
More broadly, a number of leasehold properties had been transferred by the removed executors to Amir and Mrs Nazemi, in apparent breach of the self-dealing rule, and sold, traded or rented out by Amir, with rents paid into Mellcraft Ltd. If those leaseholds were shown to have formed part of Abbas’ estate, Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis would be accountable to the estate for all losses. A finding that the Declarations of Trust reflected the truth of the pooling arrangements averred by Amir would have reduced the removed executors’ liability by two thirds. All three would have been well served had the case advanced by Amir succeeded.
Costs Issues Before the Court
The court was required to determine a number of distinct costs issues arising from the outcome of the trial.
The first and most fundamental issue was whether Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis should be ordered to pay the costs of both Gabriela and her children and the independent administrators, and if so, on what basis. Costs on the indemnity basis were sought by both sets of receiving parties against all three of the removed executors. It was submitted that liability should be joint and several as between Amir, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis.
The second issue concerned the scope of the costs recoverable by each receiving party. Gabriela and her children’s claim was for the entirety of their costs of the proceedings, their claim having been fully resolved by the order of 3 June 2026. The independent administrators’ position was more limited: their entitlement to costs was confined to the costs of the trial leading to the substantive judgment, and did not extend to costs referable only to the general administration of the estate. A question arose as to whether costs described in their costs summary as “administrative” were properly referable to the trial and therefore recoverable as trial costs.
The third issue was whether the costs orders should be subject to any percentage reduction to reflect concerns raised by the paying parties as to duplication of work and resources between the two sets of legal advisers pursuing the same litigation objective, and as to any uplift in costs arising from the delay in initiating the Declarations of Trust claim, given that the dispute had been identified as early as 2013 but proceedings were not issued until July 2024.
The fourth issue was the quantum of any payments on account of detailed assessment, including the appropriate starting point and any further adjustments to reflect the concerns identified above. The question of the time allowed for payment also arose, given the substantial sums involved.
A further discrete issue arose in relation to Mr Pittalis specifically. His counsel submitted that, having been deceived by Amir’s dishonesty, he should bear no liability for the costs of either receiving party, and that Amir should instead be directed to pay his costs. In the alternative, it was submitted that his liability should be assessed on the standard basis, should not be joint and several, and should reflect only the costs attributable to his own conduct by way of a percentage of the overall costs.
The Parties’ Positions
Amir Ahmed Moaven
Through counsel, Ms Pemberton, Amir accepted liability for costs in respect of both Gabriela and her children and the independent administrators. It was candidly accepted that his conduct in advancing an entirely dishonest defence was manifestly outside the norm of acceptable litigation behaviour, and that he had no answer to the contention that costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis. Ms Pemberton also accepted that Amir’s costs liability should be joint and several with Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis. She raised a question as to whether liability should also be shared by Mrs Nazemi’s estate, though the court noted that it was for those claiming costs to elect from whom costs were sought, and that if Amir wished to seek contribution or indemnity from Mrs Nazemi’s estate, he should have taken appropriate steps to do so.
Ms Pemberton’s primary submission on quantum was that the costs incurred by both receiving parties had been unreasonably incurred by reason of duplication and the unnecessary use of excessive resources, and that any costs order should be subject to a percentage discount to reflect that unreasonableness. She also raised the concern that costs had been inflated by the delay in prosecuting the challenge to the Declarations of Trust, and that this too should be reflected in a percentage reduction in recoverable costs.
Marios Robert Pittalis
Mr Pittalis’ position changed in the course of the proceedings. His earlier witness statement of 14 August 2025 had, at paragraph 15, entirely omitted any mention of the circumstances in which the Declarations of Trust had come into being and the fact that various alternatives, containing factually inconsistent recitals, had been prepared and executed before eventually alighting upon the formulation chosen to be advanced by way of the Declarations of Trust. His position at that stage, reflecting in essence the position advanced by Amir, was that he had simply drafted the Declarations of Trust as requested by Abbas.
His later witness statement of 30 January 2026, while for the first time acknowledging the context and circumstances in which the Declarations of Trust had come into being, nonetheless continued to assert their validity and contended that Gabriela and her children’s claims as to their validity should be dismissed. Reflecting that position, his skeleton argument robustly contended that Gabriela and her children’s claims as to the Declarations of Trust were ill-founded and that those claims should be dismissed.
