Defendant Loses Costs Of Late Documents Whoever Wins | No Extension Application Was Made | Court Bars Recovery At Permission Stage

In Rayaan Abdil, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2026] EWHC 2738 (Admin), the Administrative Court barred a defendant public authority from recovering the costs of late documents, and of the permission hearing, whoever ultimately wins the judicial review. The sanction was fixed at permission stage and does not depend on the outcome, so a defendant that misses a directed deadline cannot rely on later success to recoup that expenditure.

Background

The claim concerned a four year old child with disabilities, adaptations to the family’s rented home and the defendant local authority’s statutory duties towards him. On 17 September 2026 the court refused urgent interim relief and expedited the claim. It directed the defendant to file and serve Detailed Grounds and any written evidence within 14 days of service of the claimant’s amended Claim Form and chronology [4].

The claimant served on 18 September 2026, so the defendant’s deadline was 2 October 2026 [8]. Nothing was filed. The defendant later sent witness statements with exhibits on 16 and 19 October 2026, and counsel served a 15-page skeleton argument at 15:41 on 19 October, the day before the oral permission hearing. The claimant’s mother, acting in person, received a 418-page hearing bundle at 7pm that evening [13].

Costs Issues Before the Court

At the oral permission hearing on 20 October 2026, Fordham J read the late documents de bene esse in order to decide whether reliance on them should be permitted [13]. He had to determine whether the defendant could rely on the witness statements, exhibits and skeleton argument at the permission stage and, if not, what costs consequence should attach to the defaults.

The Parties’ Positions

Mr Beglan, for the defendant, did not resist the grant of permission. He acknowledged that it was appropriate for the court to mark its disapproval, and that a disallowance of costs was one course open to it [14]. He also accepted that the defaults were serious and inexcusable, and especially unacceptable where Mrs Abdul was acting in person [15].

Mrs Abdul, the claimant’s mother and litigation friend, invited the court to exclude the materials going forward to the substantive hearing and to bar the defendant from filing anything else. She also said that she did not wish to hide anything from the court and would not object to the materials being used at the substantive hearing if the court considered it appropriate [15].

The Court’s Decision

Fordham J had no hesitation in declining to allow the defendant to rely on any of the late documents, and in disallowing recovery of the costs of their preparation and of the permission hearing, “whoever wins or loses this case at the end of the day” [14]. His order provided that the defendant “shall not, in any circumstances hereafter, recover its costs” of those materials or of the hearing [17].

That wording gives the sanction its force. The disallowance does not wait for the outcome of the substantive claim. Even if the defendant succeeds at the final hearing, the costs of late documents and of the permission hearing remain irrecoverable. The exclusion of the documents, by contrast, was expressly limited to reliance at “this permission hearing” [17].

The judge grounded the sanction in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2026. He identified the court’s sanctions for defaults as including declining documents filed late and imposing adverse costs orders, including disallowing recovery of the costs of preparing a document, under §§2.2 and 20.4.6 [1]. For skeleton arguments, the Guide provides that late filing may lead to refusal of reliance and disallowance of costs (§20.4.5) [6].

The trigger was, in Fordham J’s words, “a very clear set of breaches of an Order of the Court, as well as contraventions of the guidance in the JR Guide” [14]. No Detailed Grounds were ever filed, and the defendant never identified omissions or inaccuracies in the claimant’s chronology or provided its own [13].

The order of 17 September 2026 made no provision for a skeleton argument, because the permission judge would have the Detailed Grounds. The defendant was not entitled to default on Detailed Grounds and provide a later skeleton argument instead [6]. The skeleton argument, itself unfairly late, could not through the back door properly or fairly provide the substance that should have been in the Detailed Grounds [14].

The absence of any extension application weighed heavily. No Form N244 was filed at any time, and no communication referred to needing or seeking an extension, or to any reason for granting one [13]. The judge recorded that there was “no attempt or even reference to applying for extensions of time” [14]. He held there was no place for an attitude treating compliance as optional, citing FRY v SSD [2026] EWHC 2571 (Admin) [14].

Three features aggravated the defaults and reinforced the decisions. Mrs Abdul acted in person and was placed in what the judge called an intolerable position. The background communications showed that the order had been received and its terms were clear. The defendant’s communications contained no apology to her and no acknowledgement that an extension of time would be needed [15].

Nobody suggested an adjournment, and the hearing had been fixed under an order designed to achieve expedition. The judge observed that, had this been an urgent substantive hearing, there could have been a rule of law dilemma, but said nothing about how that would be approached and resolved. At the expedited permission stage he found no similar dilemma [14].

The sanction did not leave the defendant without evidence for trial. The judge allowed the evidence to be relied on going forward and set a short further window, to 3 November 2026, for Detailed Grounds and further evidence, with directions to an expedited substantive hearing [15]. The procedural exclusion was confined to the permission hearing; the bar on the costs of late documents was not [15, 17].

Practical Implications

For defendant public authorities, the first step on discovering a missed deadline is a prompt application for an extension of time on Form N244, with reasons. The judgment treats the absence of any such application, or any reference to one, as a central feature of the default [13, 14]. Serving late evidence and a skeleton argument without one invites exclusion and a disallowance of costs.

Where directions require Detailed Grounds, a skeleton argument is not a substitute [6, 14]. If both are served, the skeleton needs two clear working days before the hearing, and an authorities bundle at least 3 clear days unless urgency makes that impossible [6, 7]. Communications with an unrepresented opponent should acknowledge the default and the need for an extension [15].

For claimants, the decision supports asking the permission judge to fix the costs consequence of late documents immediately, using “in any circumstances” wording, rather than leaving it to the final hearing. Costs practitioners preparing or assessing a successful defendant’s bill should check the permission-stage order for any such bar before claiming those items [17]. The ruling is a first instance decision of the Administrative Court.

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