Part 36 Consequentials | Enhanced Interest, Indemnity Costs And 100% Payment On Account

Following a £5.2m judgment matching their Part 36 offer, defendants mounted comprehensive challenges to avoid Part 36 consequences under CPR 36.17—from offer validity to enhanced interest rates to payment on account percentages. The court rejected each argument, reinforcing that escaping Part 36 consequences requires clearing a “formidable obstacle.”

Part 36 Consequences
In Learning Curve (NE) Group Ltd v Lewis & Anor (Consequentials) [2025] EWHC 2491 (Comm), HHJ Russen KC determined costs following a £5.2m judgment that matched the claimant’s Part 36 offer. The defendants mounted comprehensive challenges to avoid CPR 36.17(4) consequences, arguing the offer was unclear about a prior £783,325 payment, that the claimant’s shifting quantum case made application unjust, that enhanced interest should be capped at 4% above base, that costs should be reduced by 50% for claim exaggeration, and that payment on account should be limited. All arguments were rejected. The court held that defendants who fail to seek clarification under CPR 36.9 cannot later claim ambiguity, that the availability of settlement at the correct sum reinforced rather than undermined Part 36 consequences, and that defendants “come nowhere close” to overcoming the “formidable obstacle” required to escape those consequences. Enhanced interest at 8% above base was awarded, indemnity costs ordered from the relevant period, and payment on account set at 100% of budgeted costs given the irrelevance of CPR 3.18 to indemnity basis assessment.

By making the Offer a year before the trial the claimant gave the defendants the opportunity and incentive to compromise the proceedings at just over half the principal sum sought in the particulars of claim. They did not take that opportunity. Instead, they have battled against the Judgment which establishes the same result, but with interest and very substantial legal costs being incurred in the meantime, and they have done so by taking many other points beside those going to quantum. In my judgment they come nowhere close to overcoming the 'formidable obstacle' that lies in the way of depriving the claimant of the advantages in CPR 36.17(4).

Citations

Synergy Lifestyle Ltd v Gamal [2018] EWCA Civ 210; [2018] 1 WLR 4068 A payment on account by a defendant does not increase the value of an earlier Part 36 offer and should be treated as made on account of that offer unless clarified otherwise. Macleish v Littlestone [2016] EWCA Civ 127; [2016] 1 WLR 3289 A Part 36 offer includes sums previously paid on account or partially admitted unless the offer expressly provides otherwise, avoiding absurd or unintended outcomes. Smith v Trafford Housing Trust [2012] EWHC 3320 (Ch) The burden on a claimant who has failed to beat a Part 36 offer to demonstrate injustice is high, and courts are not free to depart from the standard consequences without strong justification. Webb v Liverpool Women’s NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWCA Civ 365; [2016] 1 WLR 3899 Courts should give effect to the standard Part 36 consequences unless persuaded it would be unjust, reaffirming the strict approach to offers not beaten at trial. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2011] EWHC 664 (Comm) Interest under section 35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 is compensatory, intended to reflect the cost to the claimant of being kept out of money due. Sycamore Bidco Ltd v Breslin [2013] EWHC 174 (Ch) For interest purposes, a “judgment” under section 35A of the Senior Courts Act and section 17 of the Judgments Act means the judgment determining liability, not the subsequent order quantifying it. Kitcatt v MMS UK Holdings Ltd [2017] BCLC 352 A commercial rate of interest at base rate plus 2% was deemed reasonable compensation on sums withheld despite low prevailing base rates at the time. OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG [2017] EWCA Civ 195; [2017] 1 WLR 3465 Enhanced interest under CPR 36.17(4)(a) may serve a dual compensatory and penal purpose, rewarding claimants for making effective offers and encouraging settlement. McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 933; [2002] 1 WLR 934 The availability of indemnity costs under Part 36 is a deliberate incentive encouraging claimants to make reasonable offers and defendants to accept them. Burgess v Lejonvarn [2020] EWCA Civ 114; [2020] 4 WLR 43 An order for indemnity costs renders an earlier costs budget irrelevant, as the assessment is no longer constrained by proportionality or the budget under CPR 3.18. Thomas Pink Ltd v Victoria’s Secret UK Ltd [2014] EWHC 3258 (Ch); [2015] 3 Costs LR 463 Courts routinely award 90% of the approved costs budget as a reasonable payment on account for budgeted costs on the standard basis. MacInnes v Gross [2017] EWHC 127 (QB); [2017] 4 WLR 497 In quantifying a payment on account of costs, courts may take 90% of the budgeted costs absent compelling reason to depart from the approved budget. Sheeran v Chokri [2022] EWHC 1528 (Ch) For assessing payments on account of costs, the court may take a high proportion of the approved costs budget when costs are to be assessed on the standard basis. DEFRA v Downs [2009] EWCA Civ 257 A stay pending appeal may only be granted where there are solid grounds that irreparable harm would result from immediate enforcement of a judgment. Hammond Suddard Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 2065 The court must balance potential injustice to both parties when deciding whether to grant a stay pending appeal, with emphasis on avoiding appeal frustration or irrecoverable loss. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48 An appeal against a judge’s evaluative findings based on factual and expert evidence must demonstrate that the conclusion was irrational or unsupported to have real prospects of success.

