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A consent order requiring a defendant to pay a specified sum in full and final settlement of a claim can, in substance and effect, constitute a “judgment” for the purposes of engaging CPR 36.17, even if the order does not use the word “judgment”. §13,§15§13, §15§13,§15
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When determining whether an order amounts to a judgment, the court will focus on the substance and effect of the order rather than its precise wording. A final order requiring payment in respect of the claim is to be treated as equivalent, in substance, to an order made following a judgment. §12–13§12–13§12–13
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Where a claimant obtains a judgment (including a qualifying consent order) that is more advantageous than its own Part 36 offer, the court held that the usual costs consequences under CPR 36.17 are engaged from the expiry of the relevant period. §6,§17§6, §17§6,§17
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Although the court retains a discretion under CPR 36.17(5) to disapply the usual costs consequences if it would be unjust to do so, no such argument was advanced in this case, and the court observed that there was no reasonable basis on the facts for such an argument. §16§16§16
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Once CPR 36.17 is engaged, the court has a discretion to set the rate of interest on costs, and in this case exercised that discretion by fixing the rate at 7%. §18(i)§18(i)§18(i)
