Inquests, London Solicitors, Hourly Rates And Proportionality

Full Background And Decision

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Background – lead up to and death of Amanda Briley

The case arose from the tragic early death of Amanda Briley, born on 25 August 1996, who suffered from mental health difficulties, including Asperger’s Syndrome, leading to multiple inpatient stays at the Bradgate Mental Health Unit.

From 2012 to 2016, she experienced numerous self-harm and suicide attempts. Amanda’s care involved various levels of observation, medication adjustments, and efforts to find a specialist placement, delayed by funding issues.

A detailed plan for her overnight leave on 24 December 2016, including reducing observation levels, was not followed, and the rationale was lost from the records. Amanda’s regular consultant was on leave, and the covering consultant was unaware of the plan for her return, leading to inconsistencies in her care and reflecting the challenges in managing her mental well-being and safety.

On Boxing Day, 26 December 2016, Amanda was found having ligatured herself and was declared deceased on 28 December 2016.

A serious incident investigation identified failings in communication, suitability of placement at Bradgate Unit, delay in funding for specialist care, and safeguarding concerns. The investigation found Amanda’s extended stay at Bradgate Unit detrimental to her well-being, and the failure to provide level 1 constant observations was primarily a system error.

The concerns surrounding these tragic events led to an investigation and a future Inquest touching upon Amanda’s death.

The inquest and civil action

Bhatt Murphy were instructed to act on behalf of the Claimants (Amanda’s family) in a claim against the Defendants for declaratory relief and damages, including aggravated damages, arising from the acts and omissions of the Defendants’ employees, servants and/or agents. The claims were brought pursuant to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and the common law for negligence and in respect of breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights) and the Equality Act 2010.

Chronology of relevant steps taken

• 17 May 2017: A pre-Inquest review hearing was listed but adjourned to allow ongoing investigations into Amanda’s death, including the Serious Incident Investigation Report.
• May – August 2017: The Serious Incident Investigation Report was received, along with numerous handwritten records and witness statements, as part of the disclosure process.
• 8 December 2017: The Claimants filed an Application Notice and draft Order to bring proceedings, which was adjourned with liberty to restore, pending further evidence and argument.
• 13 December 2017: A Witness Statement of Ms. Megan Phillips was filed to assist the Court with further information regarding the proposed claims.
• 15 December 2017: A Consent Order was granted, allowing the Claimants to bring proceedings against the Defendants under the Mental Health Act 1983. The Claim Form was subsequently filed.
• 11 December 2017: A pre-Inquest review hearing took place, confirming that a Jury would be summoned and that it would be an Article 2 Inquest. Directions were made for expert evidence, disclosure, and witness statements.
• January 2018: Further voluminous medical records were received from the First Defendant, requiring careful review and flagging of entries for instructions from the Claimants.
• February 2018: Additional witness statements were disclosed, along with a report regarding Amanda’s mobile phone, emphasizing the importance of reviewing its contents.
• March 2018: Submissions were made to the Coroner regarding expert evidence to assist with liability for the civil claim. Dr. Camden Smith and Dr. Stephen Edgeley were instructed as experts.
• 12 April 2018: An Application Notice was filed for an extension of time for service of the Particulars of Claim, reflecting the complexity of the case.
• 25 May 2018: A Consent Order was made, providing an extension of time for service until 15 February 2019, allowing for further preparation.
• May 2018: Extensive bundles of medical records were received, leading to consideration of safeguarding records, witness statements, and detailed case notes.
• 30 May 2018: A further pre-Inquest review hearing was listed, focusing on the jury, Article 2, scope, disclosure, and witness evidence.
• July 2018: Consideration was given to drawings made by Amanda, and the Coroner was approached for permission to prepare a statement explaining the context.
• 25 July 2018: A Part 36 offer was made by all three Defendants, but it was rejected by the Claimants due to the lack of an admission of liability.
• 15 August 2018: A detailed response to the Defendants’ Part 36 offer was provided, outlining the causes of action and inviting admissions of liability.
• 30 August 2018: The Defendants responded, requesting the Claimants to prepare draft wording for a letter of apology, reflecting negotiations.
• 27 September 2018: The Claimants set out the admissions of liability sought, and the First Defendant responded, seeking instructions for full admissions.
• 10 October 2018: The First Defendant confirmed they would arrange full disclosure of Amanda’s medical records, ensuring comprehensive evaluation of the claim.
• 26 October 2018: The Defendants made a further Part 36 offer, again not supported by full admissions, leading to continued negotiations.
• 30 October 2018: The Claimants wrote to the Defendants requesting confirmation of admissions, emphasizing their importance.
• 3 November 2018: The First and Second Defendants admitted liability in respect of all causes of action, marking a significant step towards resolution.
• 15 November 2018: The draft wording of the letter of apology was provided to the First Defendant, reflecting agreement on key terms.
• 16 November 2018: The Defendants’ Part 36 offer was accepted by the Claimants, finalizing the settlement terms.
• 19 November 2018: The Inquest commenced, with the letters of apology received thereafter.
• After 19 November 2018: The settlement was accompanied by full admissions of liability, a letter of apology, and a commitment to involving the family in training and learning lessons from Amanda’s death, concluding the legal process.