By the end of the trial, all that had dissipated and Mr Pittalis was put forward by his counsel, Ms O’Neill, simply as someone who had become innocently involved in giving effect to Amir’s (and Abbas’) dishonest scheme. Reflecting that position, Ms O’Neill contended that her client should not have to pay any part of the costs of either Gabriela and her children, or those of the independent administrators. She contended, further, that her client, having been deceived by Amir’s dishonesty and duplicity, Amir should be directed to pay her client’s costs. In the alternative, she contended that any costs liability should reflect the difference in culpability as between her client and Amir and Mr Faiz, that his liability should not be joint and several, should be assessed on the standard and not indemnity basis, and should reflect, by way of a percentage of the overall costs, the costs attributable to Mr Pittalis’ conduct.
Behzad Faiz
Mr Faiz, although warned of the likelihood that costs would be sought against him, elected to take no part in the hearing on 3 June 2026, neither attending nor affording himself representation. He lodged a short statement as to his involvement as executor in respect of Abbas’ estate, which did not touch upon the circumstances or his own conduct in respect of the creation and execution of the Declarations of Trust.
The Court’s Decision on Liability for Costs
Amir Ahmed Moaven
The court accepted Ms Pemberton’s concession that Amir was liable for costs on the indemnity basis, jointly and severally with Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis. His conduct in advancing an entirely fictional and dishonest case was manifestly outside the norm of acceptable litigation behaviour.
Marios Robert Pittalis
The court rejected Ms O’Neill’s submissions that Mr Pittalis had been deceived by Amir and should bear no liability. It was perfectly plain from the substantive judgment and from Mr Pittalis’ own detailed attendance notes of 17, 18 and 19 April 2012 that Mr Pittalis knew exactly what was going on and was fully involved in the creation and then selection of the sham Declarations of Trust.
He knew, as nobody else except Amir and Mr Faiz did before he gave his evidence at trial, that the multiple declarations of trust that he had prepared, setting out different and entirely inconsistent factual recitals, had been executed by Abbas. He knew, also and necessarily, that those recitals, given their inconsistency, could not each of them represent the truth. He was himself fully involved in the discussion on 18 April 2012 of the clutch of declarations then to hand, as to which declaration best served Abbas’ purpose in purportedly diminishing his estate, and which of those declarations were best capable of being sustained. As the court observed, the truth or falsehood of the declarations was never an issue in that debate. The declarations, and ultimately the Declarations of Trust, were, consistently with Mr Pittalis’ own conduct in 2002 when he drafted declarations of trust purportedly transferring all of Abbas’ then assets to his mother to preclude any matrimonial claims by Gabriela, never anything more than dispensable and interchangeable pieces of paper designed to obscure or hide the true facts from those concerned with Abbas’ estate. They were never intended to reflect or give effect to the truth.
Far from being duped by Amir, Mr Pittalis was complicit with Amir and with Mr Faiz in the creation and execution of the sham Declarations of Trust and complicit, therefore, in the creation of the state of affairs that had given rise to the trial. Notwithstanding that fact and his full and detailed knowledge of all the circumstances leading to the execution of those Declarations of Trust, Mr Pittalis chose both to give, in his 14 August 2025 witness statement, an abbreviated and misleading account of the provenance of the Declarations of Trust and, even after his disclosure in August 2025 of his attendance notes, to continue to assert the validity of the Declarations of Trust. His position only changed when, under forensic examination at trial, the true position as to the Declarations of Trust became indisputably clear.
In these circumstances, the court could see no reason at all as to why Mr Pittalis should not be liable in costs for his role in the conduct that, in complicity with Amir and Mr Faiz, had given rise to the trial. Correspondingly, given that complicity, there was no reason at all as to why that liability should not be joint and several with Amir and Mr Faiz. There was no sensible basis for any order that his costs, or any part of them, should be paid by Amir. Mr Pittalis was not an innocent bystander. He was a full participant in the creation of the sham Declarations of Trust and someone who had his own interest in asserting the validity of the Declarations of Trust. It had always been open to Mr Pittalis (or indeed Amir and Mr Faiz) to tell the truth about the Declarations of Trust and thereby obviate or reduce the need for the trial. They had each elected not to do so.
