Background

The case at hand involved HNW Lending Limited (“HNW”) and Ms. Nicole Stacey Ann Lawrence (“Ms. Lawrence”), who were involved in a legal dispute regarding a loan agreement and a first charge registered against a property. HNW initiated the claim seeking possession of the property known as Former Social Club, Horton Lane, West Park Road, Epsom, KT19 8PH (the “Property”) and repayment of an outstanding loan amount of £3,535,965.82.

On 10 November 2021, HNW commenced proceedings in Kingston County Court. A possession order was initially granted on 3 May 2022, but it was set aside on 13 July 2023 due to non-service of proceedings on Ms. Lawrence. Consequently, the matter was transferred to the Chancery Division of the High Court. Subsequently, the parties filed various applications including HNW’s application to amend the Particulars of Claim and strike out the Defence and Counterclaim, while Ms. Lawrence sought to strike out the claim, other related reliefs, and security for costs.

Throughout the proceedings, Ms. Lawrence raised various defences, including allegations of duress and undue influence, contesting the validity of the Loan Agreement, and refuting HNW’s entitlement to possession of the Property.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The critical costs issue before the court was Ms. Lawrence’s application for security for costs. Ms. Lawrence sought security for her legal costs amounting to £300,000, and additionally, a separate security of £500,000 for Setfords Solicitors’ costs. The application for security for costs was grounded in the assertion that there was reason to believe that HNW would be unable to meet the costs liabilities if ordered to do so.

The Parties’ Positions

Ms. Lawrence, in her application dated 28 August 2024, contended that security for costs was necessary as there was legitimate concern regarding HNW’s ability to satisfy any potential costs orders. She posited that without such security, she and the third party (Setfords Solicitors) would face substantial financial risk.

HNW, through its submissions, disagreed with Ms. Lawrence’s assertions. The firm contended that the application for security for costs should be rejected, particularly emphasising that with the anticipated striking out of Ms. Lawrence’s Defence and Counterclaim, no basis existed for granting such an order. HNW also highlighted that Ms. Lawrence’s estimate of her own costs was unsubstantiated and lacked detailed breakdowns, thus rendering it unpersuasive.

The Court’s Decision

Judge Andrew Lenon KC thoroughly considered the applications and submissions made by both parties. The court ultimately ruled against Ms. Lawrence’s application for security for costs, reasoning that since her Defence and Counterclaim were being struck out, it would be inappropriate to order security. The judge highlighted that Ms. Lawrence’s estimate of £300,000 for her costs lacked a detailed breakdown and was insufficiently substantiated, and the justification for the security in respect to Setfords’ costs was inadequately explained.

Moreover, the overall observations underscored that further disclosure, which Ms. Lawrence also sought, was deemed unnecessary since it would not materially alter the conclusions reached regarding the binding nature of the Loan Agreement and the enforcement rights under the charge.

Background

The case concerned an appeal brought by Mr Emmanouil Spanakis against an order of Costs Judge Whalan dated 29 August 2023, following a solicitor-client assessment under section 70(2) of the Solicitors Act 1974. Mr Spanakis had instructed Schillings International LLP in relation to a defamation and breach of confidence matter. The parties entered into a retainer agreement on 9 February 2022, which included an estimate for the first phase of work (“Phase One”) of up to £10,000 plus VAT.

An invoice for £15,000 plus VAT was rendered by Schillings on 6 April 2022, covering work carried out between 29 November 2021 and 31 March 2022. Mr Spanakis disputed the invoice on the grounds that it exceeded the initial estimate, that the work was substandard, and that no adequate warning had been given before costs escalated. The matter proceeded to a detailed assessment before the Costs Judge, who allowed the bill at £19,141.80 (including VAT). Mr Spanakis appealed.

