QOCS Protection Lost Where Dishonesty Inflated Claim Value By 100%

Ms O’Connell, a former gunner in the Royal Horse Artillery, brought proceedings against the Ministry of Defence following a riding accident in September 2015. The claim was pursued both in negligence and under the Animals Act 1971, seeking damages totalling £2,446,738.66.

The defendant sought not only dismissal of the claim but also a finding of fundamental dishonesty and permission to enforce any costs order against the claimant under CPR 44.16(1), which provides that costs orders “may be enforced to the full extent of such orders with the permission of the court where the claim is found on the balance of probabilities to be fundamentally dishonest.”

The allegations centred on surveillance evidence from March 2022 showing the claimant performing physical activities inconsistent with her reported disability, together with evidence regarding her responsibility for horses, representations about vehicle adaptations, and other material inconsistencies.

The Parties’ Positions on Fundamental Dishonesty and Costs

The defendant argued that the claimant had misrepresented her disability in a manner that constituted fundamental dishonesty. They relied particularly on surveillance footage showing the claimant driving a manual transmission horsebox and performing various physical tasks using her allegedly disabled left arm. The defendant submitted that the dishonesty tainted the entire claim, affecting claims for general damages, loss of earnings, and future care costs.

The defendant also relied on sophisticated attempts to conceal evidence, including Facebook messages showing the claimant seeking someone to provide false evidence about vehicle adaptations that had never occurred.

The claimant contended that she had been consistent in reporting her disability to medical experts and that the surveillance evidence showed only brief periods of exceptional activity enabled by pain medication and a spinal cord stimulator. She argued that any inconsistencies could be explained by the stress of lengthy litigation and pointed to her continued invasive treatment as inconsistent with dishonesty.

The Court’s Analysis | Applying CPR 44.16 Fundamental Dishonesty Principles

The court applied the dishonesty test from Ivey v Genting Casinos Limited, requiring first a subjective assessment of the claimant’s actual state of knowledge, then an objective determination of whether the conduct was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.

For fundamental dishonesty, the court applied the approach in Howlett v Davies, distinguishing between dishonesty that is merely “incidental” or “collateral” and dishonesty that goes “to the root of either the whole of his claim or a substantial part of his claim.”

The judge considered the three questions from Muyepa v Ministry of Defence: when the dishonest conduct started, whether it tainted the whole claim, and how the value of the underlying valid claim compared with the dishonestly inflated claim.

Key Findings on Dishonesty

The court found that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest across multiple areas:

Surveillance evidence: The differences between what the claimant told experts and what she could be seen doing were “stark” and not capable of explanation by assistance from her friend or by pain medication. The claimant’s presentation on video was “of someone with normal or near normal function in their left upper limb and shoulder.”

Responsibility for horses: The court rejected the claimant’s evidence that she was merely helping a friend, finding that she had been responsible for the care of horses on a long-term basis, contradicting her accounts of disability.

Vehicle adaptations: The court found that the claimant owned two different white Audi A3 vehicles, transferring the number plate between them in December 2022 after being asked to provide evidence of adaptations. Facebook messages demonstrated the claimant seeking false evidence about vehicle alterations that had never occurred.

Employment capacity: The claimant’s schedule claimed she was only fit for part-time work, but she told an investigator she was working full-time hours.

The CPR 44.16 Fundamental Dishonesty Finding

Applying the Muyepa questions, the court found:

    • The dishonest conduct started by December 2018 when the claimant told her orthopaedic expert she had adapted her vehicle when she had not.
    • The dishonesty tainted the whole claim because it went to the extent of the left upper limb disability which formed the basis for all compensation claims.
    • The underlying valid claim would have been worth perhaps 50% of the dishonestly inflated claim, despite the claimant still having had a substantial claim due to her lost army career.

The Costs Decision

The court concluded that the dishonesty went to the heart of the claim, supporting higher general damages, a significantly greater loss of earnings claim, and a claim for future support to which she would not otherwise have been entitled.

The judge noted that the claimant had “persisted with her dishonesty over a long period” and had “sought to engage others” with “sophisticated” attempts to conceal the truth. The court found this “an appropriate case in which to grant permission to the Defendant to enforce any order for costs it may obtain against her to its full extent.”

The QOCS protection that would ordinarily apply to this personal injury claim was therefore displaced, allowing the defendant to enforce costs orders against the claimant without the usual restrictions under CPR 44.13-44.16.

Broader Implications

The case demonstrates the application of established fundamental dishonesty principles to sophisticated attempts at concealment. The court’s willingness to examine Facebook messages and vehicle registration transfers shows the detailed scrutiny that may be applied where fundamental dishonesty is alleged.

The judgment confirms that where dishonesty affects the core presentation of a claimant’s disability rather than being merely collateral to minor aspects of the claim, removal of QOCS protection will follow. The case also illustrates how multiple strands of inconsistent evidence can combine to establish a pattern of fundamental dishonesty that taints an entire claim.

Fundamental dishonesty found on appeal by reason of material non disclosure

£70,000 Costs Order Upheld Against Unrepresented Tenants For Vexatious Conduct In The FTT (Property Chamber)

Coogan v Taheri [2025] UKUT 293 (LC)

The Upper Tribunal has dismissed an appeal against a £70,000 costs order made by the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber), confirming that unrepresented parties pursuing serious allegations without foundation can face substantial costs sanctions under rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2013.

The Costs Dispute

Steven and Louise Coogan, unrepresented tenants of residential premises in London, brought multiple applications before the FTT against their landlords. Following a two-day hearing where only one minor allegation from their section 22 notice was substantiated – a 17-year-old statutory declaration matter – the landlords applied for costs under rule 13(1)(b).

The FTT made a costs order for £70,000, finding the tenants had acted unreasonably in bringing and conducting their applications. The tenants appealed, challenging both the finding of unreasonable conduct and the tribunal’s exercise of discretion in making the order.

The Costs Arguments

The landlords’ costs application rested on two grounds. First, they argued the tenants had pursued obviously hopeless allegations, noting that beyond the single substantiated matter from 2007, other allegations were unsupported by documents, inherently implausible, legally flawed, or too historical to be relevant to a manager appointment application.

