In David Parsons v Convatec Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 1357, the Court of Appeal held that section 106 Patents Act 1977 applies when the court approves costs budgets. The court must therefore have regard to the parties’ financial position at that stage in employee inventor compensation claims. Practitioners acting for individual claimants can raise the inequality of resources at the costs management conference rather than waiting for the final costs order.
Background
Dr Parsons, a former employee of Convatec, claimed compensation under section 40 of the Patents Act 1977. The claim concerned inventions protected by seven patent families and was valued at its highest at some £366 million [2]. A claim of that value would not normally be costs managed. Dr Parsons nevertheless proposed costs management, and Convatec agreed, principally because he required ATE insurance [60]. His ATE policy had a current limit on cover of £800,000, and his solicitors acted under a conditional fee agreement [61, 62].
At the costs management conference on 30 January 2026, Richards J first carried out a conventional budgeting exercise. He approved future costs of approximately £4.7 million for Dr Parsons and £6.5 million for Convatec [64]. In a reserved judgment he then held that section 106 did not apply to costs budgeting. In the alternative, he rejected each of Dr Parsons’ three proposals [65].
Costs Issues Before the Court
Dr Parsons appealed on two grounds [66]. Ground 1 raised a question of statutory construction: whether section 106(1) applies to costs budgeting at all. That provision directs the court, in determining whether to award costs and what costs to award, to have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including the financial position of the parties. Ground 2 was whether, if section 106(1) does apply, the judge erred in exercising his discretion. Convatec relied on further reasons by respondent’s notice [67]. It was common ground that section 106(1) applies to both interim and final costs orders [88].
The Parties’ Positions
Dr Parsons contended that determining what costs to award embraced each step on the critical path to a decision on the amount of costs. He relied on the natural meaning of the statutory language and on the purpose identified by the judge [89]. Neither party dissented from that purpose: to reduce the risk that concern about an ultimate costs award would deter employees from bringing claims [87].
Convatec argued that section 106 did not apply at this stage at all, for two reasons. First, determining what costs to award is distinct from assessing their amount. Secondly, a court cannot decide what costs to award before deciding whether to award costs [90]. In the alternative, it advanced four arguments that section 106 does not apply to costs budgeting, even if it can apply before the incidence of costs is decided [98].
The Court’s Decision
Arnold LJ, with whom Baker LJ and Asplin LJ agreed, rejected both of Convatec’s principal arguments [90]. Costs are conventionally dealt with in two stages: incidence and basis first, quantum second. A costs judge is bound by the first judge’s order [91]. It did not follow that determining what costs to award excluded assessment. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words included the amount, as CPR 44.2(6)(b) and section 106(2) confirmed [92].
The second argument also failed. A court can determine the amount of costs before their incidence. The fixed costs regime under CPR Part 45 and the scale costs in the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court are examples [93]. On Convatec’s case, financial position would bear on incidence and basis but not on amount. Arnold LJ considered that illogical and contrary to the language and purpose of section 106(1) [95].
He therefore held that the statutory words embrace “each step on the critical path to a decision as to what costs to award” [96]. Approval of costs budgets is such a step, because it sets out what each party will prima facie recover if wholly successful. It is not wholly determinative, but it is nevertheless an important step on the way [97].
Convatec’s first budgeting argument was that budgeting concerns only what is reasonable and proportionate for the putative receiving party to incur, whatever the paying party’s means [98]. Arnold LJ accepted that CPR 44.4 sets out a closed list of factors which does not include financial circumstances, citing Coventry v Lawrence [99]. Although no detailed argument was heard, it appears to follow that the paying party’s financial position should not be taken into account when approving budgets, notwithstanding CPR 1.1(2) [99].
That did not answer the point where section 106(1) applies. Reasonableness and proportionality need not be viewed solely from the receiving party’s perspective [100]. As Arnold LJ put it: “Furthermore, section 106(2) suggests that the financial position of the potential paying party can, and should, be taken into account.” Relying on Salts Healthcare Ltd v Pelican Healthcare Ltd, he identified the rationale of scale costs: access to justice through predictable costs exposure. That rationale was plainly applicable to section 40 claims [100].
The second argument was that section 106(1) can operate only when costs are actually awarded, because only then are all relevant circumstances known [101]. The court rejected it. Budgeting takes into account the relevant circumstances so far as they are then known. Later developments that provide a good reason for departing from a budget can be taken into account [101].
The third argument was that this approach offended the principle against deciding costs orders pre-emptively. That argument also failed. Taking the parties’ financial position into account when approving budgets does not, at least necessarily, amount to a pre-emptive costs order [102].
The fourth argument was that section 106(1) cannot apply both at budgeting and at the final decision. Arnold LJ held that “there is no reason why section 106(1) should not apply to every step on the critical path to determining what costs to award” [103]. The court must take care at later stages not to apply the same deduction twice. Budgeting does not cover incurred costs, so section 106(1) can still be applied to those [103].
Ground 1 was therefore upheld: section 106 Patents Act 1977 applies when a court is approving costs budgets [104]. Dr Parsons also succeeded on ground 2, and the court limited Convatec’s budgeted costs to £4 million [122].
Practical Implications
Claimants in employee inventor compensation claims who rely on section 106 Patents Act 1977 need not wait for the final costs order. They can ask the court at the costs management conference to reflect the parties’ financial position in the approved budgets. They should come with evidence of means, as Dr Parsons did [107]. A rejected proposal does not end the exercise: the court remains obliged to try to devise an order that is fair to both parties [118].
Employers defending such claims should prepare to meet arguments on means at the budgeting stage, not only arguments on reasonableness and proportionality. Where a reduction has been made at budgeting, they can resist any later attempt to apply the same deduction again. Incurred costs, however, remain open to section 106(1) at the end of the case [103].
In proceedings outside section 106(1), the decision points the other way. On the closed list in CPR 44.4, it appears that the paying party’s financial position is not a budgeting factor, although that observation was made without detailed argument [99]. Whether section 106(1) applies in the Court of Appeal was left undecided [88].
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PRACTICE DIRECTION 3E – COSTS MANAGEMENT
Costs Budgeting, Proportionality and Incurred Costs
Related service: costs management, including Precedent H budgets and CCMC representation.




