Key Points

  • The court must apply CPR 36.17(4) unless it would be unjust to do so, and arguments that defendants could have settled to avoid costs typically reinforce rather than undermine the consequences. Parties seeking to avoid Part 36 consequences face a “formidable obstacle”.
  • Defendants cannot escape Part 36 consequences by arguing an offer was unclear when they never sought clarification under CPR 36.9; prior payments on account are presumed included within offered sums absent contrary indication.
  •  Where significant costs will be assessed on the indemnity basis, CPR 3.18 becomes irrelevant to those costs, justifying departure from the usual 90% payment on account figure. A 100% payment on account can sometimes be justified in these circumstances.
  • A costs reduction for pursuing an inflated claim cannot succeed where the claimant offered settlement at the realistic value—the offer itself demonstrates proper evaluation. Arguments that claims were “exaggerated” will likely fail where a realistic Part 36 offer has been made.
  • Courts may award up to 10% above base rate under CPR 36.17(4)(a) where supported by evidence of actual borrowing costs; 8% was appropriate where claimant borrowed at 4.5-7% above base.

"I cannot see how these points detract from the usual impact of an effective Part 36 offer. If anything, they reinforce the effectiveness of the Offer. The claimant has not by any means made good its pleaded case (see paragraph 2 of the Judgment) and the defendants would have spared themselves both the continuing uncertainty over the level of their financial exposure, including ongoing interest, and the very significant legal costs incurred by both sides since the Offer was made, if they had themselves recognised at the time what has now been established to be the true value of the claim."

Key Findings In The Case

  • The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the Part 36 offer lacked clarity due to silence about a prior £783,325 payment, holding that this was properly treated as a payment on account of the offered sum and that the defendants’ failure to seek clarification under CPR 36.9 undermined their ambiguity claim.
  • The defendants’ argument that the claimant’s “shifting case” on quantum (from £6.8m to £10.18m in pleadings) made application of Part 36 consequences unjust was rejected; the court found this reinforced that they should have accepted the £5.2m offer rather than incurring substantial further costs.
  • The court refused to cap the claimant’s costs recovery at 50% for alleged claim exaggeration, holding that the defendants had “ample opportunity” to settle via the Part 36 offer and had “come nowhere close” to overcoming the “formidable obstacle” required to escape CPR 36.17(4) consequences.
  • A payment on account of 100% of approved budgeted costs (£1,257,382) was ordered, departing from the usual 90% figure, because CPR 3.18’s protection for approved budgets becomes “prima facie irrelevant” where signific ant costs will be assessed on the indemnity basis.
  • Enhanced interest was awarded at 8% above base rate (not the defendants’ proposed 4%) from expiry of the relevant period to judgment, supported by evidence that the claimant’s actual borrowing costs ranged from 4.5-7.14% above base rate during the relevant period.

