CPR 36.17(4)(c) | How To Calculate Enhanced Interest On Costs — Aggregate Method Applies

Enhanced interest on costs under CPR 36.17(4)(c) is calculated on the aggregate sum of post-offer costs from the offer’s expiry date, not item by item from when each cost was incurred.

CPR 36.17(4)(c) enhanced interest on costs aggregate method calculation
In Barry v Essex County Council, Deputy District Judge Rathod determined the proper method for calculating enhanced interest on costs under CPR 36.17(4)(c) after the claimant beat her own Part 36 offer. The claimant had succeeded at trial and, under District Judge Mills’s order, was awarded indemnity costs from the offer’s expiry with interest at 9% per annum. The issue was whether interest should be applied to the aggregate of all post-offer costs from the expiry date, or calculated item-by-item from the date each cost was incurred. The court held that the aggregate method applied. McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd was not binding on this point, its compensatory rationale having been treated as limited following OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG, which recognised the non-compensatory element of Part 36 enhancements. The aggregate method was consistent with the ‘broad brush’ approach endorsed in Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc, reflected the post-Jackson settlement policy underpinning Part 36, and was the only workable method, particularly in cases involving summary assessment.

I consider that in such a case, the Individual Item method is not workable at all, which rather demonstrates, in my view, that it is not the correct method to be used to calculate interest under CPR 36.17(4)(c). Indeed, in my experience, it is the Aggregate Costs method that is used when calculating enhanced interest on costs where a claimant has beaten their own Part 36 offer in a Fast Track trial and where the court is required to conduct a summary assessment of costs.  For those reasons, I find that the Aggregate Costs method contended for by the Claimant is the method which is consistent with authority, with the policy behind CPR Part 36 and with the practical reality of calculating awards of enhanced interest on post-expiry costs.

Citations

McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 933 The Court of Appeal held that interest on post-Part 36 offer costs should run from the date upon which the work was done or liability for a disbursement was incurred, aiming to compensate for the loss of use of money paid before judgment. OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG [2017] EWCA Civ 195 The Court of Appeal recognised that enhanced interest under CPR Part 36 may have a punitive, non-compensatory element and confirmed that such orders are not purely compensatory in nature. BXB v Watchtower and Bible Tract Society of Pennsylvania [2020] EWHC 656 (QB) The High Court stated that enhanced interest on costs under CPR Part 36 performs both a compensatory function for the claimant and a public role in encouraging settlement. Mate v Mate [2023] EWHC 806 The judgment approved the reasoning in BXB regarding the dual compensatory and public policy purposes of enhanced interest on Part 36 costs. Andrews v Aylott [2010] 4 Costs LR 568 The court held that it was inappropriate to award enhanced interest on future losses under CPR Part 36, affirming that interest must relate to losses actually incurred. Pankhurst v White [2011] 3 Costs LR 392 The Court of Appeal affirmed that enhanced interest under CPR Part 36 could not be applied to future losses, echoing principles from McPhilemy. Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc [2012] EWCA Civ 137 The Court of Appeal held that interest on costs generally begins on the date liability is established, cautioning against overly precise calculations and endorsing a broad-brush approach. Petrotrade Incorporated v Texaco Ltd (unreported, 23 May 2000) The court emphasised that CPR Part 36 orders, including indemnity costs and enhanced interest, are not to be regarded as penal but aim to achieve a fairer outcome for claimants. Hunt v R M Douglas (Roofing) Ltd [1990] 1 AC 398 The case reaffirmed the general rule that interest was not traditionally payable on costs incurred before judgment, a rule later addressed by enhanced interest provisions.

Key Points

  • Where a court order for interest on costs pursuant to CPR 36.17(4)(c) specifies a rate and a start date without further elaboration, it is to be construed as applying that rate to the aggregate of all costs incurred from that single start date, rather than requiring an item-by-item calculation from individual dates of incurrence. [45-48, 69]
  • The calculation of interest on costs under CPR 36.17(4)(c) should be approached in a broad-brush manner to avoid prolonged argument and excessive complexity; a method that requires interest to be calculated separately on each individual cost item from its specific date of incurrence is inconsistent with this principle. [46, 66-67]
  • The policy underlying the enhanced interest sanction in CPR 36.17 is not purely compensatory and can include a non-compensatory, punitive element designed to encourage settlement, which can justify an interest calculation method that results in a claimant receiving more than a strictly compensatory sum. [62-64]
  • The decision in McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd on the mechanics of calculating interest on costs is not binding authority on lower courts for subsequent cases, particularly where the factual justification for its reasoning (compensation for loss of use of money paid on account) is absent, such as in cases funded by a conditional fee agreement. [50-58, 62]
  • When interpreting a costs order, the absence of express wording directing a complex or unusual method of calculation (such as interest running from individual dates of incurrence) indicates that the court intended the standard, more straightforward method of calculation to apply. [47-48]

"I do not regard that as an absurdity. If that is the outcome of a rule which was designed to encourage early settlement by implementing a carrot and stick approach in Part 36, then that must be taken to be a fair result. A defendant can expect little sympathy from a court in being made to face the consequences of its decision not to accept a settlement offer made some years before a trial, which offer was subsequently beaten."