Defendants’ case on Hourly Rates

1. Charging Rate of Ms. Phillips:
   • Issue & Argument:The Defendants disputed the hourly rate charged by Ms. Phillips, a Solicitor at Bhatt Murphy in Dalston, London. They asserted that since the Claimants resided in Leicester, it was not objectively reasonable to instruct a London-based firm, and the rate of £350.00 per hour was excessive.
   • Support: Wraith v Sheffield Forgemasters [1988] 1 WLR 132 and A v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2008] EWHC 1658 (QB).
2. Involvement of Counsel:
   • Issue & Argument: he Defendants emphasized the heavy involvement of Counsel in the case, arguing that this should have reduced the Solicitors’ hourly rates. They believed that only Ms. Phillips’ rate should have been enhanced, as she delegated most of the salient work to Counsel.
   • Support: Specific examples of tasks handled by Counsel, such as considering the Expert’s CV and working on the letter of settlement, were provided to illustrate their argument.
3. Guideline Hourly Rates (GHR):
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants argued that the degree of departure from the GHR (National Band 2) was unreasonable, asserting that a National (Band 2) firm from in/around Leicester would have been capable of conducting the litigation.
   • Support: Research on the Law Society website and references to firms like Duncan Lewis and Irwin Mitchell.
4. INQUEST Recommendation:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants challenged the relevance of INQUEST’s recommendation of Bhatt Murphy to the Claimants, arguing that as Mr Bhatt of Mhatt Murphy was a founding member this did not assist them. Furthermore, the Claimants would not have paid attention to hourly rates give its importance to them and the fact that the case was to be funded either by Legal Aid or a CFA.
5. Inflation and GHR Increase:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants dismissed the relevance of inflation to the hourly rates. They referred to the recent substantial increase in GHR and the Master of the Rolls’ previous stance that the rates were already too high in 2014.
   • Support: Historical context of GHR adjustments and the decision-making process behind them.
6. Comparison with Other Cases:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants compared the complexity of this case with other high-value claims, arguing that the circumstances were tragic but did not warrant a rate comparable to a £20 million Clinical Negligence claim.
   • Support: Reference to JXA where Fieldfisher was awarded £350 per hour in a £20 million Clinical Negligence claim, emphasising the difference in complexity and value.
7. Review of Amount and Importance:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants urged the need to assess the amount of money involved and the importance of the case, comparing it to other Clinical Negligence cases to argue for a more reasonable rate.
   • Support: KMT, KAY, MEY, MJY (Children proceedings by their Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) v Kent County Council [2012] EWHC 2088 QB.
8. Enhancement and Exceptional Circumstances:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants suggested that a large complex case may have warranted an enhancement of up to 70%, but anything more must have approached the ‘exceptional’, arguing that this case could not have warranted those sorts of rates.
   • Support: Johnson v Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd [1992] 1 All ER 169, Brush v Bower Cotton and Bower [1993] 1 WLR 1325, Higgs v Camden & Islington Health Authority [2003] EWHC 15 (QB), and Finley v Glaxo Laboratories Limited (1997 Costs Law Reports at page 109).

