In Linda Foster & Anor v Wargrave on Thames Housing Association Ltd [2026] EWHC 3000 (KB), the High Court held that acting in person does not relieve the court of its obligation to apply reasonableness and proportionality to litigant in person costs. It reduced a 649-hour time claim to approximately 40% of the sum claimed.
Background
The substantive appeal arose out of possession proceedings brought by a housing association against two tenants over the scope of a contractual Electricity Charge in their tenancy agreement. The appellants, acting in person, succeeded on a narrow issue of contractual construction [3]. The parties agreed that the possession order could not stand, that the appellants were entitled to costs, and that the court should assess those costs summarily [4].
The appellants asked the court to assess the costs of the whole litigation without distinction between the appeal, the hearing below and the wider litigation. The respondent did not object and made submissions on all aspects of the costs claimed [26]. The judge refused indemnity costs, so the assessment proceeded on the standard basis [30].
Costs Issues Before the Court
The court had to decide the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs claimed by the appellants as litigants in person, including the number of hours claimed [4]. The main schedule claimed 649 hours: 113 hours of case preparation, 165 hours of legal research, 116 hours drafting court documents, 105 hours of correspondence and case management and 150 hours attending hearings [31]. Claiming no quantifiable financial loss, the appellants applied the prescribed rates of £19 per hour and £24 per hour from October 2025 [31]. A supplemental schedule claimed 74 hours for the consequential proceedings [43].
The Parties’ Positions
The appellants relied on the scale and duration of the litigation: about three years, three linked claims, ten hearings at four court centres, a two-day trial and an appeal. Excluding 150 hours of attendance and travel, they put the remaining approximately 499 hours at about three hours a week, which they said was not excessive for litigation concerning their home [32].
They also submitted that the two-thirds restriction in CPR 46.5(2) was not engaged, since no realistic assessment of a represented party’s costs could fall low enough to trigger it. They pointed to the respondent’s statement of costs of £12,554.40 for the appeal hearing alone [33]. The respondent argued that the hours claimed were substantially greater than the nature and value of the dispute could justify [29], and that allowing 150 hours would be generous [37].
The Court’s Decision
Mr Justice Sweeting first dealt with Mr Hitchens’s point that the appellants’ costs were substantially lower than the respondent’s. That comparison was not determinative in any assessment, and was of even less significance given the difference in the rates which may be claimed. The judge described it as “somewhat doubled-edged” [34].
He then tested the hours against professional rates. Applying the respondent’s grade D rate to the hours claimed would produce approximately £120,000, the grade A rate £227,150, and an equal split between the two over £170,000. Professional costs of that magnitude would, he said, “without more, if sought by represented parties be well in excess of what could be recovered for litigation of this nature” [34]. The real dispute concerned the extent of the hours claimed for preparation.
The judge accepted that the litigation required a substantial investment of time and effort. The appeal was competently presented, the written submissions were detailed and carefully researched, and the appellants had succeeded on a point lost at first instance. He also accepted that litigants in person will frequently require more time than experienced legal representatives to undertake legal research and prepare documents [35].
Those matters did not carry the claim. The judge held that “the fact that time has been spent does not of itself render the resulting costs recoverable” [36]. On the standard basis the court must ask whether the costs are reasonable and proportionate, not simply whether the work was done. The dispute raised a relatively narrow issue of contractual construction, without factual or legal complexity of a kind which would ordinarily justify costs on the scale claimed [36].
Standing back, the judge found force in the respondent’s submission that the costs were disproportionate to the nature, importance and value of the dispute, and described the 649-hour claim as particularly striking. The court assesses what was reasonably necessary and proportionate rather than compensating every hour expended. On litigant in person costs specifically, he held: “The fact that the Appellants acted in person cannot relieve the court of its obligation to apply the requirements of reasonableness and proportionality” [37].
The judgment records the appellants’ submission on CPR 46.5(2) [33] but does not rule on it. The reduction was made on reasonableness and proportionality grounds. Because the hours claimed in periods at differing rates were more or less equivalent, a single reduction could be applied. Adopting a broad brush approach, and bearing in mind the wider sweep of the litigation and the orders made below, the judge reduced the overall sum claimed to £5,600, approximately 40% of the sum claimed [42].
The same scrutiny applied to disbursements. Printing, photocopying, binding and postage are usually overheads for lawyers. Litigants in person, however, have no legal business overheads, and such claims have been allowed in principle, as in Tanya Grand v Param Gill. The judge was not certain that all the material needed printing and allowed £300 rather than the £822 claimed [40].
The supplemental claim was treated in the same way. Much of the work was plainly necessary. However, 25 hours for a skeleton argument and 74 hours in total appeared high against the limited issues, and the appellants had not succeeded on every issue they raised [47]. The judge reduced the hours by 50%, allowing £888 [50].
Practical Implications
For paying parties, the decision confirms that the prescribed litigant in person rate does not answer a challenge on hours. A schedule built on a modest hourly rate can still be disproportionate where the time claimed is out of scale with the nature, importance and value of the dispute [37]. Running the claimed hours at a represented party’s grade rates, as the judge did, is one way of showing that scale [34].
Receiving litigants in person, and those advising them, can expect the court to accept that they need more time than lawyers, but not to compensate every hour. Schedules should break time down by task and show why research and drafting time was needed for the issues actually in dispute. A comparison with the opponent’s higher costs is unlikely to assist where the recoverable rates differ so markedly [34].
Litigant in person costs of consequential hearings face the same scrutiny, and a mixed outcome on the issues argued may justify a further reduction [48]. Printing and similar costs may be allowed in principle to a litigant in person, but only in a reasonable amount [40]. The assessment was summary and on a broad brush basis, made by a single High Court judge on appeal from the County Court.
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