Behzad Faiz
The only distinction between Mr Faiz’ position and that of Mr Pittalis was that, unlike Mr Pittalis, he did not at any stage actively assert the validity of the Declarations of Trust. He was, however, equally as involved in their creation as was Mr Pittalis and equally, therefore, as responsible as Mr Pittalis for the creation of the state of affairs that had given rise to the trial. Like Mr Pittalis, it was in his interest to see the validity of the Declarations of Trust upheld. Like Mr Pittalis, he could have at any stage told the truth about the Declarations of Trust and obviated or reduced the need for the current trial. Like Mr Pittalis, he did not do so. Instead, he stood by while the costs of the trial were incurred and awaited events.
In these circumstances, looked at in the round, Mr Faiz’ position was in substance identical to that of Mr Pittalis, and Mr Faiz was ordered to pay the costs of the trial jointly and severally with Amir and Mr Pittalis.
The Basis of Assessment | Indemnity Costs
The court ordered that costs be assessed on the indemnity basis in respect of all three paying parties. As explained in Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Limited v Salsbury Hammer Aspden & Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879 and Esure Services Limited v Quarcoo [2009] EWCA Civ 595, the court’s discretion as to an award of indemnity costs arises where the conduct of the party in respect of whom indemnity costs is sought has been outside the norm to be expected in properly and reasonably conducted litigation. That conduct, as set out in CPR 44.5(a), includes conduct before as well as during the proceedings. It includes, but is not limited to, conduct amounting to misconduct or calling for moral condemnation. The width of the discretion as to conduct falling outside the norm is deliberately set wide to allow for the infinite variations and possibilities which arise in the course of litigation.
In this case the conduct of Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, which in concert with Abbas had given rise to the litigation, had been manifestly and radically outside the norm. They chose to deliberately put in place sham documents with the intention not merely of misleading those to whom they were deployed, but ultimately with the intention of misleading the court.
It was this latter aspect which, over and above the entirely dishonest case advanced at trial by Amir, rendered the case an appropriate one for an order for indemnity costs. The discussions that took place on 18 April 2012 centred upon the sustainability of the various forms of declaration of trust that might be put in play, meaning their sustainability, if challenged, before a court. Similar discussions took place after Abbas’ death, as recorded in Mr Pittalis’ attendance notes of 31 May 2012 and 12 April 2013, in respect of the Declarations of Trust as executed and in respect of their sustainability if challenged before the court.
The conduct of Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz in respect of the Declarations of Trust was, from the very outset, directed towards the creation of sham documents which could be sustained in court and which might or would deceive the court. That conduct was, in consequence, central to and causative of the current trial and it was for that reason, and in consequence of their role in the creation of sham documents for those purposes, that they should now, the dishonest nature of the documents having been exploded, be liable on the indemnity basis for the costs that had had to be incurred in exposing the deceitful nature of the Declarations of Trust.
The position was compounded by the conduct of Mr Pittalis (and Mr Faiz) at trial. The court had already discussed Mr Pittalis’ active opposition, up until trial, to the attacks made upon the validity of the Declarations of Trust. Even, however, when the point came when he appreciated that the Declarations of Trust were unlikely to be sustained, his position was not to tell the truth as to the Declarations of Trust but to stand by and abide events. That was the position adopted by Mr Faiz from the outset. While in many circumstances it may be legitimate for a litigant to abide events, where the party standing by is both aware of the truth and, more importantly, is at the source of the conduct whereby, to his or her knowledge, an untrue case is being advanced before the court, that conduct is in itself sufficiently outside the norm as to warrant an award of indemnity costs.
In reaching these conclusions, the court did not found itself on any moral condemnation of the conduct of either Mr Faiz or Mr Pittalis, but rather upon the causative nature of their conduct in enabling a false case to be brought to court and in standing by while that false case was advanced. The court nonetheless observed that the conduct of Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis, as professional men owing professional obligations of probity and integrity, was extraordinary. There appeared to have been in neither of them any loyalty to the truth, or even any interest in the truth. They manifestly saw nothing at all wrong in the preparation and deployment, on behalf of a client, of false and deliberately misleading documents. They appeared to have seen their role as entirely functional, having no interest or concern either in the content or consequences of the documentation that they brought into being.
