The High Court’s decision in Smith v Campbell [2026] EWHC 144 (Ch) confirms that the test for a trustee’s indemnity following removal is whether they defended in the interests of the trust and acted reasonably in all the circumstances — not whether they were ultimately successful in resisting removal.
Background
The claimants, Nathan James Smith, Leah-Jane Styring, and Suzanne April Smith, beneficiaries of the Graham Cheslyn-Curtis Will Trust, brought proceedings against the four trustees. The claim was for the removal and replacement of all trustees; as recorded in this costs judgment, it involved “numerous allegations of breach of trust and misconduct,” the majority of which were ultimately dismissed. The trial on the merits resulted in a written judgment on 17 November 2025 (Smith v Campbell [2025] EWHC 3011 (Ch)) (the “Main Judgment”). In that judgment, the court ordered the removal of two trustees, Ian Patrick Campbell (‘Paddy’) and Malcolm Ronald Taylor, but declined to remove the remaining two, Sarah Cheslyn-Curtis and Maldwyn Stephen Henry Worsley-Tonks MBE. Following that decision, the parties agreed to the appointment of Freeths Trustees Limited as a replacement professional trustee. The only outstanding matter was the determination of costs, which was the subject of a hearing on 14 January 2026.
Costs Issues Before the Court
The court was required to determine two distinct but related costs issues. The first was the incidence of costs as between the claimant beneficiaries and the defendant trustees, to be decided under the court’s general discretion pursuant to section 51 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR rule 44.2. The second issue was whether the trustees should be deprived of their right to an indemnity from the trust fund for their costs of the proceedings, which is governed by section 31(1) of the Trustee Act 2000, implemented in the litigation costs context by CPR rule 46.3 and Practice Direction 46.
The Parties’ Positions
The claimants, represented by Paul Burton, argued they were the substantially successful party as they had achieved “regime change” by securing the removal of two trustees and the appointment of an independent professional trustee. They submitted the trustees had unreasonably refused to mediate and had rejected offers of settlement made shortly before trial which reflected the ultimate outcome. The claimants sought an order that the trustees pay their costs on the standard basis and that the trustees be deprived of their indemnity from the trust fund, contending it was unreasonable for Paddy and Malcolm to have “fully and determinedly defended their removal.”
The trustees, represented by Alexander Learmonth KC, submitted they were the successful parties in substance. They emphasised that the claimants had failed to remove two trustees and had advanced numerous allegations of misconduct which were almost entirely dismissed. They argued the claimants’ true objective was commercial, relating to Paddy’s directorship of the underlying company, Millpledge, and that the claimants had acted unreasonably by issuing proceedings without any pre-action correspondence and by rejecting reasonable settlement offers, including an early proposal for Paddy to retire as trustee. The trustees sought an order that the claimants pay their costs, or circa 90% of them, and that they retain their full right of indemnity from the trust.
The Court’s Decision
On the incidence of costs between the parties, the court held that the claimants were the partially successful party, having achieved the removal of two of the four trustees. The starting point pursuant to CPR rule 44.2(2)(a) was therefore that the trustees should pay the claimants’ costs. However, the court exercised its discretion to depart from this rule. The court found the claimants’ conduct was unreasonable in several key respects: they issued proceedings without any pre-action correspondence or compliance with the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct; they made and pursued “myriad allegations of misconduct” against the trustees which were unjustified and exaggerated, and which formed the bulk of the litigation costs; and they were primarily responsible for the failure to engage in early alternative dispute resolution. On this last point, the court found the claimants had not accepted early offers of mediation and had rejected outright the trustees’ December 2024 proposal that Paddy retire as a trustee. Although shortly before trial the parties exchanged without prejudice save as to costs offers with substantive terms closely reflecting the eventual outcome, the principal remaining dispute was costs, and time ran out before a resolution could be reached. In all the circumstances, the court ordered that there be no order as to costs between the parties.
On the trustees’ right of indemnity, the court held that their costs were not improperly incurred and they were entitled to be indemnified from the trust fund. The court found it was proper and reasonable for the trustees to defend themselves against the numerous allegations of breach of trust and misconduct, the majority of which were dismissed. Furthermore, the trustees had made a good faith and reasonable attempt to address the legitimate relationship issues by making an open offer in December 2024 for Paddy to retire or for a demerger of the trust assets involving an independent trustee. The claimants’ rejection of that proposal, on the basis that Paddy would remain a company director, was not a reasonable basis on which to refuse an offer that sought to address their concerns about trust administration. The trustees had not acted perfectly—for example, Malcolm’s position was not addressed in their open proposal—but their conduct in defending the allegations and making a constructive settlement proposal was not such as to justify depriving them of their indemnity. The court also noted, obiter, that it was doubtful whether it had jurisdiction to order a partial deprivation of indemnity, but declined to decide the point and stated it would not have exercised any such jurisdiction on the facts of this case.

Trust and estate costs principles explained in Mussell v Patience
Executor estate indemnity lost after hostile removal litigation in Fernandez v Fernandez
Partial success and the courts’ approach to costs
Refusal to mediate does not always justify indemnity costs
Costs penalty applied for silence in the face of an invitation to mediate