Second, they contended the tenants had pursued serious allegations vexatiously, pointing to repeated unfounded allegations of harassment and fraud culminating in Mr Coogan’s skeleton argument accusing them of Bribery Act offences and comparing their conduct to torture of prisoners of war.

The tenants countered that their position reflected a genuine dispute legitimately pursued over 17 years of poor landlord-tenant relations, emphasising their substantial property improvements and reasonable concerns about contributing 25% towards roof repairs affecting only upper floors.

The Three-Stage Willow Court Test

The Upper Tribunal confirmed the established approach from Willow Court Management Co v Alexander [2016] UKUT 290 (LC), which requires sequential consideration of three questions:

  1. Has the party acted unreasonably?
  2. Should a costs order be made given any unreasonable conduct found?
  3. What should be the terms of any order?

At stage one, unreasonable conduct follows the Ridehalgh v Horsefield definition – conduct that is vexatious and designed to harass rather than advance case resolution. The acid test remains whether the conduct permits a reasonable explanation.

Stage One | Finding of Unreasonable Conduct

The FTT had properly considered the tenants’ unrepresented status but located them within the spectrum of unrepresented litigants, noting Mr Coogan’s property experience and Mrs Coogan’s advocacy skills. The Upper Tribunal rejected the argument that this imposed a higher standard, finding the FTT was correctly assessing what behaviour could reasonably be expected from these particular unrepresented parties.

Crucially, the FTT made a finding of fact that Mr Coogan was “willing to say whatever suited his purpose, regardless of its truthfulness.” The Upper Tribunal confirmed this amounted to a finding of dishonesty, noting that recklessness about truth falls within the classic definition of deceit.

The costs judgment had to be read alongside the substantive judgment and underlying materials, including the skeleton argument containing allegations of deliberate falsehoods, harassment, unlawful eviction, fraud, bribery, and modern slavery. Without a hearing transcript, the tenants could not discharge their burden of proving the FTT’s evaluation was wrong.

Stage Two | Exercise of Discretion

The FTT characterised this as a “bad case” where “obviously bad points were pursued vigorously” and “serious allegations of fraud and bad faith were bandied about vexatiously.” The Upper Tribunal found this assessment was open to the FTT based on the evidence.

The tribunal confirmed that “vexatiously” was used in its ordinary sense – conduct designed to harass rather than advance case resolution. The skeleton argument’s extensive allegations of criminal behaviour and misconduct supported this characterisation.

While a different tribunal might have exercised discretion differently, the FTT had properly directed itself on the law, considered relevant matters, and reached a rational conclusion.

The Appeal Decision

The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal on both grounds. The fact that the landlords subsequently voluntarily appointed the same manager the tenants had proposed did not vindicate the tenants’ approach, particularly given the FTT’s evaluation of how the application had been conducted.

The £70,000 costs order stands as a significant exception to the FTT’s usual no-costs approach, demonstrating that pursuing serious allegations without foundation can trigger substantial costs sanctions even for unrepresented parties.

This decision reinforces that rule 13(1)(b) provides meaningful costs protection for respondents facing vexatious tribunal applications. The three-stage Willow Court framework remains the established approach, with unreasonable conduct assessed objectively against the Ridehalgh standard. While unrepresented status remains relevant at stage one, tribunals can properly differentiate between different types of unrepresented litigants when assessing reasonable expectations of conduct.

Unreasonable conduct and costs in the First-tier Tribunal

Costs Of And Incidental To Proceedings In The Case Of Compulsory Purchase – Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) guidance on costs awards and the scope of proceedings, relevant to tribunal costs jurisdiction principles.

The Power To Strike Out Points Of Dispute In The First-Tier Tribunal – Upper Tribunal decision addressing vexatious conduct and abuse of process in FTT proceedings.

Unreasonable conduct and costs in the First-tier Tribunal – Contains detailed analysis of the Willow Court three-stage test and unreasonable conduct standards for unrepresented parties.

Costs On Indemnity Basis For Wasted Hearing Due To Unreasonable Adjournment Application.

Background

The costs determination arose from Century Property (Leeds) Limited’s successful application for mandatory injunctions to enforce a judgment debt against Dr Jason Aldiss’s self-invested personal pension (SIPP). The underlying judgment debt of £402,500 stemmed from an order made by Master Eastman on 31 October 2023, which was subsequently assigned to Century Property on 1 December 2023.

The enforcement proceedings involved Century Property obtaining a charging order over Dr Aldiss’s SIPP on 11 June 2024, with the total sum due reaching £450,939 by 29 April 2025, accruing interest at £88.22 daily. The SIPP, valued at £618,249.94 as of 16 April 2025, could not be accessed until Dr Aldiss reached his 55th birthday on 17 August 2025.

The application proceedings involved two hearings. At the first hearing, Dr Aldiss, appearing as a litigant in person, successfully applied for an adjournment to gather evidence to respond to Century Property’s application. Despite being granted this adjournment, Dr Aldiss failed to serve any evidence and provided no explanation for this failure. Shortly before the second hearing in April 2025, Dr Aldiss made an application to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal the original Tomlin Order, and at the second hearing, he unsuccessfully sought both an adjournment and a stay of enforcement proceedings.

Following the court’s judgment on 4 June 2025 allowing Century Property’s application, the parties were directed to submit written representations on consequential matters, including costs, by 30 May 2025. Dr Aldiss’s response to Century Property’s statement of costs was delayed due to an injury, with his submissions ultimately provided on 9 June 2025.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The court was required to determine three principal costs issues following the successful enforcement application. First, whether Dr Aldiss should bear Century Property’s costs or whether the circumstances justified departing from the general rule under CPR 44.2(2)(a) that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s costs.

Second, the court needed to consider the appropriate basis of assessment. Century Property sought its costs on the indemnity basis, arguing that Dr Aldiss’s conduct throughout the proceedings was sufficiently unreasonable to take the case “out of the norm” as established in Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings Ltd v. Salisbury Hannah Aspden & Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879. The alternative was assessment on the standard basis.

Third, the court was asked to summarily assess the quantum of costs. Century Property submitted two statements of costs: the first dated 28 April 2025 for £55,363.02 (including VAT) covering both hearings, and the second dated 29 May 2025 for £2,204.41 (including VAT) for work on consequential matters, totalling £57,567.43. The court needed to determine whether these costs were reasonable and proportionate in accordance with CPR 44.3(5) and 44.4.