Issues on Appeal

The key issues on appeal concerned whether the costs should have been limited to the initial estimate, and more broadly, how solicitor-client cost estimates should be treated when costs exceed them. The appeal required analysis of:

• Whether Schillings had breached its contractual obligation to inform the client if costs would exceed the estimate;
• Whether reliance on the estimate was a necessary condition to limiting the recoverable costs;
• Whether Mr Spanakis had in fact relied on the estimate when instructing the firm;
• Whether the court should have exercised discretion to limit recovery due to the excessiveness of the charges or the timing of notification.

Appellant’s Arguments

Mr Spanakis advanced five grounds of appeal. Central to his case was that the initial estimate created a legitimate expectation or implied cap, and that the respondent failed to comply with its obligation to notify him if the estimate was likely to be exceeded. He submitted that the court below had:

1. Failed to consider his position as a consumer and apply the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
2. Misinterpreted clause 8.3 of the retainer, which he argued imposed a firm duty to provide notice before costs could be increased.
3. Wrongly concluded that an email of 28 March 2022 constituted sufficient notice.
4. Erred in law by treating reliance as a requirement for challenging costs above the estimate.
5. Exercised discretion improperly by failing to account for relevant facts.

Respondent’s Arguments

Schillings contended that the initial estimate was expressly non-binding and subject to assumptions. Clause 8.3 only required the firm to “endeavour” to provide notice. The 28 March 2022 email, sent when just over half the estimate had been used, was said to amount to fair warning that costs would be exceeded.

Schillings further submitted that the estimate could not reasonably have been viewed as a cap, and that the client continued to instruct the firm even after that update, demonstrating both acquiescence and an absence of reliance. The fees claimed were reasonable in light of the additional work, urgency, and complexity that arose during the instruction.

Judgment

Mrs Justice Tipples dismissed the appeal in its entirety. She found that the retainer did not impose a strict duty to provide advance notification before exceeding the estimate. The obligation in clause 8.3 was limited to an obligation to “endeavour” to provide notice. While earlier notification might have been better practice, a failure to notify sooner did not render subsequent costs unrecoverable.

The judge held that reliance on the estimate was necessary to support an argument that the fees should be limited. Mr Spanakis had not shown that he would have acted differently had he been given a more accurate forecast earlier. Rather, after receiving the 28 March 2022 email, he had urged the firm to continue with urgency. This undermined any suggestion of reliance.

At paragraph 94 of the judgment, the court expressly found that Spanakis was aware of the growing costs and continued to instruct the firm. There was no evidence of any detrimental reliance on the original estimate. The judge concluded that the work done and charges claimed were reasonable in all the circumstances, including the scope of work ultimately performed and the evolving instructions given by the appellant.

Analysis and Commentary

This judgment provides a significant clarification of how estimates in solicitor-client relationships are treated in detailed assessment proceedings. The High Court reaffirmed that:

• An estimate is not a cap unless expressly stated to be such. The use of caveats or terms such as “we will endeavour to inform you” do not give rise to absolute obligations or hard ceilings on costs.
• A client’s ability to resist paying costs in excess of an estimate depends not only on the size of the overrun but on the reasonableness of the solicitor’s actions and the presence (or absence) of reliance.
• Reliance must be demonstrated with evidence of a change in position or lost opportunity. Mere expectation that costs would remain within the estimate is insufficient.

The decision is particularly valuable for legal practitioners in the way it distinguishes between best practice and enforceable obligation. It recognises that while good client care requires timely and accurate cost updates, the absence of such updates does not automatically disentitle solicitors to recover reasonable fees.

From a costs law perspective, this case reaffirms the importance of clear, well-drafted engagement letters. The inclusion of explicit language confirming that estimates are not binding and may be revised offers protection against challenges where final costs significantly exceed early forecasts. Conversely, it places an evidential burden on clients seeking to rely on estimates as a basis to resist payment.

The involvement of a specialist costs judge at first instance and the appellate endorsement by the High Court makes this a strong authority on the principles governing solicitor-client assessments. It is likely to be cited in future disputes over fees where the scope of a solicitor’s duty to warn of cost increases is in question.