"In this case, and in the absence of agreement upon the recoverable amount, a significant part of the claimant's costs will be assessed on the indemnity basis and CPR 3.18 will not apply to those costs. As Coulson LJ observed in Burgess v Lejonvarn [2020] EWCA Civ 114; [2020] 4 WLR 43, at [89]–[93], if there is an order for indemnity costs, then prima facie any approved budget becomes irrelevant. It follows that the reasoning underpinning the approach to a payment on account, which is illustrated by the three cases mentioned above, does not apply to the significant element of the claimant's costs covered by the award of indemnity costs, whether or not they are included in a presently approved budget."

The High Court’s decision in Learning Curve (NE) Group Limited v Lewis & Anor [2025] EWHC 2491 (Comm) demonstrates the difficulty parties face when attempting to avoid Part 36 consequences after failing to beat a claimant’s offer, with the court rejecting challenges to offer validity, interest rates, cost basis, and payment on account quantum.

Background

The claim arose from a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) dated 29 October 2021, under which the claimant, Learning Curve (NE) Group Limited, acquired shares from the defendants, Richard Huw Lewis and Melanie Probert. The claimant brought proceedings for breaches of warranty and under an indemnity clause in the SPA. In a judgment dated 4 August 2025 ([2025] EWHC 1889 (Comm)), the court found the defendants liable, and the claimant elected to enter judgment in the sum of £5,211,625 for breach of warranty. This sum was reduced by a prior payment of £783,325 made by the defendants under the indemnity, resulting in a net judgment debt of £4,428,300, which was payable by 19 September 2025.

Prior to the trial, the claimant had made a Part 36 offer on 7 February 2024, offering to settle for £5,211,625, which was not accepted by the defendants. Following the main judgment, the court addressed consequential matters, including the effect of the Part 36 offer, interest on the judgment sum, costs, permission to appeal, and a stay pending appeal. The parties provided written submissions, and the court determined these issues on the papers without a further hearing [§8, §11].

The Defendants’ Multi-Pronged Challenge

Following judgment in the claimant’s favour for the exact sum offered under Part 36, the defendants mounted challenges on multiple fronts, seeking to avoid or reduce the consequences under CPR 36.17(4). The court addressed each argument in turn.

Challenge 1 | The Offer Was Unclear

The defendants’ first argument was that the Part 36 offer lacked clarity because it offered £5,211,625 but was silent about the £783,325 already paid by the defendants under the indemnity in October 2022. They contended it was unclear whether the offer required payment of the full £5,211,625 in addition to the amount already paid, meaning the judgment (which credited the earlier payment) had not matched the offer [§19, §23].

The court rejected this argument. HHJ Russen KC held that the £783,325 was properly treated as a payment on account of the larger warranty claim. The offer’s silence on this sum was appropriate because the defendants’ counterclaim sought its return, meaning it could not be “appropriated” by either party until the counterclaim was resolved. The offer included settlement of the counterclaim, so acceptance would have resulted in the claimant retaining the £783,325 as part of the £5,211,625 total. The defendants had not requested clarification under CPR 36.9, and the court found no genuine ambiguity [§20-25].

Drawing on the reasoning in Macleish v Littlestone [2016] EWCA Civ 127 and Synergy Lifestyle Ltd v Gamal [2018] EWCA Civ 210, the court applied a presumption that the payment on account would be treated as made on account of the sum offered, absent contrary clarification. Any other interpretation would produce an “absurd result” [§25].

Challenge 2 | The Claimant’s “Shifting Case” Made Application Unjust

The defendants argued that it would be unjust to apply CPR 36.17(4) consequences because the claimant’s case on quantum had shifted significantly—from £6.8m in the claim form to £10.18m in particulars of claim to different valuations in expert evidence. They contended this uncertainty meant they could not properly evaluate the offer when made [§29-30].

The court found this argument backfired. Rather than supporting injustice, these points “reinforced the effectiveness of the Offer.” The claimant had not made good its pleaded case for £10m+, and the defendants would have “spared themselves both the continuing uncertainty over the level of their financial exposure, including ongoing interest, and the very significant legal costs incurred by both sides since the Offer was made” if they had accepted it [§30].