The Parties’ Positions

Dr Aldiss advanced four principal arguments against any costs order. He emphasised his status as a litigant in person who found the litigation uniquely stressful as it concerned both his reputation and his sole retirement asset. He contended that the enforcement application was premature given that his 55th birthday was not until August 2025. He pointed to his recent application for permission to appeal the Tomlin Order as evidence of genuine concerns about its validity. Finally, he maintained that his challenges were not designed to delay enforcement but reflected legitimate concerns about the underlying settlement.

Regarding the basis of assessment, Dr Aldiss argued for the standard basis, relying on the same grounds he had advanced against any costs order being made.

On quantum, Dr Aldiss challenged the costs as disproportionate and sought only nominal costs. He specifically criticised Mr Toby Starr’s hourly rate of £685 and the Grade C associate solicitor’s rate of £420 as significantly exceeding guideline rates without justification for enhancement. He argued that the claims for work on documents (£14,375), email correspondence, and counsel fees (£15,405) were excessive without proper breakdown or itemisation. He alleged duplication of work and excessive time on routine tasks, suggesting the statements had been “padded out”.

Century Property’s position was straightforward on liability: having succeeded on the application, there was no reason to depart from the general rule requiring the unsuccessful party to pay costs. On the basis of assessment, Century Property argued that Dr Aldiss’s conduct warranted indemnity costs, citing his non-compliance with the Tomlin Order, his request for an adjournment to gather evidence which he subsequently failed to serve, his unreasonable opposition to the application, his unsubstantiated challenges to the Tomlin Order’s validity, and his failed attempts to adjourn the second hearing and stay enforcement. Century Property maintained that this conduct took the case “out of the norm”.

On quantum, Century Property defended its costs as reasonable given the unusual nature of the application, which had only been considered in three reported first instance cases. Century Property made no specific submissions responding to Dr Aldiss’s detailed criticisms of the costs claimed.

The Court’s Decision

On the principle of costs liability, the court applied the general rule under CPR 44.2(2)(a) and ordered Dr Aldiss to pay Century Property’s costs. The court found that none of Dr Aldiss’s four grounds provided sufficient reason to displace the general rule. Whilst acknowledging his status as a litigant in person and the litigation’s impact, the court noted that Dr Aldiss had “vigorously fought, but lost, the application”. The prematurity argument had already been dismissed in the substantive judgment at paragraph 53(e). The pending appeal application did not justify departing from the general rule, and whilst not doubting Dr Aldiss’s sincerity, the court noted he had done nothing to substantiate his validity challenges despite being given opportunities to submit evidence.

On the basis of assessment, the court adopted a nuanced approach. After reviewing the principles from Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings Ltd v. Salisbury Hannah Aspden & Johnson [2002] EWCA Civ 879 and Three Rivers DC v. Bank of England [2006] EWHC 816 (Comm), the court recognised that the test was unreasonableness rather than moral condemnation. The court acknowledged that the application was “far from straight-forward”, concerning an area of law with limited authority, and that Dr Aldiss was entitled to defend against enforcement directed at his sole retirement asset.

However, the court found that Dr Aldiss, as “a professional and articulate man”, understood the need to present evidence and comply with orders. His failure to serve evidence after obtaining an adjournment specifically for that purpose, without good reason or application to vary the timetable, was particularly significant. The court concluded that Dr Aldiss’s applications at both hearings were “designed to delay determination of Century Property’s application and, ultimately, enforcement of the judgment debt”.

The court ordered costs on the standard basis, except for the costs of the first hearing which were to be assessed on the indemnity basis. This reflected a balance between the unusual nature of the application and the fact that the first hearing costs were “wasted because of Dr Aldiss’ ultimately pointless application to adjourn”.

On quantum, the court conducted a summary assessment applying the principles from West v. Stockport NHS Foundation Trust [2019] EWCA Civ 1220. For the first statement of costs, the court found the solicitors’ hourly rates and counsel’s fees reasonable. However, it reduced the correspondence costs from the claimed amount to £6,000, finding the costs for correspondence with Dr Aldiss higher than expected given its “brief and succinct nature”. The court also reduced the documents costs to £13,000, finding excessive time spent on the chronology and response to Dr Aldiss’s request for information.

The court approved the second statement of costs in full at £2,204.91. The total costs allowed were £54,432.93 (including VAT), reduced from the £57,567.43 claimed. The court found this sum proportionate under CPR 44.3(5) and 44.4, considering the unusual nature of the application, the substantial sums at stake (approximately £450,000), the additional work caused by the adjournment, and Dr Aldiss’s conduct in seeking information on matters previously communicated to him. The court refused to stay the costs order for the same reasons it had refused to stay enforcement of the substantive order.

Speculative Claims, Indemnity Costs And The Effect Of An Approved Costs Budget

Costs Judge Rejects Mathematical Approach To Proportionality Assessment | Stockler [2025] EWHC 2262

Background

The claimants, William Thomas Stockler and Alexander Charles Stockler, were holders of permanent seats at the Royal Albert Hall. They brought proceedings against The Corporation of the Hall of The Arts and Sciences, which operates the venue, concerning payments due under the Hall’s Ticket Return Scheme (TRS). Under this scheme, introduced in 1993, seat-holders could return unwanted tickets in exchange for payment.

Following amendments to the TRS payment terms in April 2018, the claimants disputed the defendant’s calculations and commenced proceedings in September 2022 seeking an account and payment of monies allegedly due. The claim was initially valued at less than £10,000, with the claimants indicating on the claim form that it fell within the small claims track limit. The defendant counterclaimed seeking, amongst other matters, a declaration as to the proper construction of the contractual arrangements.

Both parties issued applications for summary judgment in late 2022. On 23 February 2023, Deputy District Judge Kirby KC granted summary judgment to the defendant on the interpretation of the 5 April 2018 letter, stayed the balance of proceedings to enable agreement on an account, and allocated the matter to the fast track. Significantly for costs purposes, he ordered the claimants to pay the defendant’s costs of the hearing, including the summary judgment applications limited to the interpretation issue, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

When settlement negotiations failed, the matter returned before DJ Mauger on 24 May 2024. The judge refused the claimants permission to amend their particulars of claim, dismissed the balance of their claim, and gave judgment for the defendant on the counterclaim in the sum of £3,054.24. The judge made a further costs order requiring the claimants to pay the defendant’s costs of the claim and counterclaim on the standard basis until 8 June 2023 and on the indemnity basis thereafter.