Conclusion

The High Court’s dismissal of Mr Spanakis’s appeal confirmed that the cost estimate given by Schillings was not a binding limit and that the firm had not breached its contractual obligations. The ruling affirmed that reliance is a crucial component in any argument seeking to restrict recovery of fees beyond an initial estimate. This judgment provides clear, authoritative guidance for costs practitioners and solicitors alike, reinforcing the position that a properly drafted retainer and demonstrable reasonableness in billing will withstand scrutiny, even where costs exceed early projections.

The High Court’s decision in Rollerteam Ltd v Siddiqi addresses a fundamental but frequently misunderstood aspect of costs recovery: where multiple defendants benefit from a costs order but only one party has discharged the solicitors’ bills, who has the right to recover those costs?

Background

The underlying proceedings arose from a protracted family dispute concerning the Sherlock Holmes Museum in Baker Street, London. On 10 January 2019, Tariq Siddiqi commenced proceedings against five defendants claiming £4,149,911.84 in damages for alleged blackmail, harassment and libel. The defendants were represented by RPC under a joint retainer arrangement.

On 24 May 2019, following applications for strike out and summary judgment, Warby J made comprehensive orders in the defendants’ favour. He dismissed Siddiqi’s applications, granted summary judgment for the Second to Fifth Defendants, and struck out the claim save for the harassment allegations against the First Defendant. Crucially, he ordered Siddiqi to pay all five defendants’ costs of four separate applications, to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed, with a payment on account of £39,938.52.

The Critical Payment Dynamic

What emerged during the subsequent detailed assessment proceedings was that whilst all five defendants had benefited from Warby J’s costs order, only the Fourth Defendant (Rollerteam) had actually paid RPC’s bills. The other defendants, despite being named beneficiaries of the costs order, had discharged no liability to the solicitors and therefore had no costs to recover.

This arrangement is more common in practice than many appreciate. In family business disputes, partnership litigation, or group actions, it frequently occurs that one party agrees to bear the legal costs on behalf of all co-defendants, whether for reasons of financial capacity, strategic control, or simple necessity when other parties become uncooperative or insolvent.

The Detailed Assessment

Following directions from Costs Judge Rowley in December 2022, the defendants were required to commence detailed assessment proceedings by 15 February 2023. Only Rollerteam served a Notice of Commencement, claiming costs of £82,432.78. The other defendants could not do so – having paid nothing to RPC, they had no bills to serve.

On 27 April 2023, the Costs Judge made an unless order requiring Rollerteam to serve a revised bill that would indicate, where work was done jointly for multiple defendants, what proportion was claimed on behalf of Rollerteam specifically.

Rollerteam duly served a revised bill totalling £75,228.43. However, rather than attempting to apportion costs between the five defendants, they argued in detailed Assessment Notes that since RPC had represented all defendants under a joint retainer, and the costs orders were in favour of all defendants, there was no realistic basis for apportionment. They claimed 100% of the common costs, with only a 10% reduction for work done exclusively for the First Defendant on the harassment claim.

The bill stated explicitly that “100% of the costs incurred in relation to the injunction application, the disclosure application, the strike-out application and the amendment application were incurred for the benefit of the fourth defendant, just as 100% of those costs were incurred for the benefit of the first, second, third and fifth defendants.“

The Costs Judge’s Decision

On 15 August 2023, Siddiqi applied to strike out Rollerteam’s revised bill for non-compliance with the unless order. Following a hearing on 17 November 2023, Costs Judge Rowley granted the application, finding material non-compliance and striking out the bill entirely, assessing Rollerteam’s recoverable costs at zero.