Scope of Recoverable Costs
Gabriela and her children’s claim was for the entirety of their costs of the proceedings, their claim having been fully resolved by the order of 3 June 2026. The position of the independent administrators was different. Their prospective entitlement to costs was limited to the costs of the trial leading to the substantive judgment. They were not entitled to claim or recover, at this stage, any of their costs appertaining only to their steps and actions in relation to the general administration of Abbas’ estate.
The independent administrators contended that because Amir’s position had amounted to an assertion of a general partnership, and because much if not all of their investigations had borne upon or related to that question, all or virtually all of their incurred costs in the administration should be regarded as referable to the current trial. The court was not persuaded. It was plain from the letter before action dated 24 January 2023 that the question of partnership was not then an issue that the administrators had in mind. That position was confirmed by the July 2024 application itself, which did not advert to the question of partnership or seek declaratory or any relief as to that question. The question of partnership was only raised as an issue for trial in November 2025 and was not pursued at trial. Amir, in his December 2025 witness statement, stated in terms that he did not claim that he and Abbas had worked within a formal partnership.
In the result, the court indicated that for purposes of any determination of a payment on account, the independent administrators should exclude from their costs summary the bulk of the costs described in that summary as administrative. It would be for the costs judge to determine what, if any, element of these so-called administrative costs were properly related to the trial and recoverable as trial costs.
In regard to Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, they were before the court only in respect of the issues relating to the Declarations of Trust and the facts allegedly underlying those declarations. Unlike Amir, whose involvement with the 1975 Act claims embraced the issues relating to section 423 of the Insolvency Act and the application of section 10 of the 1975 Act, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz were not before the court in respect of any aspects of the 1975 Act claims, save as they related to the validity of the Declarations of Trust and the size of Abbas’ estate. They should not bear any liability for the costs of those aspects of those claims which did not bear upon those issues. The court made an allowance of ten percent to reflect those aspects of Gabriela and her children’s costs which were unrelated to the validity of the Declarations of Trust.
Duplication, Delay and Detailed Assessment
Ms Pemberton and Ms O’Neill drew the court’s attention to the possible dangers of duplication of work and of an excessive application of resources when two separate sets of legal advisers pursue the same litigation end. The court’s impression was that the bulk of the trial preparation had fallen on the independent administrators, with Gabriela and her children’s claim riding on their coat tails, and with therefore, on the face of it, little obvious duplication of work and resources. Nonetheless, it was not inappropriate for counsel to raise those concerns.
The answer, however, to that legitimate concern was not for the court to make some speculative deduction from the recoverable costs in order to reflect those concerns, but for those matters to be given proper consideration as and when there was a detailed assessment of the extent of the recoverable costs. The same approach was appropriate in dealing with any potentially uplifted or unreasonably incurred costs arising out of the fact that, although the dispute as to the validity of the Declarations of Trust was identified very early on (2013), the dispute was not crystallised by the inception of the current proceedings until the independent administrators’ application was issued in July 2024.
The court was in no position, at this stage, to determine, other than by way of pure speculation, whether the costs sought by the independent administrators or by Gabriela and her children had been unreasonably or unnecessarily uplifted by reason of delay and, if so, to what extent. That question could only be resolved by the detailed examination of the conduct of those claiming the relevant costs as part of the process of detailed assessment.
In that consideration, the costs judge dealing with any detailed assessment would necessarily be alive to the independent administrators’ case that any delay in initiating the Declarations of Trust claim had to be seen in the context of email correspondence from Amir in the summer of 2023, in which he repeatedly indicated his early intention to seek a declaration as to the validity of the Declarations of Trust. It was the independent administrators’ submission that, given those indications, they could not be criticised for any delay in initiating the Declarations of Trust claim. While the court thought there was force in those submissions, and certainly sufficient force to preclude the court from reaching any conclusion at this stage adverse to the independent administrators arising out of any alleged delay, the question of delay, the responsibility for that delay and any uplift in costs incurred consequential upon delay remained open for examination and determination as part of any detailed assessment.