The defendant commenced detailed assessment proceedings on 6 September 2024, serving a bill totalling £162,789.37. The bill was divided into three parts: Part 1 for standard basis costs (£76,066.38), Part 2 for indemnity basis costs, and Part 3 for bill preparation costs. Points of Dispute were served on 1 October 2024, followed by Replies, with the assessment hearing requested on 10 December 2024.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The primary issue before Deputy Costs Judge Joseph was whether the defendant’s costs should be reduced on grounds of proportionality following the line-by-line assessment. This issue arose specifically in relation to Part 1 of the bill, which covered costs incurred on the standard basis up to 8 June 2023.

The court was required to apply CPR 44.3 and 44.4, which mandate that on a standard basis assessment, only costs that are proportionate to the matters in issue should be allowed. Under CPR 44.3(5), proportionality requires costs to bear a reasonable relationship to various factors including the sums in issue, value of non-monetary relief, complexity of litigation, conduct of the paying party, and any wider factors such as reputation or public importance.

A preliminary issue concerned whether the court should assess proportionality across the entire bill or focus solely on Part 1. This was significant because Part 2 costs were assessed on the indemnity basis, where proportionality does not apply. Additionally, the court had to determine the appropriate approach to proportionality assessment following the guidance in West and Demouilpied v Stockport NHS Foundation Trust [2019] Costs LR 1265.

The line-by-line assessment had already addressed various contested issues, including the reasonableness of instructing London-based solicitors, appropriate fee earner grades, and the dismissal of numerous Points of Dispute for insufficient particularisation under Ainsworth v Stewarts Law LLP [2020] EWCA Civ 178. Following this assessment, Part 1 of the bill had been reduced from £76,066.38 to £55,581.38.

The Parties’ Positions

The claimants, represented initially by Counsel and subsequently by the first claimant acting in person, argued that the assessed costs were manifestly disproportionate. Their primary submission was that proportionate costs should be calculated by reference to a multiple of the monetary value of the claim. They proposed that a base figure should be between one and a half to two times the £3,200 monetary claim value (producing £4,800-£6,400), with additional allowances of £1,000-£1,500 for non-monetary relief and similar amounts for conduct-related work. This methodology produced a range of £6,800-£9,400, with a mid-point of £8,100 representing their view of proportionate costs.

The claimants relied on the fact that the claim had been initially valued at less than £10,000 and would ordinarily have fallen within the small claims track. They pointed to comments by DDJ Kirby suggesting concern about costs being incurred in relation to potential claims by other seat-holders, and to DJ Mauger’s ultimate dismissal of the account claim as disproportionate. They maintained that spending approximately £55,000 on a claim worth £3,200 was wholly disproportionate regardless of other factors.

The defendant, represented by Mr Paul Hughes, rejected the claimants’ mathematical approach to proportionality. He argued that all factors in CPR 44.3(5) should be considered without giving special weight to monetary value alone. The defendant emphasised that the DDJ had allocated the matter to the fast track despite its monetary value, indicating the case’s unsuitability for the small claims track. This allocation decision suggested a total claim value, including non-monetary elements, potentially up to the fast track limit of £25,000.

The defendant highlighted the complexity of the contractual interpretation issues, evidenced by detailed skeleton arguments and the instruction of Counsel throughout. He argued that decisions already made during the line-by-line assessment – including approval of London solicitors’ instruction and appropriate fee earner grades – demonstrated reasonableness that should not be undermined through proportionality. The defendant also stressed wider factors, including potential reputational damage and the risk of similar claims from other seat-holders among the Hall’s 320 seat-holders who returned 179,000 tickets in 2022 alone.

The Court’s Decision

Deputy Costs Judge Joseph rejected the claimants’ mathematical approach to proportionality assessment. The court held that there was no basis in West and Demouilpied for calculating proportionate costs using arbitrary multiples of claim value. Such an approach was deemed fundamentally flawed and contrary to CPR requirements, which mandate consideration of multiple factors without attributing special significance to any single element.

The court determined that proportionality assessment should focus solely on Part 1 of the bill, as proportionality does not apply to indemnity basis costs. Following West and Demouilpied, the court examined the work reasonably undertaken during the relevant period, finding it included substantial tasks: reviewing proceedings, drafting pleadings, considering documents, preparing for and attending the summary judgment hearing, responding to requests for information, and conducting settlement negotiations.

On the monetary value factor, whilst acknowledging the claim’s small financial component, the court held this should not carry special weight. The DDJ’s allocation to the fast track despite the low monetary value indicated the claim’s overall significance. The court accepted that when monetary and non-monetary elements were combined, the total claim value approached £25,000.

Regarding complexity, the court found the contractual interpretation issues required specific expertise and justified Counsel’s instruction. The earlier decisions allowing London solicitors and grade B fee earners supported this assessment. The court noted that having found these costs reasonable during line-by-line assessment, it would be difficult to subsequently deem them disproportionate.

The court accepted that the defendant was entitled to consider potential reputational damage and the risk of similar claims from other seat-holders as genuine wider factors. The Hall’s considerable public status meant the defendant could legitimately take the proceedings seriously. However, this did not entitle unlimited expenditure, and the court noted the bill had already been reduced by nearly 27% during line-by-line assessment.

A significant factor was the dismissal of numerous Points of Dispute for insufficient particularisation. The court held it would be inherently unfair to allow the claimants to achieve through proportionality what they had failed to achieve through properly formulated challenges. This would effectively permit reduction “through the back door” despite the claimants’ procedural failures.

The court concluded that the assessed costs of £55,581.38 for Part 1 were not disproportionate when all factors were properly considered. The reasonable costs were also proportionate costs, and no further reduction was warranted. The court emphasised that proportionality had already been partially considered during line-by-line assessment, particularly regarding hourly rates and fee earner grades, making further reduction inappropriate.

Implications

This case demonstrates several principles for costs practitioners. Mathematical formulae based on claim value multiples will not survive scrutiny – courts must consider all CPR 44.3(5) factors without giving special weight to monetary value alone. Track allocation decisions carry weight in proportionality assessment, particularly where judges depart from normal expectations based on case characteristics.