The Costs Judge held that since only Rollerteam was seeking costs recovery, any work done for the defendants generally needed to be “divided appropriately so that only the costs for which the fourth defendant is liable are sought from the claimant.” He concluded that the bill failed to reflect “realistic sums that may be recoverable for one of five defendants” and that the costs draftsman had wrongly attempted to circumvent the apportionment requirement.

The Appeal

Rollerteam appealed to the High Court.

On 17 March 2025, Mr Justice Rajah allowed the appeal. The Judge held that Rollerteam had complied with the unless order by clearly identifying that all work was done jointly for multiple defendants and stating that it claimed 100% of that work for its own benefit (save for the specified 10% reduction).

More significantly, the Judge clarified the fundamental principle governing recovery of common costs in joint retainer cases. The correct approach is not to assume automatic apportionment based on the number of defendants, but to ask whether the common costs would have been reasonably incurred by the paying defendant in any event to defend itself from the claimant’s allegations.

Legal Principles Established

The judgment establishes several important principles:

• Where defendants are represented under a joint retainer but only one party discharges the solicitors’ bills, that party is entitled to commence detailed assessment proceedings in its own name and recover the costs it has paid, without requiring participation from the non-paying co-defendants.
• Common costs need not be divided between multiple beneficiaries of a costs order where those costs would have been necessarily incurred for the paying party’s own defence regardless of the number of co-defendants involved.
• Following the principle established in Haynes v Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, costs such as court fees, conferences with counsel, and legal research that would have been incurred whether defending one client or multiple clients should be recoverable in full by the paying party.
• Courts should interpret unless orders pragmatically, focusing on whether the required information has been provided rather than whether the claiming party’s approach appears “realistic” to the judge.

Practical Implications

For practitioners, the decision provides important guidance:

• When preparing bills in multi-defendant cases, focus on explaining why common costs were necessary for the client’s own defence rather than attempting artificial mathematical apportionment between co-defendants.
• Where representing the paying defendant in a joint retainer situation, emphasise that the question is not how many parties benefited from the work, but whether the costs would have been incurred in any event for that client’s own protection.
• Ensure bills respond directly to the specific requirements of case management orders, but do not feel compelled to accept assumptions about apportionment that may not reflect legal principle.

Conclusion

Rollerteam Ltd v Siddiqi clarifies an area where costs practice has often been unnecessarily complex and provides welcome guidance for the many cases where multiple defendants share representation but only one party bears the financial burden. The decision confirms that the party who actually discharges solicitors’ bills under a joint retainer is entitled to recover those costs without artificial reduction, provided they were reasonably necessary for that party’s own defence.

The judgment serves as a reminder that costs recovery should be governed by practical realities and legal principles rather than superficial mathematical divisions that bear no relation to the work actually required or the liabilities actually incurred.

Background

On 11 April 2025, Mrs Justice Stacey delivered a judgment in the High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division regarding an appeal in the case of Miss Laura Attersley v. UK Insurance Limited (2025 EWHC 884 (KB)). The appellant, Miss Laura Attersley, initially brought a claim for damages in the tort of negligence following a road traffic accident, and the respondent was UK Insurance Limited, the insurer of the other driver involved.

The claim began under the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents (RTA Protocol), but subsequently exited it at the defendant’s request. The claimant issued Part 7 proceedings claiming up to £150,000 damages and, later, accepted a Part 36 offer from the defendant for £45,000 after the claim had been allocated to the multi-track. The principal matter on appeal was the determination of whether the claimant was entitled to fixed costs or costs assessed on the standard basis up until the point of the expiry of the relevant period of the Part 36 offer accepted late.

The procedural history began on 9 March 2018 when the claimant was involved in a road traffic accident in Southend on Sea, Essex. Ten days later, on 19 March 2018, the claimant’s solicitors submitted a Claim Notification Form (RTA1) under the RTA Protocol. The defendant requested the claim exit the RTA Protocol on 9 April 2018 due to disputed liability. Subsequently, on 29 April 2019, liability was admitted by the defendant. On 12 February 2021, the claimant issued Part 7 proceedings with the particulars of claim dated 13 January 2021, escalating the damages claimed to up to £150,000 based on ongoing physical and psychological issues, supported by medical reports.

