This judgment determined the costs issues arising after Mr Afriyie’s claims against the police for assault, battery and misfeasance were dismissed at trial. The court had rejected the Defendant’s argument that the claims should have been struck out for Mr Afriyie’s alleged fundamental dishonesty.

The main issue was whether the court should grant permission to the Defendant under CPR 44.16(2)(b) to enforce the costs order against Mr Afriyie, given this was a ‘mixed claim’ with QOCS protection covering the personal injury element. The judge concluded the claim was essentially a personal injury case ‘in the round’. The starting point was therefore maintaining QOCS protection for a ‘cost neutral’ result unless there were exceptional features of the non-personal injury claims.

Analysing each matter cited by the Defendant, the judge found none constituted an exceptional feature of the non-personal injury parts of the claim specifically. Most related to the personal injury claims too. As no exceptional features displacing QOCS protection were established, permission to enforce costs was refused.

In summary, in this ‘mixed claim’ the unsuccessful claimant retained QOCS protection against paying the defendant’s costs, as the proceedings were fairly characterized overall as a personal injury case and there were no exceptional features identified relating solely to the non-personal injury parts of the claim.

“Whether the client has authorised the solicitor to recoup fees by way of a deduction from funds in hand is a question of interpretation of the written contract of retainer. In our judgment it is clear that the CFA in this case, and its accompanying documents, specifically authorised the Solicitors to recoup their fees out of the Client’s compensation, up to a maximum of 25% of that compensation. Payment of the bill took place when, after delivery of the bill, the Solicitors made that deduction. It follows, in our view, that payment of the bill took place more than one year before the bill was challenged and that, consequently, the court’s power of assessment was barred by section 70(4).”

“…I conclude that where costs are ordered to be assessed, interest becomes “due” within the meaning of section 24(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 on the date of the original orderand accrues from day to day thereafter. I reject the submission that it only becomes due when quantification has taken place, albeit that it only becomes payable at that point.”

“It seems clear to me that such an informed and reasonable observer would understand the offer term to mean that after 21 days interest would accrue on the entire offer sum. The way to understand it is to imagine a black box. The amount the claimant offered to compromise the claim and that the defendant accepted to pay is in that black box. By accepting the claimant’s offer, the defendant agrees to give the black box to the claimant. But there is a delay in giving the claimant the box. If the claimant had been given the box with the full sum on the Day 21, he could have invested it and received interest. But he did not get it. Instead, the defendant kept the money for that extra period. In that delay period, two things happened. The defendant benefited from the monies and the claimant was deprived of them. It seems to me obvious that the claimant should receive interest for the net sum for the delay period (or periods, strictly).