HHJ Russen KC cited the “formidable obstacle” test from Smith v Trafford Housing Trust [2012] EWHC 3320 (Ch), endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Webb v Liverpool Women’s NHS Foundation Trust [2016] EWCA Civ 365. By making the offer a year before trial at just over half the pleaded sum, the claimant had given defendants a genuine settlement opportunity. The defendants “come nowhere close to overcoming the ‘formidable obstacle'” required to escape Part 36 consequences [§31-33].

Challenge 3 | Enhanced Interest Rate Too High

On interest, the defendants proposed that if enhanced Part 36 interest applied, it should be limited to 4% above base rate rather than the 8% sought by the claimant [§41].

The court awarded 8% above base rate for the period from 28 February 2024 (expiry of the relevant period) to 4 August 2025 (judgment date). This decision was supported by evidence from the claimant’s witness that the claimant had borrowed at rates equivalent to 4.5-7.14% above base since 2021, meaning 8% provided appropriate compensation while remaining within the 10% maximum under CPR 36.17(4)(a). The court noted that enhanced interest under Part 36 may include a “non-compensatory element” as an incentive to settle [§44-46].

For the earlier period (29 October 2021 to 28 February 2024), the court awarded 2% above base under section 35A of the Senior Courts Act 1981, rejecting the defendants’ proposal of 1% [§42, §44].

Challenge 4 | Costs Should Be Reduced by 50%

The defendants argued that the claimant’s costs recovery should be capped at 50% because the claimant had “deliberately exaggerated its claim” by pursuing £10m when the true value was approximately £5m. They also contended that any payment on account should exclude pre-budget incurred costs, limiting it to £846,206.50 [§52-53].

The court rejected this comprehensively. The existence of the Part 36 offer undermined the exaggeration argument—defendants had a clear opportunity to settle at the sum now established as correct. The claimant succeeded “on all material issues presented by the parties” and was entitled to full recovery [§54-55]. The court specifically noted that costs reserved from an earlier disclosure application should be included, as these would never have been incurred if the offer had been accepted [§57].

Challenge 5 | Payment On Account Too High

The court ordered payment on account at 100% of the approved budgeted costs (£1,257,382), departing from the common practice of 90% [§58].

HHJ Russen KC explained that the usual 90% approach reflects the protection CPR 3.18 gives to approved budgets on standard basis assessment—providing confidence that this percentage is unlikely to constitute overpayment. However, CPR 3.18 does not apply to indemnity basis costs. Citing Burgess v Lejonvarn [2020] EWCA Civ 114, the court held that where a significant portion of costs will be assessed on the indemnity basis, approved budgets become “prima facie irrelevant” to those costs [§59-60].

With total invoiced costs of £2,210,133 and a significant element on the indemnity basis, the payment on account of £1,257,382 represented only 57% of total costs incurred. The court was satisfied this was unlikely to constitute overpayment even allowing for reasonableness challenges [§61].

Final Elements | The Additional Amount and Interest on Costs

The court ordered:

      • The additional amount of £75,000 under CPR 36.17(4)(d), payable within 6 weeks [§34]
      • Interest on costs at 2% above base until 28 February 2024 and 8% above base until 4 August 2025, with the Judgments Act rate thereafter [§63]

Permission to Appeal and Stay—Also Refused

For completeness, the defendants also sought permission to appeal on four grounds and a stay pending appeal. Permission was refused on all grounds, with the court finding no real prospect of success [§67-80]. The stay application was rejected as the defendants had not demonstrated “solid grounds of irremediable harm” and appeared able to access resources to meet their liabilities [§85-88].

Key Takeaway

This judgment illustrates that comprehensively challenging Part 36 consequences rarely succeeds. The “formidable obstacle” test means courts will apply the full range of CPR 36.17(4) benefits unless clear injustice can be demonstrated—and arguments that defendants could have avoided expense by settling will typically reinforce rather than undermine those consequences.