Defendants’ case on recovery of inquest costs

1. Total Legal Costs and Nature of Costs:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants detailed the legal costs during the pre-Inquest review hearings at £14,770.67. They argued that these costs were not related to the Inquest or ancillary activities, thus questioning their relevance. They further argued that as the matter settled before the Inquest ‘proper’ took place,  these costs were unrelated to the Inquest proceedings.
2. Disproportionate Legal Costs:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants contended that the costs were disproportionate to the value of the claim, criticising the Claimants’ Solicitors for providing a ‘platinum legal service’ without regard to cost considerations. They described the legal presence throughout the Inquest process as ‘weighty’ and the legal spend as ‘eye-watering.’
   • Support: Reference to Lord Woolf’s statement in Jefferson v National Freight Carriers Ltd, emphasising the need for proportionality, planning, and curbing the amount of work done in modest litigation.
3. Recoverable Costs and Disputed Items:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants argued that only costs directly related to the civil claim were recoverable, disputing all times or items associated with procedural matters, including attending pre-Inquest hearings, assisting the Coroner, and listening to Witness Statements. They also pointed out that the costs of the Inquest do not appear in the Bill.
   • Support: Cited Roach v The Home Office, emphasising that costs must be ‘of and incidental to’ the civil claim, and highlighting the specific nature of the disputed items.
4. Challenge to Client Care and Travel Expenses:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants challenged all costs associated with client care and travel expenses, questioning their relevance and necessity. They disputed the need for such extensive client care and travel, considering the nature of the case.
   • Support: Multiple case references, including a decision by Master Rowley in Amanda Helen Lynch, highlighting previous judgments on similar matters, and emphasising the need for a reasonable approach to client care and travel expenses.
5. Relevance of Pre-Inquest Costs:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants questioned the relevance of pre-Inquest costs to the civil claim, emphasising that each case must be evaluated individually, considering proportionality and relevance. They contrasted different cases where pre-Inquest costs were either approved or not, depending on the specific circumstances.
   • Support: Comparison between Fullick & Ors v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Lynch, analysing the differences in the circumstances and the relevance of pre-Inquest costs to the civil claim.
6. Criteria for Recoverable Inquest Costs:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants outlined specific criteria for recoverable Inquest costs, arguing that these must meet three tests: usefulness in the claim, relevance to the matters in issue, and attribution to the Defendants’ conduct. They insisted that all three tests must be passed for the costs to be recoverable.
   • Support: Reference to In re Gibson’s Settlement Trusts.
7. Chronology and Liability Admissions:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants provided a detailed chronology, including liability admissions and pre-Inquest review hearings, to argue against the recoverability of costs. They emphasised that full liability admissions were made prior to the Inquest, and the Third Defendant had limited involvement, thus questioning the need for the costs.
   • Support: Specific dates, events, and correspondence, including Part 36 offers and liability admissions, and a detailed analysis of the sequence of events leading to the settlement.
8. Proportionate Investigation and Reasonable Expenditure:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants encouraged the court to “undertake a proportionate investigation into what should be recoverable”, referring to the concept of reasonable expenditure and the need to consider the lowest amount that could have been expected to spend. They argued that any expenditure beyond this level should be for the Claimants’ own account.
   • Support: Reference to Kazakhstan Kagazy plc v Zhunus, concerning the importance of proficient conduct and presentation of the case without excessive expenditure, and the principle that the touchstone is not the amount in the party’s best interests but the lowest reasonable amount.
9. Use and Service of Pre-Inquest Review:
   • Issue & Argument: The Defendants questioned the utility of the pre-Inquest review in the civil claim, detailing the known facts about the deceased’s condition and risk, and asking what additional information could be gained by in-person attendance. They argued that the importance of the Inquest to the family did not make it ‘of use and service’ in the civil claim.
   • Support: Detailed analysis of the circumstances of the case, including incidents, reports, and findings, application of the Gibson test for usefulness, and a thorough examination of the known facts and their relevance to the civil claim.
10. Conclusion and Resistance to Costs:

• • Issue & Argument: The Defendants concluded by asserting resistance to all costs in their table, arguing that neither a Solicitor/fee earner nor a Barrister should have attended the pre-Inquest review hearings, as the case settled prior to the Inquest. They insisted that general ‘housekeeping’ at the pre-Inquest reviews would not be recoverable and urged a proportionate investigation.
  • Support: Summary of their position, reference to the total costs, emphasis on the principle that general ‘housekeeping’ would not be recoverable, and a detailed argument against the need for legal representation at the pre-Inquest review hearings, considering the settlement and the nature of the case.

Claimants’ position on hourly rates

Reasonableness of Choosing Bhatt Murphy

The Claimants argued that their residence in Leicester was not a determining factor in choosing Bhatt Murphy in London. They emphasised that the choice was objectively reasonable, given the tragic circumstances of Amanda’s death and the firm’s reputation as a top human rights and civil liberties firm. The cases Wraith v Sheffield Forgemasters and Solutia UK Ltd v Griffiths were cited to support this point, emphasizing that the choice of legal representation should be based on expertise and suitability rather than geographical proximity.