The decision reinforces that properly particularised Points of Dispute remain essential. Attempting to achieve reductions through proportionality arguments after failing to mount specific challenges during line-by-line assessment will not succeed. Courts will consider whether allowing such reductions would be unfair to the receiving party.

The case also shows how wider factors like reputational damage and potential satellite litigation can influence proportionality assessment, provided the receiving party can demonstrate genuine concerns rather than speculative risks.

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Security For Costs Application Under CPR 25 | Financial Difficulties and Late Claims

Security For Costs Ordered At 75% Of Estimated Costs Due To Late Part 20 Claim

Baker Botts (UK) LLP v Carbon Holdings Limited & Ors [2025] EWHC 2225 (Comm)

In Baker Botts (UK) LLP v Carbon Holdings Ltd & Ors, the Commercial Court determined two principal costs issues: an application for security for costs against a Part 20 claimant and a late challenge to the reasonableness of the claimant’s fees. The decisions provide guidance on both the financial threshold for security applications and the common law assessment of solicitors’ fees.

Background | Unpaid Legal Fees and Late Counterclaim

Baker Botts claimed approximately £4.4 million in unpaid legal fees from Carbon Holdings Limited and EHI Limited under various engagement letters between 2019 and 2021. In May 2024, Carbon Holdings joined its subsidiary Egypt Hydrocarbon Corporation SAE (“EHC”) to the proceedings through a Part 20 claim, alleging joint liability for the fees.

EHC subsequently brought its own Part 20 claim against Baker Botts, alleging professional negligence in connection with the settlement of arbitration proceedings in March 2020. EHC claimed damages of at least US$150 million. Crucially, EHC raised no complaint about the settlement or Baker Botts’ performance until this Part 20 claim, some four years after the events.

The Security For Costs Application | Financial Difficulties and Late Claims

Baker Botts applied for security for costs of £2,016,777.45 against EHC under CPR 25.26 and 25.27 on two grounds: EHC’s residence outside the jurisdiction (Egypt) and reason to believe it would be unable to pay costs if ordered to do so.

EHC’s Financial Position

The court found compelling evidence of EHC’s financial difficulties:

  • Accumulated losses of US$384 million as at December 2023
  • Negative working capital of US$677 million
  • Outstanding debt of US$648 million with inability to meet principal and interest payments
  • Breach of financial covenants requiring a debt settlement agreement in June 2023
  • Default on that settlement agreement, necessitating an addendum in July 2024
  • Auditors’ emphasis of material uncertainty about going concern status

EHC’s Response | Claims of Financial Transformation

EHC argued its position had been transformed since July 2024 through:

  • The debt settlement addendum
  • A working capital facility of US$70 million until September 2025
  • Improved sales performance
  • Undertakings by “old shareholders” to bear financial amounts ruled against EHC

The Court’s Analysis | Substance Over Claims

David Elvin KC sitting as Deputy High Court Judge applied the principles from Explosive Learning Solutions Ltd v Landmarc Support Services Ltd [2023] EWHC 1263 (Comm), noting that whilst an applicant need not prove likelihood of inability to pay, there must be justification and evidence for that belief.

The court rejected EHC’s transformation claims, finding:

“The ‘transformation’ in EHC’s finances claimed by Mr James is significantly lacking in substance… The cashflow projections provided by EHC… significantly overstate EHC’s probable cashflow in Q4/24.”

Critical factors included:

  • The working capital facility was uncertain in effect, did not clearly provide for litigation costs, and expired in September 2025 before litigation would conclude
  • No supporting evidence for claimed sales improvements
  • Complete lack of information about unnamed “old shareholders'” financial resources
  • The addendum probably represented banks seeking to limit losses rather than genuine improvement

Security Quantum | 75% Discount Applied

On quantum, the court applied principles from Pisante v Logothetis [2020] Costs LR 1815, adopting a broad-brush approach rather than detailed assessment.

Starting from an assessment of £2,000,000, the court applied a 75% figure (awarding £1,500,000) reflecting:

  • The late timing of EHC’s Part 20 claim (brought four years after the alleged breach)
  • Lack of prior intimation of any complaint
  • The substantially distinct nature from the main claim
  • Normal litigation uncertainties

The court rejected EHC’s argument that security should be limited to prospective costs only, given the Part 20 claim was not made until May 2024, well after the main proceedings commenced.

Reasonableness of Fees | Common Law Assessment Jurisdiction

A separate costs issue arose from the defendants’ late Points of Dispute challenging the reasonableness of Baker Botts’ fees. These were served in January 2025, over two years after the most recent invoice dated August 2022.

Late Service | Highly Unsatisfactory But Permitted

The court found the delay “highly unsatisfactory” but permitted the challenge, noting:

  • The Defence already pleaded the implied term of reasonableness at paragraphs 25 and 26
  • Baker Botts bore the burden of proving reasonableness under Turner & Co v O Palomo SA [2000] 1 WLR 37
  • This common law jurisdiction exists regardless of formal assessment requests under the Solicitors Act 1974

Summary Judgment on Partial Recovery

The court granted summary judgment for invoices totalling US$1,026,053.67 representing work undertaken directly for Carbon Holdings and EHI, even accepting the defendants’ case about subsidiary liability. However, the court referred assessment of reasonableness to the Costs Judge.

The court emphasised that the burden of proving fees are reasonable rests with the solicitor, whether under common law or the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.

Key Principles for Practice

Security for Costs Applications

The decision confirms several practical points:

Financial evidence matters more than recent arrangements: Courts will look beyond debt restructuring and working capital facilities to underlying trading performance and debt history. Recent refinancing may be viewed skeptically as banks protecting their position rather than genuine improvement.

Late claims attract less favorable treatment: The court’s 75% award (rather than the more typical 60-70% discount) reflected the tactical and belated nature of EHC’s counterclaim.

Prospective vs historic costs: Security may cover both incurred and future costs where the Part 20 claim is brought well after main proceedings commenced.

Fee Reasonableness Challenges

Common law jurisdiction remains available: Solicitors cannot rely on expiry of Solicitors Act time limits to avoid reasonableness challenges where fees are disputed in ongoing litigation.

Burden always on solicitor: The solicitor bears the burden of proving reasonableness, regardless of whether a formal assessment is requested.