The claim was allocated to the multi-track on 5 January 2022, and the trial was scheduled, with extensive expert evidence anticipated. Nearly a year later, on 8 July 2022, the claimant accepted the defendant’s Part 36 offer of £45,000. A subsequent dispute arose regarding the costs consequences of this late acceptance, ultimately leading to the appeal heard on 14 October 2024.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The core issue before the High Court was the costs implications arising from the claimant’s late acceptance of the Part 36 offer. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the claimant was entitled to her reasonable costs assessed on the standard basis up to the expiry of the Part 36 offer, or whether she was restricted to fixed costs up to that date, pursuant to CPR 36.20 as it was then in force.

Central to the issue was the interplay between CPR 45.29B, which pertains to fixed costs under Section IIIA of Part 45 for cases that have exited the RTA Protocol and not been allocated to the multi-track, and Part 36.20, which encompasses costs consequences of accepting a Part 36 offer for such cases. The contention primarily revolved around whether the rule amendments following Qader v Esure [2017] removed the application of the fixed costs regime upon allocation to the multi-track, thus entitling the claimant to costs assessed on the standard basis.

The Parties’ Positions

The claimant argued that, under CPR 45.29B, the fixed costs regime ceased to apply once the case was allocated to the multi-track, implying she was entitled to costs assessed on the standard basis as per CPR 36.13. Relying on Qader v Esure, she contended that the rule amendment intended to disapply fixed costs retrospectively upon multi-track allocation.

On the other hand, the defendant maintained that the claimant was only entitled to fixed costs until the Part 36 offer acceptance deadline per CPR 36.20. They argued that this interpretation was necessary to prevent an absurd outcome where claimants could benefit disproportionately from late offer acceptances and to uphold the overarching legislative intention to encourage early settlement and cost proportionality.

The Court’s Decision

Mrs Justice Stacey reviewed the statutory provisions and case law to ascertain the proper interpretation of the conflicting CPR rules. The judgment emphasised that the intention behind the CPR amendments following Qader was explicit in disapplying the fixed costs regime upon allocation to the multi-track. The court noted that this applied retrospectively, provided there had been a judicial determination for allocation to the multi-track.

Therefore, the court held that CPR 36.20 did not apply where a case had been allocated to the multi-track. Consequently, the claimant was entitled to her reasonable costs on the standard basis up to the expiry of the relevant period of the Part 36 offer, thereby overturning the lower court’s ruling that limited her to fixed costs.

The appeal was allowed, and the claimant’s costs up to the Part 36 offer expiry were to be assessed based on the standard basis under Part 44 principles. This outcome aligned with the statutory intention of CPR amendments and provided clarity on the costs implications in multi-track allocations.

The case involved proceedings initiated by Captivatiun Limited (“the Claimant”) against Orr Litchfield Solicitors Limited (“the Defendant”). Initially, the Defendant was instructed by the Claimant to assist with litigation involving Unlockd Marketing Ltd. The Claimant made an initial payment on account of £900 plus VAT. Disputes soon arose concerning the fees charged by the Defendant.

On 30 May 2022, the Defendant issued an invoice for £4,500 plus VAT. The Claimant sought to discuss the invoice, but by 16 June 2022, the Defendant indicated they could not undertake further work until the invoice was settled. This led to the Claimant concluding that their relationship with the Defendant had ended. Subsequently, on 6 September 2022, a second invoice for £9,018 plus VAT was generated.

The Defendant commenced Part 7 proceedings on 19 December 2023, seeking recovery of unpaid fees totaling £13,338. In response, on 12 April 2024, the Claimant notified the Defendant of their intention to issue a Part 8 claim for an order and directions for a Solicitors Act assessment of the invoices.