Referral by INQUEST

The Claimants were referred to Bhatt Murphy by the charity INQUEST, known for its expertise in representing people whose loved ones have died in state care. The connection between Bhatt Murphy and INQUEST was deemed immaterial, and the recommendation was based on the firm’s specific experience with deaths in mental health custody.

Urgency and Expertise Required

The family’s urgent need for representation for the pre-Inquest review and the specific expertise required on death in Mental Health detention were highlighted. The family’s willingness to travel to Bhatt Murphy was also noted. The complexity of the case and the need for specialized knowledge were emphasized as key factors in the decision-making process.

Reasonable Choice, Not Cheapest Option

The test, according to the Claimants, was not whether Bhatt Murphy was the cheapest option but whether their choice was objectively reasonable. They cited Kai Surrey v Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust to emphasize that the choice only needed to be reasonable, not the best. The importance of the matter to the family and the unique circumstances they were facing were considered paramount.

Factors Under CPR 44.3

The Claimants relied on the factors set out in CPR 44.3, including the conduct of parties, the amount or value involved, the importance of the matter, complexity, skill, effort, specialized knowledge, time spent, and the place where the work was done. They argued that these factors justified their choice and the hourly rates charged, reflecting the multifaceted nature of the case.

National Reputation and Settlement Value

Bhatt Murphy’s national reputation for handling similar cases and the settlement value of £65,000 were presented as further justification. The reasonable valuation figures for different aspects of the case were detailed, highlighting the significance of the settlement and the complexity of the legal issues involved.

Counsel’s Involvement

The Claimants denied that Counsel’s involvement was so significant as to reduce the Solicitor’s entitlement to enhancement on hourly rates. They argued that the Guideline Hourly Rates (GHR) were not applicable to this type of case, and that the Solicitor’s role was not diminished by Counsel’s contributions.

Enhancement and Consumer Price Index

The Claimants argued that the GHR needed to be updated by reference to the Consumer Price Index, which would bring the Grade A hourly rate to £321. Enhancement would then need to be applied in line with Choudhury v Kingston Hospitals NHS Trust.

Claimants’ position on inquest costs

Proportionality and Recoverability

The Claimants contended that the costs incurred in the Inquest proceedings were not disproportionate, referencing Master Campbell’s observations in the case of Wilton v The Youth Justice Board and Another (Costs) 23 December 2010 Master Campbell’s view was that even £250,000 on an Inquest to recover £30,000 was not disproportionate. The Claimants asserted that the ‘new’ test under CPR Part 44.3(2)(a) should be considered, where costs may be disallowed or reduced if disproportionate, even if reasonably or necessarily incurred. They relied on various cases, including Roach v The Home Office [2010] EWHC 3125.

Emphasis on Relevance and Reasonableness

The Claimants emphasized the relevance of the evidence obtained during the Inquest and pre-Inquest reviews to the civil claim. They argued that all the evidence was pertinent and used in the civil claim, and that the costs incurred were recoverable by reference to the Gibson test and the case of The Bowbelle (Ross v Bowbelle (Owners)) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 196. They provided a detailed account of the Inquest, underscoring the reasonableness of the costs, and highlighted the importance of the Inquest in uncovering the truth and holding responsible parties accountable.

Challenge to Defendants’ Conduct and Admissions

Highlighting the Defendants’ conduct, the Claimants pointed out difficulties in obtaining disclosure and the timing of admissions. They argued that the full admission was not received until after the pre-Inquest reviews, and this impacted the costs. They maintained that the Defendants’ conduct justified the costs incurred, referencing the principles of fairness and transparency in legal proceedings.

Reliance on Specific Case Law and Rejection of Non-Binding Decisions

The Claimants extensively referred to specific case law, including Powell v UK [2000] 30 EHRR 362 and Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust [2012] UKSC 2, to support their arguments. They asserted that Lynch, was not binding. They emphasised that the decision must turn upon the facts in their specific case, rejecting any generalised approach, and argued for a nuanced understanding of the legal principles involved.

Conclusion on Recoverability and Proportionality

In conclusion, the Claimants maintained that all the costs were recoverable, and the costs claimed were proportionate. They emphasised the importance of ascertaining the precise nature of the Defendants’ breaches and argued that their approach to costs was consistent with established legal principles and case law. They stressed the need for a fair and just resolution, in line with the overarching objectives of the legal system.

