In The Russian Federation v Hulley Enterprises Limited & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 1353, the Court of Appeal ordered security for costs of an appeal but cut the amount to £975,000. It held that market rates for leading counsel had little relevance to what a costs judge would allow. The decision shows how the court tests counsel’s fees and solicitors’ hours when fixing security.
Background
The respondents brought proceedings in the Commercial Court in 2015 for recognition and enforcement of three arbitration awards, seated in The Netherlands, under which the appellant had been found liable for about US$50 billion plus interest [2]. Bright J decided further preliminary issues in the respondents’ favour on 2 March 2026 and granted permission to appeal on one ground. Males LJ later granted permission on further grounds [3], [5], [6].
On 15 June 2026 the respondents applied for conditions on the appeal and for security for costs of the appeal [1]. The court declined to impose conditions [30], but held that security should be ordered under Part 25 because there was a real risk that the appellant would not pay the costs of a failed appeal and that the costs order could not be enforced [74]. That left timing and quantum [76].
Costs Issues Before the Court
The respondents’ costs schedule, dated 1 June 2026, put their total expected costs at £3,642,000-odd, the majority being counsel’s fees [82]. The respondents sought 70% of the scheduled sums as security [82]. The court had to decide how much security the appellant should provide for a four day appeal, and in particular what weight to give to counsel’s fees and to the solicitors’ recorded and estimated hours [84], [87].
The Court’s Decision
Fancourt LJ, giving the judgment with which Phillips LJ agreed, described the sums sought as “extraordinarily large for a four day appeal” and the amount sought as much too high [82], [83]. He added that the views expressed on quantum should not be seen as limiting in any way the discretion of the costs judge on any detailed assessment of the actual costs [83].
The schedule provided for one leading and one junior counsel. It allowed £60,000 and £9,000 for the application for conditions and security, and £200,000 and £75,000 to adapt the respondent’s notice and skeleton argument to grounds 2 to 8. It then allowed brief fees of £2,000,000 and £375,000 with refreshers, and £100,000 and £25,000 for consequential matters including a half day hearing [84].
The court found these sums astonishing and incapable of justification, at least for these purposes [85]. On the leading brief fee, Fancourt LJ said: “We cannot understand how a brief fee of £2,000,000, on top of all the highly paid work previously done to prepare the skeleton arguments, is appropriate.” The £125,000 for a consequential hearing that will not ordinarily take place was also unjustified [85].
Mr Peters KC, for the respondents, did not try to justify the fees except on the basis of the excellence and seniority of leading counsel and market forces [85]. The court rejected that as a measure for security: “However, that yardstick has little relevance to the criteria that the costs judge will apply, in the context of admittedly complex issues and substantial value on a four day appeal.”
The governing standard was what the appellant could be expected to pay, namely what is reasonable and proportionate. There was no basis at that stage for contending that an indemnity basis of assessment would be appropriate [85]. However much the respondents chose to spend on their lawyers did not alter that.
The court declined to approach counsel’s fees by allowing a percentage of the scheduled figures, because the schedule was too extravagant for that method to be helpful [86]. It instead fixed £600,000 as sufficient security for the disbursements on counsel’s fees [86].
The solicitors’ profit costs were £217,685.38 to the date of the schedule, with a further £458,623.50 estimated [82]. The court identified items whose recoverability it doubted [87]. These included a further 130 hours (£99,238.00) estimated for preparing the application, evidence and submissions, work for which counsel also expected to charge £69,000.
Similar overlap appeared elsewhere. Over 60 hours (£53,123.00) were claimed for amending the respondent’s notice and skeleton argument, while counsel expected £275,000 for the same task. The schedule also included 160 hours for four solicitors attending the four day hearing (£122,800) [87].
The court said the hours raised doubt about the reasonableness of time spent before 1 June 2026 and about the accuracy and reasonableness of the estimates [88]. In Fancourt LJ’s words, “There are obvious questions about unnecessary duplication of work and the number of fee earners involved at various stages.” The court fixed £375,000 for profit costs, including expected disbursements on court fees, transcripts and costs consultants’ fees [89]. Security for costs was therefore ordered at £975,000, to be provided by 1 March 2027 [90].
Practical Implications
This was an interlocutory decision on quantum, and the court stated that its views do not limit the costs judge’s discretion on detailed assessment [83]. It nonetheless shows the approach the court will take when fixing security for costs on an appeal, and the scrutiny a schedule will receive.
For applicants, the supporting schedule should be pitched at what a costs judge would allow as reasonable and proportionate. Counsel’s fees justified by seniority, excellence and market forces are unlikely to carry weight [85]. Where a brief fee follows substantial paid work on skeleton arguments, the applicant should be ready to explain why both are needed. Sums for consequential hearings that will not ordinarily take place should be left out [85].
Applicants should check for overlap between counsel’s and solicitors’ work on the same task, and for the number of fee earners attending a hearing [87], [88]. An extravagant schedule risks the court abandoning a percentage approach and substituting its own lower figure [86]. The court measured security on reasonable and proportionate costs because there was no basis at that stage for contending that the indemnity basis would apply [85].
For appellants resisting an application, the decision supports a detailed challenge to counsel’s fees and to recorded and estimated hours, directed at duplication, the number of fee earners and the reasonableness of time already spent [88].
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Security For Costs | Proportionality And Foreign Enforcement
Security For Costs In UK Civil Litigation
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