In The University of Sussex v The Office for Students [2026] EWHC 2708 (Admin), the High Court refused to make an order for intervener costs under section 87 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. The decision confirms that pre-permission work falls outside the statutory power, that rejected submissions may still assist the court, and that sector-wide public interest can amount to exceptional circumstances. It matters to any party considering an application against an intervener.
Background
The claim was a judicial review brought by the University of Sussex against a decision of the Office for Students (OfS). It raised issues about the scope of the OfS’s powers to regulate and the meaning of freedom of speech in higher education [26]. The University succeeded on the large majority of the case and had the entirety of the decision quashed in respect of both breaches found [2].
The Free Speech Union (FSU) was permitted to intervene by an order of Chamberlain J dated 28 January 2026 [17]. The substantive hearing took place from 3 to 5 February 2026. Following judgment, the University sought its costs of the intervention from the FSU.
Costs Issues Before the Court
The question was whether the FSU should pay the University the costs occasioned by the intervention [12]. Under section 87(5) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, on an application by a relevant party, the court must order an intervener to pay costs incurred as a result of its involvement in a stage of the proceedings if a condition in section 87(6) is met. Section 87(7) removes that duty where exceptional circumstances make an order inappropriate [13]. The court had to decide which costs fell within the power, whether conditions (b), (c) or (d) were met, and whether section 87(7) applied.
The Parties’ Positions
The University contended that conditions (b), (c) and (d) of section 87(6) were all met. It relied on passages of the substantive judgment in which the court recorded the FSU’s position only for completeness, found that its argument added nothing to the conclusions, and described some submissions as of no assistance [14]. It said the FSU’s material was aimed at a question the court did not need to resolve [15], and that the FSU had acted unreasonably by not applying promptly and by filing unsolicited submissions after the hearing [16].
The FSU argued that section 87(5) excluded all work before Chamberlain J’s order, including the costs of objecting to its application to intervene [17]. It said its submissions addressed two issues: the meaning of freedom of speech within the law, on which the University had changed position during the hearing [19], and the scope of Convention rights in assessing reasonably practicable steps, which it said was not a significant part of its submissions [23].
The Court’s Decision
Lieven J held that the FSU was plainly correct on the temporal point [18]. She said: “The words of s.87(5) are clear, and the power is very specific in its scope for the award of costs to that particular stage of the proceedings.” Work done before the FSU was allowed to intervene was therefore not caught by the section [18]. That excluded the costs of objecting to the application to intervene, which the FSU had identified as falling before Chamberlain J’s order [17].
On the first issue, the judge did not consider that section 87(6)(b) or (c) was met [20]. The meaning of freedom of speech within the law was of considerable importance to some of the grounds and to the entire context of the case. Although the principal parties were largely agreed by the hearing, the FSU’s submissions on the breadth of the issue and the arguments arising under Article 10 ECHR were of significant assistance [20].
The judge accepted that, as is often the case with interveners, the submissions did not in the end go to the heart of the court’s conclusions. They were nevertheless of considerable assistance in understanding the broader context and the potential ramifications of the principal parties’ arguments [20]. That was particularly so where the outcome would be scrutinised across the higher education sector, given the relative lack of previous caselaw [21].
The same position arose under section 87(6)(c) [22]. It had not been necessary to reach a reasoned determination on the issue because the principal parties agreed. However, the shifts in their positions could not have been anticipated by the FSU, and those positions had been less than clear until shortly before the hearing. Having granted the FSU permission to intervene, it would be unfair to penalise it on that basis [22].
On the second issue, the court had rejected the FSU’s submission in the substantive judgment. The judge agreed with the FSU that the rejection of an argument does not mean that the submissions on the point were not of significant assistance [23].
The judge then read the statutory words “taken as a whole” as pointing “towards not disaggregating the issues unless there is a very clear demarcation between the different parts of the Intervener’s submissions or evidence, which would justify a topic-based approach to costs” [24]. There was no such demarcation, because the two issues were closely interrelated [24]. On that reading, an application under section 87(6)(b) that targets one strand of an intervention will face difficulty unless the strands are clearly separable.
On section 87(6)(d), the judge did not consider that the FSU acted unreasonably in its submissions. The case was of widespread interest and significance across the higher education sector, and the FSU’s approach was at all stages proportionate and focused. The court’s disagreement with those submissions did not make the FSU’s behaviour unreasonable [25].
Further, and in any event, the judge agreed with the FSU that there were exceptional circumstances within section 87(7) [26]. The case was of considerable wider interest to the sector on both the scope of the OfS’s regulatory powers and the meaning of freedom of speech. It was important that the court could hear a range of submissions on the specific arguments and the broad context [26].
The judge concluded: “That wider public interest would itself be justification on the facts of this case for the FSU’s submissions to fall within s.87(7).” For all those reasons she declined to make a costs order against the FSU [27].
Practical Implications
This is a first instance decision, but the reading of section 87(5) rests on what the judge described as the clear words of the statute [18]. A party opposing an intervention should advise its client that the costs of objecting to the application, and other work before the permission order, are not recoverable under section 87 [17, 18]. The date of that order marks the point from which intervener costs can be claimed under the section.
An applicant relying on section 87(6)(b) should not treat the rejection of an intervener’s argument as sufficient [23]. It will need to show that the submissions, taken as a whole, were not of significant assistance, and that any part it attacks is clearly demarcated from the rest [24]. Assistance with context and with the ramifications of the principal parties’ arguments counted, even though it did not go to the heart of the conclusions [20].
Under section 87(6)(c), a principal party whose own shifts in position narrowed the issues may find that narrowing cannot fairly be used against the intervener [22]. Interveners should keep their submissions proportionate and focused [25]. In cases of genuine sector-wide importance, they should identify the wider public interest and the value of a range of submissions as exceptional circumstances under section 87(7) [26].
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