Costs Judge James:

Point 4 Hourly Rates

1. 1. As to Point 4, hourly rates, I find first of all that it was objectively reasonable for the Claimants to instruct Bhatt Murphy. The firm has a national reputation for this kind of work and was recommended to the Claimants by INQUEST. I do not find the fact that Mr Bhatt of Bhatt Murphy is a force behind INQUEST to be troubling on the facts in this case; there are many interest groups, pressure groups and charities working with different kinds of litigants (Defendant as well as Claimant groups) and the fact that a high-profile firm or Solicitor has close ties to one such group, is of no concern here. INQUEST maintains a database of expert lawyers for such cases; they recommended Bhatt Murphy, and that recommendation is a fact upon which the Claimants are entitled to rely in accordance with the principles in Wraith.

1. 1. The Defendants suggested that a number of other firms, including Duncan Lewis and Irwin Mitchell, could have handled this ‘Clinical Negligence’ matter. The problem with that is that this is not a Clinical Negligence claim and there are issues involving Human Rights and the Equality Act/disability discrimination. Most significant of all, this is a case involving a death in mental health custody (and I reiterate, whether Amanda was being ‘held’ under Section is not determinative in any way, on the facts it was not safe for her to come home for more than a short time).

1. 1. This is a specialised area of the law; Mr Buckley asserted that Irwin Mitchell would not run the case with Legal Aid in place (although in fairness I had no evidence on that point) and that highlights just one aspect of the specialised nature of this work. The way in which Legal Aid ‘abuts’ the CFAs in such cases is not common knowledge and the ability of a specialised firm to ensure that the Claimants were able to attend the Inquest proceedings without fear of the cost thereof, is just one factor in why the choice of firm is objectively reasonable.

1. 1. The lack of evidence also cuts both ways; even if Mr Smith is right, and Duncan Lewis or Irwin Mitchell could have run this case (and bearing in mind we are going back to 2017/18, whatever capacity they have now, their capacity then would be the relevant issue) I have seen nothing to suggest that they would have run this case at a lower hourly rate than that charged by Bhatt Murphy.

1. 1. Taking Irwin Mitchell, for example, they have offices in Sheffield and to their credit when work is done in Sheffield, they apply rates lower than the rates for work done out of their London offices. However, they are a specialist firm and they do not tend to charge GHR for their services; sometimes they recover rates very substantially in excess of GHR, depending upon the type of case. Had they been approached by the Claimants in such a tragic and high-profile case, it is foreseeable that they might have decided that it warranted one of their London-based Solicitors, and even if they ran it from a regional office, it is in my view certain that their hourly rate for such work would have been substantially in excess of GHR and may have equalled Bhatt Murphy’s London 3 rate.

1. 1. Mr Smith recognised that the GHR for London 3 are not so very different from the GHR for National 2, but to be clear that again feeds into the objective reasonableness of the Claimants’ choice. If this was a case to which GHR applied – and with the death of a vulnerable young woman in the Defendants’ care this was never going to be such a case – the locality of Bhatt Murphy would make very little difference as far as hourly rates are concerned.

1. 1. The Defendants have been represented by law firms well-versed in defending claims against NHS Trusts and the like. If anyone would be in a position to produce evidence of lower hourly rates in the Midlands for such work, it would be the Defendants, and no such evidence was produced by them. In the absence of any evidence that a ‘local’ firm existed with the resources to run this case to the standard provided by Bhatt Murphy, for less per hour than Bhatt Murphy were charging, I find that the location of Bhatt Murphy does not diminish the reasonableness of the Claimants’ choice.

1. 1. I also accept the Claimants’ submissions on the ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’ and in particular, as well as the skill and expertise above referred to, which is key on the facts in this case, I note that conduct has been another such factor. Mr Buckley did not suggest, and I do not find that the Defendants’ legal representatives have been guilty of any misconduct. They are entitled to mount a robust defence and on my reading of the facts that is exactly what they did, although they capitulated once the writing was on the wall. However, their robust defence and sheer weight of numbers (the listing of Defence personnel at the pre-Inquest reviews took several minutes just to read into the record) does have an impact upon the reasonableness of the Claimants’ choice in choosing a firm that would be content to attend with just one fee earner and one Barrister in the face of such opposition.

1. 1. As to the efforts made, if any, before and during the proceedings in order to try to resolve the dispute, whilst I accept that Mr Smith was endeavouring to assist the Court with truthful and correct submissions, I am afraid that his instructions (and the Points of Dispute, which will have fettered his submissions more than somewhat) were, on this issue, incorrect. Much was made of the early ‘admission’ by the Defendants in this matter but in fact it was very limited, both as to its scope (a few hours around the time that Amanda’s life ended) and as to who was making the admission (not all three Defendants). In order for the Claimants to establish the full extent of Amanda’s suffering and of the Defendants’ failings, they had to press on with the pre-Inquest reviews and only received a full admission (and apology) from all three Defendants at a much later date, after those took place.

