In the case of Blue Manchester Limited versus Howard Kennedy LLP, the SCCO considered whether 15 interim invoices delivered by the Defendant solicitors between January 2021 and June 2022 were valid interim statute bills within the meaning of section 70(3)(a) of the Solicitors Act 1974, and whether any “special circumstances” justified their court-ordered assessment.

The Claimant argued that the invoices could not be statute bills because they were not genuinely final for the service periods they covered, particularly given the conditional fee agreement (CFA) under which Howard Kennedy’s fees were substantially discounted but subject to possible top-up charges contingent on the arbitration’s outcome. Blue Manchester also questioned the accuracy of the Defendant’s cost estimates and invoices, citing both a retrospective overcharge admitted by the solicitors and the Defendant’s inconsistent communication about a revised overall cost estimate.

Conversely, the Defendant maintained that the terms of the CFA, combined with their standard business terms, permitted the issuance of monthly interim statute bills, thereby triggering the statutory deadlines for assessment challenges.

Costs Judge Nagalingam ultimately found for the Claimant, concluding that Howard Kennedy’s failure to adequately clarify the status and finality of the bills, particularly due to the contingent nature of the CFA’s top-up provision, precluded treating them as interim statute bills. The Judge further held that special circumstances existed, significantly influenced by the admitted overcharging, the late communication of drastically revised cost estimates, and the ongoing uncertainty around the invoices’ completeness.

In Griffin v Kleyman & Co Solicitors Ltd [2024] EWHC 1151 (SCCO), Costs Judge Leonard addressed the issue of whether the solicitor’s costs for acting in ancillary relief proceedings should be limited by reference to estimates provided to the client during the retainer. The claimant argued that the defendant’s failure to provide adequate estimates deprived her of the ability to make informed decisions, and that the costs should therefore be limited to the estimates provided. The defendant countered that the estimates were caveated, and the claimant’s conduct led to increased costs. Costs Judge Leonard found that while solicitors failed to update the estimate when it became apparent it woudl be exceeded, the claimant “habitually caused unnecessary costs to be incurred, making it inevitable”. Such conduct made it impossible to identify a reasonable figure to limit the defendant’s recoverable costs. Accordingly, a detailed line-by-line assessment was necessary to determine the reasonable amount payable.

In Hensley v Morris Law [2024] EWHC 1101 (SCCO), the High Court considered an application under section 68 of the Solicitors Act 1974 for the delivery of a statute bill of costs following the conclusion of a personal injury claim. The central issue was whether the bill provided by the defendant solicitors, which only addressed the success fee deducted from the claimant’s damages, complied with the requirements of a statute bill. Costs Judge Rowley found in favour of the claimant, holding that the bill did not meet the necessary criteria, as it failed to provide a complete account of the fees, charges, and disbursements incurred. The judge emphasized that clients are entitled to a compliant bill upon request, regardless of the solicitor’s view on the merits of any potential assessment under section 70 of the Solicitors Act 1974. The defendant was ordered to provide a final statute bill, with the claimant being awarded the costs of the application.

In Bendriss v Nicholson Jones Sutton Solicitors Ltd, the High Court dismissed the claimant’s application for specific disclosure of documents relating to an ATE insurance premium claimed by the defendant solicitors. The court found that pursuing disclosure was disproportionate given the modest sum in dispute and high costs of the application. Crucially, following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Herbert v HH Law, the judge held that an ATE premium is not a “solicitor’s disbursement” to be assessed within a Solicitors Act assessment unless there is a legal obligation or professional custom to treat it as such, which was not established in this case. The judgment emphasises the importance of proportionality in costs disputes and confirms that ATE premiums will generally be excluded from Solicitors Act assessments post-Herbert.

Pickering v Thomas Mansfield Solicitors Limited [2024] EWHC 1107 (SCCO) involved a client’s application for assessment of her former solicitors’ invoices, which totalled over £2.5 million. The key issues were whether the invoices were statute bills capable of assessment under the Solicitors Act 1974 and if so, whether the assessment should be conditional upon a further interim payment by the client. Costs Judge Brown found the invoices were statute bills but declined to order a further payment on account, citing concerns about potential reductions to the bills on assessment and the continued availability of security for the solicitors’ costs. The decision provides guidance on the requirements for statute bills and the court’s approach to interim payments in the context of a solicitor and client assessment.

“Whatever the reason for Lloyd LJ’s assumption, in my judgment it was wrong. For the reasons set out at [4] to [26] above, I would hold that there are material differences between applications under section 71(3) and those under section 71(1) because of the different nature of the interests of the third party that the different sub-sections are intended to reflect. The consequence of Lloyd LJ’s mistaken assumption is that his judgment cannot be relied upon as saying anything authoritative about the position that obtains where an application and assessment are brought under section 71(3): his judgment simply does not deal with that question. Furthermore, in my judgment there is no rational basis for transposing the principles that apply to a section 71(1) assessment, as identified in [95] of Tim Martin, to the different circumstances of an assessment pursuant to section 71(3). I would therefore reject the appeal under Ground 1 on the basis of principle and the absence of any binding authority that requires us to apply the Tim Martin principles to an assessment under section 71(3). In my judgment the Costs Judge was correct to find that Tim Martin was distinguishable and should be distinguished – essentially for the reasons he gave – and that the relevant principles to be applied are to be derived from In re Brown, which is binding on us.”

“In my judgment the overall cap does not apply where the solicitor elects to claim their charges before the conclusion of the claim (for the reasons stated in Higgins), but it does apply where the solicitor elects to await the outcome of the claim.”

“It seems to me that (apart from the practical difficulties identified in Friston on Costs) one possible reason why CPR 36 has been imported into CPR 47, but not into the provisions for Solicitors Act assessments at CPR 46, is that it is not possible to reconcile the provisions of CPR 36 with subsections 70(9) and 70(10) of the 1974 Act.”

“The terms of that contract were clear and complete. They were based on the offer from the Claimant communicated to the Defendant in Ms Bartlam’s letter of 12 December 2019, as expressly accepted by the Defendant in Mrs Chikwendu’s letter of 14 February 2020 and relayed to the Claimant by Ms Bartlam. Ms Bartlam’s letters of 18 February 2020 set out the procedure by which the agreement would be implemented, which both parties, by their actions, plainly accepted. Accordingly, under the terms of the contract the Defendant was to render a “full and final bill of costs” for £10,000 plus specified disbursements and VAT, as the Defendant did on about 21 February 2020, and the Claimant was to pay it within two weeks, which the Claimant did.”

“The defendant has disclosed the solicitors’ file in the usual way in support of the bill delivered to the client. The call recordings made no appearance in the original points of dispute and their supposed importance has only surfaced quite recently and without any indication of why the claimant says those call recordings might assist. Why they should be exhumed, should they exist, and be listened to by the solicitors or their costs lawyers in such circumstances, given the expense that would incur, is not readily apparent