Market Rates Have Little Relevance To Security Quantum | £2,000,000 Brief Fee Cannot Be Justified For Security Purposes

Market rates for leading counsel carry little weight when fixing security for costs, as the paying party can only be expected to meet what is reasonable and proportionate. Where a schedule is too extravagant for a percentage approach, the court may fix its own sum.

overflowing measuring jug being poured down to a precise fill line
In The Russian Federation v Hulley Enterprises Limited & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 1353, the Court of Appeal (Fancourt LJ, with whom Phillips LJ agreed) ordered the appellant state to provide security for the costs of a four day appeal, but held that the respondents’ request for 70% of their scheduled costs was much too high. Counsel’s fees justified only by excellence and seniority of leading counsel and market forces had little relevance to the criteria a costs judge would apply, as the paying party could only be expected to pay what was reasonable and proportionate. Treating the schedule as too extravagant for a percentage approach, the court fixed £600,000 for counsel’s fees and £375,000 for profit costs and other disbursements, totalling £975,000. Its views did not limit the costs judge’s discretion on detailed assessment. Applicants should support security estimates with figures a costs judge would allow.

[85] “These sums are astonishing and cannot be justified, at least for these purposes. We cannot understand how a brief fee of £2,000,000, on top of all the highly paid work previously done to prepare the skeleton arguments, is appropriate. £125,000 for a consequential hearing that will not ordinarily take place is also unjustified. Mr Peters sensibly did not try to justify the fees, except on the basis of the excellence and seniority of leading counsel and market forces. However, that yardstick has little relevance to the criteria that the costs judge will apply, in the context of admittedly complex issues and substantial value on a four day appeal. However much the Respondents choose to spend on their lawyers, the Appellant can only be expected to pay what is reasonable and proportionate (there being no basis at this stage for contending that an indemnity basis of assessment will be appropriate).”

Citations

Danilina v Chernukhin [2018] EWHC 39 (Comm) Cited for the requirement that a party seeking security ordinarily adduces evidence of a real risk, rather than a mere possibility, of difficulty enforcing an English costs order abroad; the court distinguished it on the facts.

Spicejet Ltd v De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 1834 Cited as a case where security for costs was refused for want of particular difficulty or expense in enforcing in India, separately from the court’s analysis of its jurisdiction under rule 52.18(1)(a).

Spar Shipping v Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 520 Cited as a case dealing with an application to impose conditions on an appeal, in which the separate application for security for costs was agreed save as to quantum and was not dismissed.

Key Points

  • In fixing the quantum of security for costs, counsel’s fees justified only by the excellence and seniority of leading counsel and market forces carry little weight, because the paying party can only be expected to pay what is reasonable and proportionate. [85]
  • Absent a basis for contending that the indemnity basis of assessment will apply, security is measured against reasonable and proportionate costs, however much the receiving party chooses to spend on its lawyers. [85]
  • Where a costs schedule is too extravagant, the court may decline to allow a percentage of the scheduled figures and instead fix its own sum for security. [86]
  • Duplication between solicitors’ and counsel’s work on the same task, and the number of fee earners involved, are legitimate grounds for reducing the profit costs element of security. [87, 88]
  • Views expressed by the court on the quantum of security do not limit the discretion of the costs judge on a later detailed assessment of the actual costs. [83]

[88] “These are very large numbers of hours being recorded or estimated. They give rise to doubt about the reasonableness of time spent prior to 1 June 2026 and the accuracy of the estimate and reasonableness of the allowances for work to be done in future. There are obvious questions about unnecessary duplication of work and the number of fee earners involved at various stages. [89] We consider that a sum of £375,000, to include also the expected disbursements on court fees, transcripts and costs consultants’ fees is appropriate.”

Key Findings In The Case

  • Security for the costs of the four day appeal was ordered in the sum of £975,000, to be provided by 1 March 2027. [90]
  • The respondents’ request for 70% of their scheduled costs of £3,642,000-odd was much too high. [82, 83]
  • A leading counsel’s brief fee of £2,000,000, on top of highly paid prior work on the skeleton arguments, could not be justified, at least for security purposes, and £125,000 for a consequential hearing that would not ordinarily take place was also unjustified. [85]
  • A percentage approach to counsel’s fees was unhelpful because the schedule was too extravagant, and £600,000 was sufficient security for counsel’s fees. [86]
  • The solicitors’ recorded and estimated hours raised doubts about reasonableness, duplication of work and the number of fee earners, and £375,000 was appropriate for profit costs including court fees, transcripts and costs consultants’ fees. [87, 88, 89]

[82] “The sums sought by way of security are extraordinarily large for a four day appeal. The total sum expected to be incurred by the Respondents, including costs prior to 1 June 2026, the date of the schedule, is £3,642,000-odd. The majority of the total is disbursements, namely Counsel’s fees. The profit costs for the Respondents’ solicitors are £217,685.38 to the date of the schedule and estimated at a further £458,623.50 from then onwards. The Respondent seek 70% of those sums as security. [83] That amount is in my view much too high. The views that I express below should not, of course, be seen as limiting in any way the discretion of the costs judge if and when a detailed assessment of the actual costs is performed.”

