In Vengadeswara Raw Gopalakrishnan v The Home Office [2026] EWHC 2856 (KB), Mansfield J stated that where a personal injury claim is added by amendment, QOCS applies to the proceedings both before and after the amendment. The point on QOCS and amendment matters wherever proceedings began as something other than a personal injury claim, here a judicial review, because the claimant’s exposure for the earlier work then falls within CPR 44.14 unless an exception applies.
Background
The claim arose out of the claimant’s immigration detention between September 2013 and February 2014 [1]. It was issued in the Administrative Court on 24 October 2013 as a claim for judicial review, challenging the decision to set removal directions and the refusal of asylum [38]. On 7 November 2014 the claimant served Amended Grounds of Claim which sought permission to amend to bring a claim for personal injury [40].
After the claimant was granted indefinite leave to remain, the public law aspects were compromised by consent, and by a consent order dated 24 February 2023 the personal injury claim was transferred to the King’s Bench Division [3, 42]. The current pleaded case claims false imprisonment and negligence [44]. The Defence was later amended to plead fundamental dishonesty and the claimant discontinued. On 20 August 2026 Lambert J vacated the trial and directed a trial of the fundamental dishonesty issue under CPR PD44 para 12.4(c) [6].
Costs Issues Before the Court
The defendant sought a finding under CPR 44.16(1) that the claim was fundamentally dishonest [25]. Behind that lay the costs consequences of discontinuance. The court had to identify the starting point under CPR 38.6, how QOCS in CPR Part 44 governed the proceedings, and whether the defendant should have permission to enforce beyond the limit in CPR 44.14. The judge therefore addressed how QOCS applied to proceedings which began as judicial review and included claims that were not for personal injury [31, 32].
The Court’s Decision
Mansfield J began with CPR 38.6: a claimant who discontinues is liable for the defendant’s costs up to the date of service of the notice of discontinuance, unless the court orders otherwise [28]. He then held that the case was governed by the QOCS rules in CPR Part 44 [29].
He summarised the framework. QOCS applies to proceedings which include a claim for personal injuries under CPR 44.13(1). Costs orders against a claimant may be enforced without permission only up to the aggregate of damages, costs and interest ordered or agreed in the claimant’s favour under CPR 44.14. Full enforcement, with permission, is available where the claim is found fundamentally dishonest under CPR 44.16(1) [29].
The judge also noted that an allegation of fundamental dishonesty may remain live after discontinuance. The court may direct that it be determined although the notice of discontinuance has not been set aside, under CPR PD 44 para 12.4(c), and that was the effect of Lambert J’s order [30].
Two propositions on the scope of QOCS followed. First, because QOCS applies to a claim which includes a claim for personal injuries, it applies regardless of whether the claim also includes other claims which are not claims for personal injuries [31]. The proceedings here included the original public law challenge and a claim for false imprisonment as well as the personal injury claim [38, 44].
Second, the judge turned to QOCS and amendment. In Mansfield J’s words, “If a claim for personal injuries is added by amendment, QOCS applies to the proceedings both before and after the amendment”, citing Pathan v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2022] EWHC 3244 (KB) [32]. He set out that principle without further analysis, and without distinguishing between costs incurred in the judicial review phase and costs incurred later.
The personal injury claim was not present when the proceedings were issued in October 2013; it was raised by the Amended Grounds served in November 2014 [38, 40]. On the approach stated at [32], QOCS applied to the proceedings both before and after that amendment, not only from the date it was made.
The mixed nature of the claim also mattered at the exception stage. CPR 44.16(1) requires the dishonesty to be fundamental. The judge relied on the explanation approved in Howlett v Davies [2017] EWCA Civ 1696: dishonesty as to a collateral matter does not suffice, whereas dishonesty going to the root of the whole or a substantial part of the claim would make it a fundamentally dishonest claim [37].
Mansfield J made no finding that the public law element or the false imprisonment claim was dishonest, and was not asked to consider their merits [106]. He nonetheless held the dishonesty fundamental to the claim as a whole: “The personal injury claim is plainly a significant part of the claim throughout and accounts for the large sum of damages claimed. The Claimant’s dishonesty is fundamental to the claim as a whole.”
The order followed. The claimant was liable under CPR 38.6 for the defendant’s costs “of the whole claim up to the date of service of the notice of discontinuance”, and Mansfield J granted permission under CPR 44.16(1) to enforce that costs order to the full extent [108]. Any application for costs after the notice of discontinuance was left to the hand-down hearing [108]. The judge observed that dishonesty in presenting the claim in 2025 and 2026 would have sufficed for a finding, though he found the claim dishonest since 2014 [107].
Practical Implications
The decision is at first instance, and the amendment point was stated by reference to Pathan without further analysis. For defendants, proceedings that start as judicial review, or as any other claim not for personal injury, and later acquire a personal injury claim by amendment should be treated as within QOCS from issue. Costs of pre-amendment work should not be assumed to be enforceable in full simply because they predate the amendment.
Where full recovery matters, the route is through the exceptions to QOCS. A defendant facing discontinuance should seek a direction under CPR PD 44 para 12.4(c) so that fundamental dishonesty can be determined without setting aside the notice of discontinuance, as happened here. Where other claims run alongside the personal injury claim, the pleading and evidence should address why the dishonesty is fundamental to the claim as a whole.
For claimants, the rule on QOCS and amendment cuts the other way. Exposure for the defendant’s costs of an earlier phase that was not a personal injury claim is not left outside QOCS by the timing of the amendment. That protection is qualified: a finding of fundamental dishonesty under CPR 44.16(1) allows the defendant, with permission, to enforce a CPR 38.6 order for the costs of the whole claim to the full extent.
CPR 44.13(1) | If QOCS Applies, It Applies To The Entire Proceedings
QOCS Protection Limited To 50% Of Costs In Mixed Personal Injury Claims
QOCS In A Mixed HRA, PI Claim | Claimants Ordered To Pay 5% Costs
QOCS Applied To Mixed Claim Against Police | No Exceptional Features Found
Costs Orders | No QOCS Protection for Claimants Without Personal Injury Claims
Related service: costs advocacy at detailed assessments and costs hearings.