1. 1. As to the amount or value of any money or property involved, that was not the main focus of either party; at £65,000 the matter clearly settled at a figure much higher than (say) statutory bereavement damages and the cost of a decent funeral. I accept that the Human Rights and Equality Act issues were significant factors in the settlement figure achieved, and in that respect, the instruction of Bhatt Murphy was a decisive factor in running this claim to a successful conclusion.

1. 1. Value was clearly outweighed by the importance of the matter to all the parties; this was not just a factor for the Claimants, who had lost their loved one in the most tragic circumstances and were keen to ensure that Amanda’s death should mean something, not simply in terms of damages but in terms of lessons learned that could help to protect other vulnerable people in the same position. There was also a high degree of importance to the Defendants, which can be illustrated by just one example.

1. 1. In his submissions, Mr Smith referred to the fact that conditions in the Bradgate Unit must have been ‘torture’ for Amanda, and that this was ‘known’ (I am paraphrasing a submission made by him in regard to the claim for pre-Inquest review costs). With all due respect to Mr Smith, that was not a point that assisted the Defendants; I accept that, ultimately, the matter was resolved with the Claimants’ agreement, but during the currency of the dispute the Defendants tried to keep matters within very close parameters especially as to the timeline. The idea that they would not be motivated to deny or at least to delay admitting, that Amanda’s living conditions must have been ‘torture’ for her, is simply not persuasive. They attended the Inquest in force of numbers and fought as hard as they could for as long as they could. The hourly rates charged by Bhatt Murphy have to be viewed against that background of very robust litigation by several leading Defendant firms.

1. 1. As to the particular complexity of the matter or the difficulty or novelty of the questions raised; without repeating all of the facts set out above this was very clearly a complex and difficult matter. There were multiple failures across many months (or years), there was a vast amount of documentation and there were numerous causes of action against three Defendants. Even after the matter settled, the Points of Dispute referred to this as a Clinical Negligence matter with no reference to the Human Rights or Equality Act issues which were (as I have found) both of great significance to the Claimants in terms of what had happened to Amanda, and of importance in terms of the level of damages awarded to the Claimants which included substantial elements of non-negligence damages.

1. 1. The time spent on the case is not a factor of which either party made a great deal, but on the place where and the circumstances in which work or any part of it was done, I note Mr Buckley’s submissions as to the specialised and challenging nature of proceedings before a Coroner’s Court and I accept that this is yet another factor that affirms the choice of Bhatt Murphy to run this case.

1. 1. All of these factors also affect not only the choice of Bhatt Murphy but the rates charged by that firm. I was assisted by learned submissions from Mr Smith and from Mr Buckley on how I should proceed to calculate a reasonable and proportionate hourly rate. The old A plus B factor calculations of Johnson v Reed Corrugated et al are no longer the fashionable choice but they do allow me to take a view and then cross-check the figure reached against some established principles.

1. 1. With regards to the submission that, for work done in 2017 and 2018, inflation is not something that I should take into account; I note that the Master of the Rolls thought the rates were, if anything, too high in 2014. However, over time it became clear that the 2010 GHR were no longer fit for purpose. In a case involving General Management in the Court of Protection, which is not work of the same order of complexity as this case, and which warrants GHR as this case does not, in PLK and Others (Costs) [2020] EWHC B28 (Costs), Costs Judge Whalan said Judges should apply: “some broad, pragmatic flexibility” when applying the 2010 GHR during the period from 1 January 2018 onwards and that “if the rates claimed fall within approximately 120% of the GHR they should be regarded as prima facie reasonable.”

1. 1. A PLK uplift on £267/hour (top end London 3 Grade A rate) would bring it to just over £320/hour without any enhancement whatsoever. Given the factors above referred to, I would be prepared to enhance the hourly rate above that amount. Bearing in mind my own knowledge of the rates charged in the legal services market for specialised work of this sort and doing the best that I can, I find that the hourly rate claimed in the Bill for time spent/work done by for Ms Phillips is reasonable as claimed at £350/hour. Applying PLK alone, would result in an hourly rate of £145 for Grade D London 3, and for that reason I uphold the £140/hour claimed even though for Grade D work I would not have allowed any enhancement. As for the Costs Consultant, this is specialised work meriting more than the GHR for Grade D London 3 and I find that £150/hour is also a reasonable rate, which I uphold.