Procedural complications followed. The Claimant filed the Part 8 costs-only proceedings on 18 April 2024 to secure detailed assessment of the invoices. This led to a directions hearing being scheduled by the Senior Courts Costs Office (SCCO) on 10 May 2024, which was later adjourned to 26 June 2024 due to service issues.

On 26 June 2024, the Claimant served the sealed Part 8 claim form on the Defendant, although a certificate of service was not filed until 15 November 2024. The Defendant disputed the court’s jurisdiction in their acknowledgement of service filed on 18 December 2024, and on 12 February 2025, the Claimant requested a breakdown of the disputed invoices.

The matter centred on whether the Part 8 claim was an abuse of process, given the concurrent existence of Part 7 proceedings. Further, the court needed to consider if “special circumstances” justified allowing the Part 8 claim despite the delays.

This case raises crucial issues on the intersection of procedural rules governing costs disputes under Part 7 and Part 8, especially when one party is out of time under the Solicitors Act 1974.

Costs Issues Before the Court

The primary costs issues the court had to determine included the timeliness and appropriateness of the Claimant’s Part 8 application under the Solicitors Act 1974. Specifically, the Claimant was out of time but sought to rely on Section 70(3)(c) of the Act, which allows a court to exercise discretion if “special circumstances” arise.

The court had to consider:
– Whether the Claimant’s delay in bringing Part 8 proceedings constituted an abuse of process considering the ongoing Part 7 proceedings.
– The Claimant’s eligibility to pursue a Part 8 claim when it had been significantly out of time.
– Evaluation of the procedural efficiency and merits of resolving the dispute under Part 8 versus continuing under the ongoing Part 7 proceedings.

These issues were framed within the context of competing procedural rules, the timeline of events, validity and proper service of proceedings, and the special circumstances argument posited by the Claimant.

The Parties’ Positions

The Claimant, represented by James Miller, argued that although out of time, there were special circumstances warranting a Part 8 detailed assessment. It cited the Defendant’s lack of transparency and failure to provide a breakdown of costs despite repeated requests. The Claimant asserted that invoking the Part 8 process was essential to investigate serious allegations regarding the Defendant’s fees, including accusations of fabricated charges.

On the other hand, the Defendant, represented by Francesca O’Neill, focused on the argument that the Claimant was out of time and that their Part 8 application constituted an abuse of process. The Defendant contended that the issues raised by the Claimant were already adequately addressed in the Part 7 proceedings, which were well advanced. They argued that the ongoing Part 7 litigation offered a more appropriate forum for resolving the disputes and insisted that the parallel Part 8 proceedings were unnecessary and vexatious.

The Court’s Decision

Costs Judge Nagalingam ruled against the Claimant’s Part 8 application. He clarified that, despite the Part 8 procedural framework usually being favoured for costs disputes, the concurrent existence of the advanced Part 7 proceedings and the considerable delay by the Claimant in initiating Part 8 procedures could not be ignored.

The court found that the special circumstances asserted by the Claimant, such as the Defendant’s refusal to provide cost breakdowns and allegations of fabricated charges, were equivalent to common themes in many solicitor-client disputes. These did not, in themselves, rise to the level of special circumstances required to justify a late Part 8 application.

Additionally, the court found that all procedural directions necessary for a detailed investigation into the Defendant’s fees had already been set in the ongoing Part 7 proceedings, including orders for disclosure, exchange of witness evidence, and provision for a trial. Considering these facts, the court saw no added value in permitting the Part 8 application to proceed.

The court dismissed the Claimant’s Part 8 claim and awarded costs to the Defendant. However, the court expressed concerns over the significant costs claimed by the Defendant in response to the Part 8 claim and suggested that both parties aim to agree on a sensible sum before any further costs assessments.

In conclusion, Judge Nagalingam determined that continuing with the Part 7 proceedings was the most efficient and just course of action, both procedurally and substantively.