Payment on Account
It was not submitted either by Ms Pemberton or Ms O’Neill that the court should not make an order for the payment of costs on account. Nor, given the order that costs be paid on the indemnity basis, was there any serious opposition to the proposition that, as a starting point in the determination of the reasonable sums to be paid on account of costs, the court should work on the assumption or rule of thumb that, on detailed assessment, the claiming parties would recover something in the order of eighty percent of their claimed costs. Nor was it suggested, other than in respect of time to pay, that the amount payable should be dictated or informed by the paying parties’ ability to pay.
What was submitted, reflecting the concerns as to duplication, use of excessive resources and, in respect of the independent administrators’ costs, the prospect or possibility that the costs estimates placed before the court by the independent administrators included costs not properly recoverable as costs of the trial, was that the court should make appropriate allowances in respect of those matters in order to avoid over recovery.
The court’s task, as explained by Christopher Clarke LJ in Excalibur Ventures LLC v Texas Keystone Inc. [2015] EWHC 566 (Comm), was not simply to find a figure which reflected the irreducible minimum to be expected on recovery. The court was looking to determine a reasonable sum which reflected all relevant factors. These included, on the one hand, that the claiming parties were already out of pocket in respect of the costs that they had had to incur and the desirability, where possible, of the court determining a figure which was sufficiently close to the likely figure recoverable on assessment as to avoid the need for such an assessment. On the other hand, where there was a perceived risk that the receiving party might not, or might not be in a position to, repay the sum awarded on account, then that factor would come into play in reducing to a ‘safe’ sum the amount payable on account.
The court was not persuaded that, in this case, that last risk was material. As a result of the findings at trial and the settlement consequential upon those findings of the 1975 Act proceedings, there would seem to be no significant risk that the two receiving parties in this case would be unable to repay any over recovery that might arise, were it to be the case that the amount directed to be paid on account turned out to exceed the costs recoverable on assessment.
That said, reflecting the submissions made by Ms Pemberton and Ms O’Neill and the concerns that they had properly raised, some further allowances in reduction of the eighty percent starting point were appropriate.
The costs estimate provided on behalf of Gabriela and her children placed their estimated costs in the sum of £229,361. In regard to Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz, that base figure fell to be reduced by ten percent, to £206,425. Eighty percent of that figure would be £165,140. A further five percent of that base figure, however, should be deducted to reflect the matters which had been raised by counsel, resulting in an amount of £154,819, say £154,800, to be paid jointly and severally by Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis on account of the costs incurred by Gabriela and her children. In Amir’s case, the ten percent deduction was inapplicable, with the result that while he was jointly and severally liable with Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz in the sum of £154,800 payable on account, he was separately liable on account for an additional sum of £17,221.
In regard to the independent administrators, Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis received no special allowance. However, for purposes of payment on account, the court left out of account the bulk of the costs described in their costs summary as administrative, resulting in a base figure for purposes of payment on account of £455,544.39. Eighty percent of that figure was £364,465.61. However, to further reflect the possibility that costs not properly referable to the trial had been included in the costs summary, the court considered it fair that the figure payable on account should reflect seventy percent of the base figure rather than eighty percent. That figure, for which Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz were all jointly and severally liable, was £318,881, say £318,880.
In regard to the payment of these very substantial sums, the court considered it unrealistic to make the usual fourteen day order. Payment of the sums due on account was ordered to be made by 4 p.m. on 21 September 2026.
Conclusion
Amir, Mr Pittalis and Mr Faiz were ordered to pay the independent administrators’ costs on the indemnity basis. They were ordered to pay Gabriela and her children’s costs on the same basis. In respect of both sets of costs, their liability was joint and several. In regard, however, to Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis’ liability for Gabriela and her children’s costs, their liability was subject to an allowance of ten percent to reflect those aspects of those costs which were unrelated to the validity of the Declarations of Trust. Both sets of costs were subject to detailed assessment, if not agreed, and the court gave permission for the immediate commencement of that assessment.
Substantial payments on account were ordered. Mr Faiz and Mr Pittalis were ordered to pay jointly and severally £154,800 on account of Gabriela and her children’s costs. Amir was jointly and severally liable with them for that sum, and separately liable for an additional £17,221. All three were ordered to pay jointly and severally £318,880 on account of the independent administrators’ costs. Payment was to be made by 4 p.m. on 21 September 2026.
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