Fee Earner	London 3 GHR	C Rates claimed	D Rates offered	Allowed
Ms Phillips Grade A	229.00-267.00	350.00	225.00	350.00
Ms Solopova Grade D	121.00	140.00	111.00	140.00
Mr Ferdinand Grade D	121.00	140.00	111.00	140.00
Ms Carini Grade D	121.00	140.00	111.00	140.00
Ms Lisette Grade D	121.00	140.00	111.00	140.00
Costs consultant	121.00	150.00	111.00	150.00

Point 6

1. 1. At the hearing before me, the judgment in Fullick was referred to by both sides; Mr Buckley, Costs Lawyer for the Claimants in this case also appeared for the Claimants in Fullick and the case was a recent decision in the High Court (and therefore potentially binding rather than merely persuasive) dealing with the question of whether the costs of attending an Inquest are recoverable in cases where the claimant has succeeded in a claim following death.

1. 1. Slade J in Fullick reinforces the fact that the costs of attending an Inquest are potentially recoverable in a claim for damages following the death, but that the Court has to be careful to ensure that the costs allowed are those that are reasonably necessary (and proportionate) in the pursuit of the civil claim, which must be decided upon consideration of the Bill of Costs. Here, I have what would at the time have been a relatively early electronic Bill, which has sufficient detail to enable me to assess whether the sums claimed do indeed relate to investigation of the civil claim, especially as assisted by the learned submissions of the advocates who attended before me.

1. 1. Fullick also reminds the reader that Proportionality does not just relate to the sums of money involved; in cases such as this one, finding out what caused such a death is a very significant factor as well. Due to her various health issues, Amanda did not have and may never have had any prospect of a career, let alone a high-earning one. Nor was she in a relationship (not counting ‘Declan’ who may or may not have existed) and nor had she had any children. Those facts close off a great many potential heads of loss, but that does not mean that Amanda’s life was not worth anything nor that her life was not worth more than £65,000.

1. 1. Obviously, it was, but on the facts in this case I would say that, as important to the Claimants as the money damages, was finding out exactly what happened to Amanda and why so as (hopefully) to avoid the same sad fate befalling any other vulnerable people in a similar position. This is borne out by the fact that the Claimants did not accept the £65,000 settlement figure the moment it was offered, but held out, not for more money but for a meaningful apology and a commitment to take lessons from Amanda’s death, to benefit other vulnerable young people in Amanda’s position.

1. 1. It is notable that in Fullick the action settled without service of a letter of claim or particulars of claim, for £17,000 and the Claimants’ Bill of costs totalled £122,000, to include the costs of attending two pre-Inquest hearings.  Deputy Master Keens allowed the costs of attending those hearings and the Defendant appealed on the grounds (inter alia) that costs of attending the Inquest should not be recoverable at all. Mrs Justice Slade, after duly considering the competing arguments, found that Deputy Master Keens, “did not err in his conclusion that the costs attendance at the Inquest hearing were reasonably and proportionately incurred. The cause of death and recommendations for changes in police procedure were relevant to the civil claim. The claim was for damages for breaches of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to the death of Ms Jones at a police station. Evidence on the cause of death and actions and procedures of the police given in the Inquest and the verdict reached are relevant to those issues. Consideration should be given to whether all or only some of the steps in the Inquest proceedings are relevant to the civil claim. If they are, whether the costs incurred in participation by the Claimant in each of those steps is proportionate and reasonable. If some of those steps are agreed, such as the giving of certain evidence, it is unlikely to be proportionate or reasonable for a receiving party to attend a pre-hearing review to deal with agreed matters.”

1. 1. If one substitutes, ‘Amanda’ for ‘Ms. Jones’, ‘following a ligature on the Bradgate Unit’ for ‘at a Police Station’ and ‘the Defendants’ for ‘the Police’ the above quote could apply to this case; notably of course this case dealt with pre-Inquest reviews rather than an Inquest ‘proper’ but equally notably, there was not much in the way of ‘agreed matters’ as far as I have seen. As in Fullick and unlike Kazakhstan Kagazy, the civil claim in Amanda’s case was about much more than money. It challenged the Defendants’ systems and practices and asserted multiple breaches not only of the Defendants’ duty of care in negligence but of the European Convention on Human Rights as well as the Equality Act. Without repeating all of the facts there were concerns around keeping a young person with autism on the Bradgate Unit which Mr Smith rightly accepted must have been ‘torture’ for her, concerns around bullying, safeguarding, concerns around a young woman reporting rape and nothing being done about it, concern around a young woman ligaturing to the point of unconsciousness and no Serious Incident Report being made, concern about Amanda having access to a salt-like substance and so on.