Late challenges may still succeed: While procedural delay is “highly unsatisfactory,” substantive challenges to reasonableness may still be permitted where properly pleaded.

Conclusion

The Baker Botts decision demonstrates the court’s willingness to look beyond surface financial arrangements to underlying commercial reality when assessing security applications. For solicitors, it confirms that the common law obligation to charge only reasonable fees remains enforceable through ordinary litigation, providing clients with protection even where statutory routes may be time-barred.

The 75% security award reflects judicial recognition that late, tactical counterclaims should not receive the same treatment as genuine disputes raised promptly. This approach may influence how courts approach security applications in similar circumstances where professional negligence counterclaims emerge only after fee recovery proceedings commence.

Security for costs and the role of court approved costs budgets

Security for costs and the role of court approved costs budgets – SARPD Oil v Addax Energy CA decision on “deliberate reticence” – Court of Appeal decision directly relevant to security for costs under CPR 25.27(b)(ii) and the “reason to believe” test, with analysis of financial disclosure obligations.

£6m Security For Costs Denied As Escrow Funds In UK Account Deemed Sufficient – Virgo Marine v Reed Smith – High Court Commercial Court case on CPR 25.27 applications, discussing availability of funds and the “reason to believe” test with similar quantum considerations.

Additional Security For Costs Ordered For Inquiry And Detailed Assessment – Arcadia v Bosworth – High Court Commercial Court decision on additional security orders and material changes in circumstances, relevant to quantum and percentage discounting.

The Cost Of Providing Security For Costs | Court of Appeal Decision – Court of Appeal guidance on form of security and discretionary considerations under CPR 25.13, relevant to the banker’s draft requirement in Baker Botts.

The principles from Explosive Learning Solutions Ltd v Landmarc Support Services Ltd were applied by the court in assessing EHC’s financial position.

 

Summary Assessment | No Justification Found For Indemnity Costs, Leading Counsel, Multiple Fee Earner Attendance Or £750+ Hourly Rates

The summary assessment of costs followed an application by Saudi Arabian Airlines Corporation (the claimant) for an extension of time to exchange disclosure certificates and extended disclosure lists. The original direction required disclosure in March 2025, which was subsequently extended by consent to 18 April 2025 as an interim measure whilst the parties negotiated a longer extension. When those negotiations failed to produce an agreed date, the claimant issued the present application.

The underlying dispute involved aviation-related proceedings in the Commercial Court, with Norton Rose Fulbright LLP acting for the claimant and Stephenson Harwood LLP representing the defendant, Sprite Aviation No.6 DAC. The claimant’s difficulties in meeting the disclosure deadline stemmed from Saudi Arabian data protection laws, though this was not initially disclosed in the application notice.

His Honour Judge Mark Pelling KC granted the extension to 8 August 2025 but did so subject to an undertaking from the claimant’s solicitors to inform the defendant’s solicitors within one working day if they became aware that the deadline would not or might not be met. The judge rejected the defendant’s request for an unless order and more draconian reporting obligations, finding that the undertaking struck the appropriate balance in addressing the delays.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The court was required to determine two principal costs issues. First, whether the defendant should recover its costs of and occasioned by the application, and if so, whether those costs should be assessed on the standard or indemnity basis. The defendant sought its costs on the grounds that the application was necessitated by the claimant’s failure to comply with the original disclosure timetable and its lack of transparency about the true reasons for the delay.

Second, the court undertook a summary assessment of the defendant’s costs, which totalled over £75,000. This required the judge to apply the well-established tests of reasonableness and proportionality to various categories of work claimed, including solicitors’ time, counsel’s fees, and disbursements. The assessment involved scrutinising hourly rates claimed significantly above the guideline rates, the number of fee earners involved, and the hours expended on various tasks.

The Parties’ Positions

The defendant submitted that it should recover its costs on the indemnity basis, arguing that the claimant had acted outside the norm expected in commercial litigation. The defendant relied on several factors: the claimant’s failure to comply with the original order, its failure to identify the real problem in the evidence initially filed in support, the ambiguous description of the disclosure exercise in Mr Springthorpe’s fourth witness statement, and the late filing of clarifying evidence in Mr Springthorpe’s fifth statement.

The claimant contended that costs should be in the case, characterising the application as relatively straightforward. Whilst accepting that a hearing was necessary due to the effect on the progress monitoring date, the claimant argued it was disproportionate for the defendant to resist the application as there was ample time in the timetable to accommodate the extension. The claimant emphasised that disclosure difficulties requiring extensions were not unusual in commercial litigation.

On summary assessment, the defendant sought to justify hourly rates of £744-760 for grade A fee earners (compared to guideline rates of £566), £432 for grade C (guideline £299), and £252 for grade D (guideline £205). The defendant argued these rates were justified given the aviation nature of the case and the requirement for specialist lawyers. The defendant also sought to recover fees for leading counsel’s involvement and extensive solicitor time across multiple fee earners.

The Court’s Decision

The judge ordered the defendant to recover its costs but on the standard basis, rejecting the application for indemnity costs. Applying the Excelsior test, the judge found that none of the factors relied upon, individually or collectively, justified an indemnity costs order. The judge observed that if every in-time application for an extension attracted indemnity costs, standard orders would be virtually unknown. Whilst the absence of information was aggravating and made it marginally more difficult for the defendant to respond, this did not warrant the exceptional remedy of indemnity costs.

On the principle of whether any costs order should be made, the judge found this to be finely balanced but ultimately concluded the application could have been avoided had the claimant either complied with the original order or sought an extension on a full and frank basis from the outset. The judge therefore awarded costs to the defendant on the standard basis.

In the summary assessment, the judge applied the principles from Kazakhstan Kagazy Plc v Zhunus, that proportionality in commercial litigation means the minimum sum required for a proper job to be done. Following Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd v LG Display Co. Ltd, the judge held that whilst guideline rates were the starting point, any excess must be clearly justified on reasonableness and proportionality grounds.

The judge found no coherent justification for departing from guideline rates, rejecting the argument that this being an aviation case warranted higher rates for what was essentially a straightforward disclosure extension application. With hesitation, the judge allowed London 1 rather than London 2 rates, primarily due to the size of the claim.