In The Russian Federation v Hulley Enterprises Limited & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 1353, the Court of Appeal ordered security for costs of an appeal but cut the amount to £975,000. It held that market rates for leading counsel had little relevance to what a costs judge would allow. The decision shows how the court tests counsel’s fees and solicitors’ hours when fixing security.

Background

The respondents brought proceedings in the Commercial Court in 2015 for recognition and enforcement of three arbitration awards, seated in The Netherlands, under which the appellant had been found liable for about US$50 billion plus interest [2]. Bright J decided further preliminary issues in the respondents’ favour on 2 March 2026 and granted permission to appeal on one ground. Males LJ later granted permission on further grounds [3], [5], [6].

On 15 June 2026 the respondents applied for conditions on the appeal and for security for costs of the appeal [1]. The court declined to impose conditions [30], but held that security should be ordered under Part 25 because there was a real risk that the appellant would not pay the costs of a failed appeal and that the costs order could not be enforced [74]. That left timing and quantum [76].

Costs Issues Before the Court

The respondents’ costs schedule, dated 1 June 2026, put their total expected costs at £3,642,000-odd, the majority being counsel’s fees [82]. The respondents sought 70% of the scheduled sums as security [82]. The court had to decide how much security the appellant should provide for a four day appeal, and in particular what weight to give to counsel’s fees and to the solicitors’ recorded and estimated hours [84], [87].

The Court’s Decision

Fancourt LJ, giving the judgment with which Phillips LJ agreed, described the sums sought as “extraordinarily large for a four day appeal” and the amount sought as much too high [82], [83]. He added that the views expressed on quantum should not be seen as limiting in any way the discretion of the costs judge on any detailed assessment of the actual costs [83].

The schedule provided for one leading and one junior counsel. It allowed £60,000 and £9,000 for the application for conditions and security, and £200,000 and £75,000 to adapt the respondent’s notice and skeleton argument to grounds 2 to 8. It then allowed brief fees of £2,000,000 and £375,000 with refreshers, and £100,000 and £25,000 for consequential matters including a half day hearing [84].

The court found these sums astonishing and incapable of justification, at least for these purposes [85]. On the leading brief fee, Fancourt LJ said: “We cannot understand how a brief fee of £2,000,000, on top of all the highly paid work previously done to prepare the skeleton arguments, is appropriate.” The £125,000 for a consequential hearing that will not ordinarily take place was also unjustified [85].

Mr Peters KC, for the respondents, did not try to justify the fees except on the basis of the excellence and seniority of leading counsel and market forces [85]. The court rejected that as a measure for security: “However, that yardstick has little relevance to the criteria that the costs judge will apply, in the context of admittedly complex issues and substantial value on a four day appeal.”

The governing standard was what the appellant could be expected to pay, namely what is reasonable and proportionate. There was no basis at that stage for contending that an indemnity basis of assessment would be appropriate [85]. However much the respondents chose to spend on their lawyers did not alter that.

The court declined to approach counsel’s fees by allowing a percentage of the scheduled figures, because the schedule was too extravagant for that method to be helpful [86]. It instead fixed £600,000 as sufficient security for the disbursements on counsel’s fees [86].

The solicitors’ profit costs were £217,685.38 to the date of the schedule, with a further £458,623.50 estimated [82]. The court identified items whose recoverability it doubted [87]. These included a further 130 hours (£99,238.00) estimated for preparing the application, evidence and submissions, work for which counsel also expected to charge £69,000.

Similar overlap appeared elsewhere. Over 60 hours (£53,123.00) were claimed for amending the respondent’s notice and skeleton argument, while counsel expected £275,000 for the same task. The schedule also included 160 hours for four solicitors attending the four day hearing (£122,800) [87].

The court said the hours raised doubt about the reasonableness of time spent before 1 June 2026 and about the accuracy and reasonableness of the estimates [88]. In Fancourt LJ’s words, “There are obvious questions about unnecessary duplication of work and the number of fee earners involved at various stages.” The court fixed £375,000 for profit costs, including expected disbursements on court fees, transcripts and costs consultants’ fees [89]. Security for costs was therefore ordered at £975,000, to be provided by 1 March 2027 [90].

Practical Implications

This was an interlocutory decision on quantum, and the court stated that its views do not limit the costs judge’s discretion on detailed assessment [83]. It nonetheless shows the approach the court will take when fixing security for costs on an appeal, and the scrutiny a schedule will receive.

For applicants, the supporting schedule should be pitched at what a costs judge would allow as reasonable and proportionate. Counsel’s fees justified by seniority, excellence and market forces are unlikely to carry weight [85]. Where a brief fee follows substantial paid work on skeleton arguments, the applicant should be ready to explain why both are needed. Sums for consequential hearings that will not ordinarily take place should be left out [85].

Applicants should check for overlap between counsel’s and solicitors’ work on the same task, and for the number of fee earners attending a hearing [87], [88]. An extravagant schedule risks the court abandoning a percentage approach and substituting its own lower figure [86]. The court measured security on reasonable and proportionate costs because there was no basis at that stage for contending that the indemnity basis would apply [85].

For appellants resisting an application, the decision supports a detailed challenge to counsel’s fees and to recorded and estimated hours, directed at duplication, the number of fee earners and the reasonableness of time already spent [88].

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