1. 1. There were unanswered questions about why it had taken so long to recognise that Amanda needed to be moved from the Bradgate Unit, to seek or obtain funding for such a move and as to whose responsibility it was to seek and obtain such funding. There was even doubt as to Amanda’s cause of death, given the lack of tell-tale ligature marks and the availability of other potentially harmful substances which should not have been within reach of someone with her history of self-harm. There was so much more going on than simply a lack of level 1B supervision for a few hours upon her return on Christmas day; the situation was untenable, and this had gone on for months if not years.

1. 1. The question of whether the costs of the items in the Defendants’ table (at Point 6 in the Points of Dispute) should be allowed at all is different from the issue of whether the amounts claimed in respect of them is proportionate and reasonable; the Point of Dispute as drawn seeks to disallow all of these costs and make no offers in respect of any of them. In my judgement, the pre-Inquest reviews were of very significant use and benefit in the civil claim, both in respect of the issues referred to above (as to the treatment received by Amanda and its impact on the non-negligence aspects of the Claimants’ claim) and in respect of disclosure.

1. 1. Without having been more than robust as they are entitled to be (and, as guardians of the public purse, the public would expect them to be) the Defendants were trying to limit the scope of what the Coroner would be looking at and therefore to limit the disclosure available to the Coroner and hence to the Claimants. That again made the pre-Inquest reviews of significant use and benefit in the civil claim because, in plain terms, but for their representation at those pre-Inquest reviews, the weighty presence of Defendant lawyers may have prevailed upon the Coroner and key documents and facts might never have come to the fore.

1. 1. I find that these costs are in principle recoverable. They are relevant to issues in the civil claim so as to be recoverable as costs in that claim, and I have set out above the identification of outstanding issues necessary to the civil claim in respect of which the Claimants’ case would be advanced by participation in the Inquest, and what it was in that participation which would assist with the civil claim. Weighing the value of that assistance against the cost of pursuing that particular point in the Inquest, I also take the view that they are at first blush proportionate.

1. 1. It is a matter for the parties as to how much more time they would wish to devote to the necessary exercise (as Slade J found it to be in Fullick) of identifying and evaluating the relevance and utility to the civil claim of participating in the various items in the table at Point 6.

1. 1. I find that it was reasonable, proportionate and of use and benefit to the civil claim to attend and therefore to prepare for (and to travel to) the pre-Inquest review Hearings, and that it was reasonable for Ms. Phillips and Mr Desai both to attend. If the Defendants believe that more may be achieved in terms of reducing the £14,770.67, than it will cost to do so, by taking me to any specific items at a future line-item Assessment I will consider the position – the Claimants may say that the ‘holding’ General Point 1 is not sufficient to allow such an approach. I would certainly question whether it is worth going through (e.g.) the transcripts of the pre-Inquest reviews to try to isolate odd bits of ‘housekeeping’ (if any) that could be excluded here and there; the ‘High level’ decision is that the pre-Inquest review costs are, broadly speaking, recoverable on the facts in this case.

1. 1. I would add that whilst the use of hyperbole is a viable tool in rhetoric, the Defendants’ reference to ‘eye-watering’ costs at Point 6 is misplaced. Amanda died after months of inadequate care, culminating in her taking steps that ended her life (I do not say taking her own life because it is far from clear that she intended it to go as far as that) at the young age of twenty.

1. 1. In the context of the Claimants’ wish to get to the bottom of why such a vulnerable young person who had been making multiple ‘cries for help’ over the preceding months and years, and who seemed, based upon the background facts, to have had a reasonably clear pattern of harming herself at the first opportunity if her supervision levels should fall, had been put on such a low level of supervision hours before she died, I do not regard the costs as ‘eye-watering’ at all.

1. 1. To end on a more positive point, I have made several references to Mr Smith acknowledging this or accepting that. To be clear, the advocates on both sides advanced their respective clients’ cases to the best of their ability and Mr Smith took every point that he was able to take. Where there were points that he did not press, that was in the performance of his overriding duty to assist the Court and I am most grateful to him and to Mr Buckley (and Ms Phillips) for their submissions.

1. If the remainder of this matter does not settle, I can list it fairly soon; I will hand this Judgment down on 9 June 2023 but nobody need attend on that date.