In PXT v Atere-Roberts [2024] EWHC 1372 (KB), the court considered a child’s claim for a severe traumatic brain injury which she had suffered after being struck by a vehicle being driven by the Defendant. As the claim was brought by a child, it was exempt from automatic costs budgeting under CPR 3.12. However, the Defendant applied for costs budgeting to be directed under CPR 3.13 due to concerns over the Claimant’s rapidly increasing incurred and estimated costs, which had doubled to over £1.1 million in less than a year. The Claimant argued that the case’s complexity and uncertainty over the child’s long-term prognosis made budgeting inappropriate at this stage. Despite these arguments, Master Brown ordered costs budgets, finding that the risk of disproportionate costs outweighed other factors.

In Wazen v Khan, following settlement of a clinical negligence claim in the sum of £300,000, the defendant challenged the claimant’s costs. The key issue was whether the Ainsworth principles on the specificity required in points of dispute apply to inter partes detailed assessments, and if so, whether the defendant’s points of dispute complied with those requirements. Deputy Costs Judge Roy KC held that the Ainsworth principles do apply to inter partes assessments, although less particularity is required than in solicitor-client cases. The judge found that the defendant’s points disputing time for disclosure and ADR phases lacked the necessary specificity, as they did not identify the specific items being challenged and provided only broad-brush assertions of excess. Consequently, those points were struck out. The judgment also noted that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Samsung Electronics Co Ltd & Ors v LG Display Co Ltd & Anor (Costs) [2022] EWCA Civ 466, requiring a “clear and compelling reason” for exceeding guideline hourly rates, does not apply to detailed assessments.

In Choudhury v Mukherjee [2024] EWHC 1153 (SCCO), the court dismissed the Defendant’s application for an extension of time to appeal a Final Costs Certificate issued seven years earlier. The court found that the lengthy delay was serious with no good reason and that, in any event, there is no right to appeal a provisional assessment per PME v Scout Association. The Defendant’s grounds of appeal, including allegations that the Final Costs Certificate was obtained unlawfully and that service of the Notice of Commencement and Bill of Costs was invalid, were found to be “between weak and non-existent.”

In CXR v Dome Holdings Limited the claimant had engaged Premex, a medical reporting agency, to obtain expert medical reports but did not provide a breakdown of the expert’s fees and the agency’s fees when serving the bill. The defendant challenged this, and the court had to decide whether such a breakdown was required under paragraph 5.2 of Practice Direction 47. Senior Costs Judge Gordon-Saker, following the reasoning in Stringer v Copley (2002) and the decision of His Honour Judge Bird (in Hoskin), ruled that the claimant must provide a breakdown of the fee notes to show the separate fees of the expert and the agency.

In Scenic International Group Limited (In Provisional Liquidation) v Adenaike and others [2024] EWHC 1178 (Ch), the High Court addressed the consequences of the Claimant’s failure to file a schedule of costs in advance of a hearing, as required by Practice Direction 44 on the basis that “it was felt that it was unlikely that the Claimant would succeed in recovering costs and that it was therefore disproportionate to incur the expense of preparing a schedule of costs.” The Court found this approach to be mistaken and the failure to be serious, particularly given that the Defendants were unrepresented and would have been deprived of the assistance of a CLIPS barrister in scrutinising the schedule of costs. Taking this failure into account, along with the proportionality and reasonableness of the costs charged, the Court assessed the costs on a broad brush basis at £23,235, significantly lower than the £36,000 claimed by the Claimant.