Key Findings In The Case

  • The judge found that the wording of paragraph 5 of DJ Mills’ original costs order—providing for 9% per annum interest on post-expiry costs from 28 October 2019—indicated an intention for interest to apply to the aggregate amount of such costs without requiring item-by-item calculations from individual cost incurrence dates [45–48].
  • The court accepted that the Claimant’s costs incurred after 28 October 2019 totalled £75,000 (excluding interest and assessment costs), which had been agreed between the parties following the filing of the original Bill of Costs in the amount of £91,173.92 [7].
  • The judge found that the lengthy period between the expiry of the Claimant’s Part 36 offer (28 October 2019) and judgment at trial (6 July 2023)—totalling over three years and eight months—was significant when evaluating the enhanced interest award and its practical effect on the calculation of post-offer costs interest [6].
  • The court found that the Claimant’s solicitor acted under a conditional fee agreement and that no monies had been paid on account by the Claimant; this fact rendered inapplicable the reasoning in McPhilemy, which was premised on compensating for the loss of use of advance payments made to solicitors [24, 58].
  • The judge determined that applying the Individual Item method of interest calculation would be impractical and inconsistent with summary assessment procedures, particularly in smaller-scale litigation and cases using paper bills, and would unduly complicate the assessment of costs [66–67].

"In the course of argument, I raised the issue of how the Individual Item method could be expected to work at the conclusion of a Fast Track trial (in a case not subject to fixed costs) where a summary assessment of costs was carried out. By its very nature, a summary assessment does not involve a line-by-line examination of the costs incurred by a successful party and it is not possible to ascertain what dates individual items of work were carried out...I did not receive any particularly persuasive answers to this observation. I consider that in such a case, the Individual Item method is not workable at all, which rather demonstrates, in my view, that it is not the correct method to be used to calculate interest under CPR 36.17(4)(c)."

The County Court’s decision in Barry v Essex County Council [2025] EWCC 64 confirms that enhanced interest on costs awarded under CPR 36.17(4)(c) is calculated using the aggregate costs method from the date of offer expiry. This is of course a first instance non-binding decision in the county court and should be treated accordingly.

Background

The claimant, Kelly Barry, brought a claim for damages against Essex County Council for personal injuries sustained in a tripping accident on 18th March 2018. Liability was denied by the defendant. On 7th October 2019, the claimant made a Part 36 offer to settle liability on a 70/30 basis in her favour, which was rejected. The offer expired on 28th October 2019. The matter proceeded to a trial on 5th and 6th July 2023 before District Judge Mills (as he then was). Quantum was partly agreed at £27,031, subject to liability. The trial judge found wholly in the claimant’s favour on liability, making no deduction for contributory negligence, and entered judgment for the agreed sum of £27,031.

As the claimant had beaten her own Part 36 offer, the judge applied the consequences under CPR 36.17(4). He awarded an additional 10% of the damages (£2,703.10) and enhanced interest on those damages at 9% per annum from 28th October 2019 to the first day of trial, amounting to £8,971.33. Regarding costs, the judge ordered that the defendant pay the claimant’s costs up to 28th October 2019 on the standard basis, and costs from that date on the indemnity basis. Crucially, he also ordered, pursuant to CPR 36.17(4)(c), that the defendant pay “additional interest on those costs… from 28th October 2019 at the rate of 9% per annum.”

A Bill of Costs was subsequently served totalling £91,173.92. The parties later agreed the base costs at £75,000, excluding interest and the costs of the assessment. A dispute arose solely concerning the method for calculating the interest on the post-offer indemnity costs, leading the claimant to issue an application on 25th April 2025 to resolve the issue.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The single issue for determination was the correct method for calculating interest on costs awarded under CPR 36.17(4)(c). The claimant argued for the “Aggregate Costs method,” whereby interest at 9% per annum is applied to the total sum of all costs incurred from the expiry of the Part 36 offer (28th October 2019) until the date of the costs order (6th July 2023). The defendant contended for the “Individual Item method,” whereby interest is calculated separately on each individual item of costs incurred after the offer’s expiry, running from the specific date that item of work was done or the disbursement was incurred.

The Parties’ Positions

Claimant’s Submissions: Mr Meehan, for the claimant, advanced two primary arguments. Firstly, he submitted that on a natural reading of District Judge Mills’s order, the only reasonable construction was that it intended the Aggregate Costs method. His second, alternative argument was that if the interpretation remained open, the Aggregate Costs method was consistent with case law, the policy behind CPR Part 36, and practical reality. He argued that the Court of Appeal’s decision in McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd, upon which the defendant relied, was not binding. He relied on the subsequent case of OMV Petrom SA v Glencore International AG, which indicated that the policy behind Part 36 had evolved to include a non-compensatory, punitive element designed to encourage settlement—a “carrot and stick” scheme. He further argued that the Individual Item method was practically unworkable, creating unnecessary complexity for costs judges.