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CPR 36.17 And The Just Rewards Of A Good Part 36 Offer

igh Court decision on full CPR 36.17(4) consequences including enhanced interest at 6% above base, indemnity costs, and additional amount. Directly relevant authority on when courts apply Part 36 benefits.

CPR 36.17 | Part 36 Offer To Accept £1 Was A Genuine Attempt To Settle

Court of Appeal guidance on the “formidable obstacle” test and when Part 36 consequences apply. Discusses the strict compliance required and high hurdle for escaping consequences.

CPR 36.17(5) | Costs Following Trial On Liability And The Effect Of An Extant Part 36 Offer

High Court decision on CPR 36.17(5) mandatory factors and when costs must be reserved. Explores the “formidable obstacle” threshold in split trial context.

CPR 44.2(8) | Payments On Account In Costs Budgeted Cases

Guidance on payment on account principles, including the standard 90% of budgeted costs approach and the relevance of CPR 3.18 on assessment.

When Part 36 Offers Demand Total Capitulation | Matière v ABM

Recent High Court decision on what constitutes a genuine Part 36 offer and when offers may be challenged as demands for capitulation rather than settlement.

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Court of Appeal guidance on Part 36 offer validity and construction, relevant to the offer clarity arguments in Learning Curve.

LEARNING CURVE (NE) GROUP LIMITED V LEWIS [2025] EWHC 2491 (COMM) | HHJ RUSSEN KC | CPR 36.17(4) | PART 36 OFFER | CPR 36.9 | ADDITIONAL AMOUNT OF £75,000 | INTEREST ON JUDGMENT SUM | CPR 40.8 | JUDGMENTS ACT 1838 SECTION 17 | SENIOR COURTS ACT 1981 SECTION 35A | STANDARD BASIS COSTS | INDEMNITY BASIS COSTS | CPR 44.2(6)(G) | INTEREST ON COSTS | PAYMENT ON ACCOUNT OF COSTS | COST MANAGEMENT ORDER | CPR 3.18 | INCURRED COSTS | COSTS BUDGET VARIATION | CPR 52.6 | PERMISSION TO APPEAL | STAY PENDING APPEAL | CPR 52.16 | CPR 40.11 | CPR 36.17(1)(B) | CPR 36.17(5)(A) | CPR 44.3 | T&L SUGARS LTD V TATE & LYLE INDUSTRIES LTD [2014] EWHC 1066 (COMM) | MACLEISH V LITTLESTONE [2016] EWCA CIV 127 | SYNERGY LIFESTYLE LTD V GAMAL [2018] EWCA CIV 210 | MDW HOLDINGS LTD V NORVILL [2022] EWCA CIV 883 | VOLPI V VOLPI [2022] EWCA CIV 464 | WEBB V LIVERPOOL WOMEN’S NHS FOUNDATION TRUST [2016] EWCA CIV 365 | SMITH V TRAFFORD HOUSING TRUST [2012] EWHC 3320 (CH) | OMV PETROM SA V GLENCORE INTERNATIONAL AG [2017] EWCA CIV 195 | MCPHILEMY V TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD (NO. 2) [2001] EWCA CIV 933 | SYCAMORE BIDCO LTD V BRESLIN [2013] EWHC 174 (CH) | KITCATT V MMS UK HOLDINGS LTD [2017] BCLC 352 | BURGESS V LEJONVARN [2020] EWCA CIV 114 | THOMAS PINK LTD V VICTORIA’S SECRET UK LTD [2014] EWHC 3258 (CH) | MACINNES V GROSS [2017] EWHC 127 (QB) | SHEERAN V CHOKRI [2022] EWHC 1528 (CH) | BRIGHTSIDE GROUP LTD V RSM AUDIT LLP [2017] 1 WLR 1943 | KENNEDY V NATIONAL TRUST FOR SCOTLAND [2019] EWCA CIV 648 | DEFRA V DOWNS [2009] EWCA CIV 257 | HAMMOND SUDDARD SOLICITORS V AGRICHEM INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD [2001] EWCA CIV 2065