On specific items, the judge made significant reductions: attendances on clients were reduced from five to three hours for the grade C fee earner; the involvement of Mr Edward Cumming KC was disallowed entirely as neither reasonable nor proportionate for an extension application; attendance at the hearing was limited to one grade A fee earner rather than three solicitors; and travel time for attending counsel’s chambers remotely was disallowed. The judge allowed £8,000 for junior counsel’s brief fee despite reservations, acknowledging the additional work caused by the claimant’s late disclosure of material information.

For document preparation, the judge substantially reduced the claimed 40.6 hours across three fee earners for preparing for the CMC, allowing 2.5 hours for the grade A fee earner, 13.3 hours for the grade D fee earner, and three hours for the grade C fee earner. The costs lawyer’s fee was reduced from £1,625 to £1,200, finding the higher figure excessive for preparing a relatively simple costs schedule.

SIAC Lacks Jurisdiction To Award Costs In Naturalisation Review Proceedings

The costs issue in this case arose from proceedings in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) concerning an application for naturalisation as a British citizen. FGF had applied for naturalisation on 27 January 2020, which the Secretary of State refused on 16 February 2022 on good character grounds. The decision was certified under section 2D(1)(b) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, meaning it relied on sensitive information that could not be made public.

FGF applied to SIAC for a review of this decision on 23 February 2022. He did not qualify for legal aid due to his financial circumstances exceeding the relevant thresholds. His solicitors and counsel agreed to represent him under a heavily discounted conditional fee arrangement.

On 2 August 2022, the Secretary of State withdrew the original decision to consider further evidence. SIAC served a notice on 11 August 2022, signed by Jay J, recording that FGF’s application was treated as withdrawn pursuant to rule 11A of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003.

Despite the withdrawal, FGF applied to SIAC on 12 June 2023 for his costs of the first review proceedings. The Secretary of State resisted the application on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that SIAC had no power to award costs. SIAC heard the costs application on 15 February 2024 and, in a judgment dated 23 February 2024, concluded it had jurisdiction and ordered the Secretary of State to pay FGF’s costs, with any detailed assessment to be transferred to the High Court if not agreed.

The Secretary of State challenged SIAC’s costs order by judicial review. Two additional interested parties, H7 and H15, were joined to the proceedings as they had pending costs applications in their own SIAC proceedings that would be affected by the outcome.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The High Court was required to determine two specific costs issues. First, whether SIAC has jurisdiction to award costs in cases where an applicant has applied under section 2D of the SIAC Act to have a naturalisation decision set aside. This raised fundamental questions about the scope of SIAC’s statutory powers and whether costs jurisdiction was incorporated within its review powers.

Second, and alternatively, whether SIAC has jurisdiction to award costs where an application under section 2D is withdrawn before determination. This issue specifically concerned the effect of rule 11A(2) of the SIAC Procedure Rules, which provides that an application for review shall be treated as withdrawn if the Secretary of State withdraws the underlying decision.

The court also had to consider a preliminary matter regarding whether judicial review was the appropriate remedy, given Mr Armstrong’s contention that the Secretary of State had an adequate alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Court of Appeal under section 7(1A) of the SIAC Act.

The Parties’ Positions

The Secretary of State, represented by Ms Giovannetti KC, argued that SIAC had no costs jurisdiction in review proceedings. She submitted that SIAC’s powers are entirely statutory and that Parliament did not confer a costs jurisdiction when enacting the review provisions in sections 2C-2F. She emphasised that section 6A of the Act demonstrated Parliament’s intention to provide the Lord Chancellor with power to make costs provisions through rules under section 5, and in the absence of such rules, SIAC lacked any costs power.

Ms Giovannetti contended that sections 2D(3) and 2D(4) should be read together as dealing with substantive judicial review orders under section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, not the wider powers of the High Court such as the general costs powers under section 51. She highlighted that Parliament uses express language when conferring costs powers on tribunals, citing section 29(2) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 as an example.

Regarding the withdrawal issue, Ms Giovannetti submitted that section 2D(4) only confers power where SIAC “decides that the decision should be set aside.” Once a decision is withdrawn, there is nothing to set aside, and SIAC’s role is limited to the administrative act of recording the withdrawal under rule 11A(3).

H7 and H15, represented by Mr Armstrong KC, invited the court to uphold SIAC’s reasoning. He argued that “the principles which would be applied in judicial review proceedings” in section 2D(3) included costs principles developed in judicial review case law. He submitted that the language of section 2D(4) – “any such order” and “any such relief” – could not be broader and must include costs orders.

Mr Armstrong argued it would be absurd for Parliament to replace judicial review in the High Court with a SIAC review framework without providing for costs. He acknowledged this would create one-way costs shifting but argued this was rational and not unprecedented. He also raised arguments under article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, contending that the inability to recover costs would discriminate against those forced to use SIAC rather than the High Court.

On the withdrawal issue, Mr Armstrong argued that once a costs power is established, there was no good reason why it should not extend to cases where the application is treated as withdrawn, relying on SIAC’s reasoning that it retained jurisdiction for consequential matters.

The Court’s Decision

The High Court allowed the judicial review claim, finding that SIAC had no jurisdiction to award costs. Dame Victoria Sharp and Mrs Justice Farbey DBE held that SIAC’s jurisdiction is entirely statutory, with no inherent powers, and that costs powers had not been conferred by the SIAC Act.

The court adopted a purposive approach to interpreting sections 2D(3) and 2D(4), reading them together. It held that these provisions were concerned with the substantive determination of judicial review applications and the orders flowing from such determinations, not with ancillary matters such as costs. The reference to “principles which would be applied in judicial review proceedings” meant principles for determining claims substantively, not principles relating to costs awards.

The court found that the proper source for any costs power would be section 5 of the Act, which empowers the Lord Chancellor to make rules conferring “ancillary powers” on SIAC. The absence of costs provisions in the current rules meant no such power had been conferred. The court explicitly rejected SIAC’s reasoning that the rules’ silence on costs meant section 5 was not the source of any costs power, distinguishing between the source of a power and the decision whether to exercise it.

Applying the reasoning from C7 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 265, the court held that if SIAC was to have any power to award costs, it could only be conferred by rules made by the Lord Chancellor. The detailed statutory code governing SIAC’s procedural powers meant there was no room for an implied costs jurisdiction.