Defendant’s Submissions: Mr Roderick, for the defendant, clarified that the Individual Item method involved recalculating the interest due each time a new cost was incurred post-offer. He contended that this method was consistent with the precedent in McPhilemy, which he submitted was binding, where the Court of Appeal had expressly ordered that interest run from the date work was done. He accepted that Part 36 now had a punitive element but argued that this was delivered through the enhanced rate of interest itself, not the method of calculation. He submitted that the Aggregate Costs method could lead to absurd outcomes, such as interest running on a counsel’s brief fee for some three years before it was actually incurred. He argued for consistency with the principle that interest on damages typically runs from the date the loss was incurred. Finally, he asserted that the Individual Item method was practical and straightforward to operate using spreadsheets and electronic bills.

The Court’s Decision

Deputy District Judge Rathod found in favour of the claimant, holding that the Aggregate Costs method was the correct approach. The decision was reached for several key reasons.

      • First, on a straightforward construction of District Judge Mills’s order, the judge found that the wording indicated a clear intention to apply interest at 9% per annum to the entirety of the post-offer costs from a single specified date. This aligned with the “broad brush” approach to interest on costs endorsed by Lord Neuberger in Simcoe v Jacuzzi UK Group plc, which discouraged overly detailed and prolonged arguments on such points.
      • Second, the judge held that he was not bound to follow the specific outcome in McPhilemy. He analysed that the ratio of McPhilemy concerned the trial judge’s erroneous exercise of discretion in refusing Part 36 consequences, not the precise mechanics of interest calculation. The specific order made in that case was a product of its own facts and was not an issue that had been fully argued. Furthermore, the judge found McPhilemy to be of limited persuasive authority as it pre-dated the Jackson reforms, which introduced a stronger “carrot and stick” policy into Part 36, and its reasoning was based on compensating a claimant for loss of use of money paid on account—a factor not present in this case where a conditional fee agreement was used.
      • Third, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Petrom was found to dilute the authority of McPhilemy. The judge noted that in Petrom, the Chancellor held that enhanced interest awards under Part 36 were not purely compensatory and could include a non-compensatory element. This shift in policy supported an interpretation that could lead to a more punitive result for a defendant who rejected a reasonable offer.
      • Fourth, the judge rejected the defendant’s argument that the Aggregate Costs method produced an “absurd” result by potentially accruing interest on costs before they were incurred. He stated that if this was the outcome of a rule designed to encourage settlement, it was a fair consequence for a defendant who chose not to accept an offer. He also found the defendant’s analogy with interest on damages to be a false one, noting that in personal injury cases, a simple half-rate from the date of accident is often used to avoid complexity.

Finally, the judge agreed with the claimant that the Individual Item method was unworkable in practice. It would add significant complexity to detailed assessments and, crucially, would be impossible to apply in cases involving summary assessment of costs, where individual dates of incurrence are not examined. The Aggregate Costs method, in contrast, was consistent with authority, the policy of Part 36, and practical reality.

The application was therefore allowed, and it was declared that interest should be calculated at 9% per annum on the aggregate of all costs incurred from 28th October 2019 to 6th July 2023.

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KELLY BARRY V ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL [2025] EWCC 64 | DEPUTY DISTRICT JUDGE RATHOD | CPR 36.17(4)(C) | AGGREGATE COSTS METHOD | INDIVIDUAL ITEM METHOD | INDEMNITY COSTS | STANDARD BASIS COSTS | INTEREST ON COSTS | INTEREST RATE 9% PER ANNUM | CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENT | SIMCOE V JACUZZI UK GROUP PLC | MCPHILEMY V TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD [2001] EWCA CIV 933 | OMV PETROM SA V GLENCORE INTERNATIONAL AG [2017] EWCA CIV 195 | CPR 44.2(6)(G) | PART 36 CONSEQUENCES | CARROT AND STICK APPROACH | NON-COMPENSATORY SANCTIONS | ENHANCED INTEREST | SUMMARY ASSESSMENT | FAST TRACK COSTS | DETAILED ASSESSMENT | BXB V WATCHTOWER AND BIBLE TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA [2020] EWHC 656 (QB) | MATE V MATE [2023] EWHC 806 | JACKSON REFORMS | COSTS OF ASSESSMENT | BROAD BRUSH APPROACH | UNWORKABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL ITEM METHOD | INTEREST ON COUNSEL’S BRIEF FEE | PUNITIVE ELEMENT | DATE OF EXPIRY OF PART 36 OFFER | COSTS INCURRED POST-OFFER EXPIRY | LOSS OF USE OF MONEY | CPR INTERPRETATION | JUDICIAL DISCRETION ON COSTS | HUNT V R M DOUGLAS (ROOFING) LTD [1990] 1 AC 398 | CHADWICK LJ | SIR GEOFFREY VOS C | LORD NEUBERGER MR | SUMMARY COSTS ORDERS | SIMPSON V NORFOLK & NORWICH UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL NHS TRUST | PETROTRADE INCORPORATED V TEXACO LTD | ENHANCED INTEREST ON DAMAGES | POST-JACKSON COSTS PRINCIPLES | STATUTORY INTEREST DEFINITION | PRACTICALITY IN COSTS CALCULATIONS