The court rejected arguments that the absence of costs recovery would breach access to justice principles, noting that many tribunals operate without costs powers and that this does not prevent them from doing justice. It also found no merit in the article 14 discrimination arguments, holding that no difference of treatment arose between those using SIAC and others in analogous situations.

On the withdrawal issue, the court held that even if SIAC had costs powers in successful reviews, these would not extend to withdrawn applications. Rule 11A(2) provides that applications “shall be treated as withdrawn” when the Secretary of State withdraws the underlying decision. This automatic effect leaves SIAC with no discretion and no judicial decision to make. The court found SIAC had erred in law by treating the service of a notice under rule 11A(3) as a judicial decision that could carry consequential powers.

The court emphasised that from the moment of withdrawal notification, the application is deemed withdrawn and any purported costs order would have no jurisdictional foundation. It rejected SIAC’s attempt to draw parallels with High Court procedures, noting there was “no analogue to rule 11A” in judicial review proceedings and that SIAC’s codified powers could not be equated with the High Court’s broader jurisdiction.

Fraudulent Non-Disclosure in Financial Remedy Proceedings | Indemnity Costs Award Following Successful Appeal

The Court of Appeal’s recent costs judgment in Helliwell v Entwistle [2025] EWCA Civ 1071 demonstrates how deliberate non-disclosure in financial remedy proceedings can justify indemnity costs orders. Following a successful appeal against Francis J’s financial remedy order, the court awarded costs on the indemnity basis both for the appeal and the proceedings below, finding the respondent’s (wife’s) conduct was “well out of the norm”.

Background to the Costs Application

The costs judgment arose after the appellant (husband) successfully appealed Francis J’s order of 20 March 2025 in financial remedy proceedings. The Court of Appeal found that the judge’s decision to uphold a pre-nuptial agreement was wrong due to the respondent’s (wife’s) fraudulent non-disclosure of assets, with the matter being remitted to the High Court for an assessment of the appellant’s (husband’s) needs.

Francis J’s original costs order had required the appellant (husband) to pay £75,000 to the respondent (wife). Following the successful appeal against that decision, the appellant (husband) sought to recover this sum alongside his costs of both the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

The Costs Orders Sought

The appellant’s (husband’s) costs application comprised three distinct elements totalling over £669,000:

  • £120,522 for the costs of the appeal on the indemnity basis
  • Repayment of the £75,000 paid under the costs order of 20 March 2025
  • £474,318 for costs incurred up to and including the first instance hearing, also on the indemnity basis

All sums were sought to be payable by 13 August 2025, with the appellant (husband) requesting summary assessment rather than detailed assessment.

The Respondent’s Position on Costs

The respondent (wife) accepted liability in principle for the costs of the appeal but “fiercely resisted” any assessment on the indemnity basis. She sought standard basis assessment with detailed assessment unless quantum could be agreed. More significantly, she proposed substantial delays to payment, seeking to defer payment until either 14 days after determination of the appellant’s (husband’s) remitted needs assessment, or if permission to appeal to the Supreme Court were granted, until after conclusion of that appeal.

The respondent (wife) also submitted that costs of the hearings below should be considered at the conclusion of the remitted needs assessment rather than being determined immediately.

The Court’s Analysis | Conduct “Out of the Norm”

The Court of Appeal applied the established test from Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 879, which requires conduct or circumstances taking the case “out of the norm” to justify indemnity costs. The court particularly relied upon Waller LJ’s clarification in Esure Services Ltd v Quarcoo [2009] EWCA Civ 595 that “norm” reflects something outside the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings, rather than statistical frequency.

The court identified several factors that placed the respondent’s (wife’s) conduct well outside reasonable parameters:

The respondent (wife) had deliberately failed to disclose the majority of her assets despite expressly warranting to the appellant (husband) that she had made full disclosure under the terms of the pre-nuptial agreement. She had also used what the court described as a “copy and paste email” to prevent the appellant (husband) from receiving legal advice about that disclosure.

When challenged at the hearing before Francis J, the respondent (wife) maintained her position, denying dishonesty and advancing “self-interested explanations relating to her own and her father’s tax affairs” to justify misleading the appellant (husband). The court noted that the respondent (wife) had rejected an offer that would have resulted in precisely the outcome that would now occur following the successful appeal – an assessment of the appellant’s (husband’s) needs under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

The Costs Decision

The court concluded that such conduct could not “possibly be described as reasonable in relation to the use of a pre-nuptial agreement” and was not “the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings in the Family Division”. Finding the conduct was “well out of the norm”, the court ordered costs both at first instance and on appeal to be assessed on an indemnity basis if not agreed.

While the judgment does not explicitly address the timing of payment or confirm the specific quantum sought, the court’s robust language and unanimous decision on the indemnity basis issue suggests strong support for the appellant’s (husband’s) position on immediate enforcement.

Implications for Family Solicitors

This decision provides important guidance for solicitors handling financial remedy proceedings, particularly regarding disclosure obligations and their potential costs consequences. The court’s willingness to award indemnity costs demonstrates that fraudulent non-disclosure will be treated as conduct falling well outside normal parameters, especially where a client has given express warranties about full disclosure.

The case highlights the critical importance of ensuring clients understand their disclosure obligations from the outset. Where pre-nuptial agreements are involved, solicitors should be particularly cautious about any warranties or representations regarding full disclosure, as these can create additional exposure if subsequently proved false.

The judgment also illustrates how the rejection of reasonable settlement proposals can contribute to findings that conduct justifies indemnity costs. The appellant (husband) had proposed at the outset the very outcome that ultimately occurred, yet the respondent (wife) chose to maintain her position based on incomplete disclosure. This suggests solicitors should carefully evaluate whether their client’s position is sustainable if fuller disclosure were to emerge.

For solicitors advising clients in financial remedy proceedings, the case serves as a stark reminder of the costs risks associated with inadequate disclosure practices. The court’s characterisation of the respondent’s (wife’s) conduct as fraudulent, combined with the substantial costs award exceeding £669,000, demonstrates the serious financial consequences that can flow from deliberate concealment of assets.

The decision also indicates that attempts to delay costs payments pending further proceedings or potential appeals may be unsuccessful where the conduct justifying indemnity costs is clear and established. While the judgment does not explicitly rule on the timing issue, solicitors should be aware that courts may show little sympathy for arguments seeking to postpone the costs consequences of established misconduct.