Abusive Litigation Conduct Does Not Automatically Shift Costs | Misconduct Must Increase Costs Or Be Egregious | Appeal Fails

Abusive litigation conduct is weighed principally by its causative effect on costs, though sufficiently egregious misconduct may warrant a proportionate penalty regardless. The weight given to such conduct is an evaluative matter for the trial judge, and a finding that conduct was deplorable does not compel a costs shift.

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In Mary Egan v Neil Morgan & Anor [2026] EWHC 2946 (BP), the High Court (Tappin J) dismissed an appeal against a no order as to costs decision made after a boundary dispute trial in the County Court. The Appellant argued that the trial judge had wrongly required the Respondents’ abusive conduct towards lawyers, judges and court staff to have increased her costs before it could count against them. Tappin J held, applying Widlake v BAA and Walsh v Singh, that conduct is principally weighed by its causative effect on costs, but may be so egregious as to warrant a proportionate penalty regardless. The trial judge had not applied a causation-only test; he had weighed the behaviour and declined to give it particular weight. Parties seeking a conduct-based costs shift should identify which limb they rely on, recognising that the weight given to conduct is an evaluative matter for the trial judge.

[30] “The parties referred me to Widlake v BAA [2009] EWCA Civ 1256 at [39]-[41] and Walsh v Singh [2011] EWCA Civ 80 at [25]. Those cases establish that the principal way in which regard is to be had to conduct is to enquire into its causative effect on increased costs, but in addition misconduct may be so egregious that a costs penalty should be imposed upon the offending party regardless of causative effect, though such a penalty should be proportionate.”

Citations

Widlake v BAA [2009] EWCA Civ 1256 Cited with Walsh v Singh as establishing that conduct is principally considered by its causative effect on increased costs, but that sufficiently egregious misconduct may attract a proportionate costs penalty regardless of causative effect.

Walsh v Singh [2011] EWCA Civ 80 Cited with Widlake v BAA for the same two-limb approach to conduct: causative effect on increased costs, or misconduct so egregious as to justify a proportionate penalty regardless of causation.

F&C Alternative Investments v Barthelemy [2012] EWCA Civ 843 Cited for the principle that costs decisions after trial are matters of discretion and evaluation, and an appellate court may only interfere if the decision is wrong in principle, takes account of an irrelevant matter or omits a relevant one, or is plainly unsustainable.

Roache v News Group [1998] EMLR 161 Cited for the proposition that an appeal court must not interfere with a costs order merely because it would have exercised the discretion differently, and that the court asks who, as a matter of substance and reality, has won.

Tanfern v Cameron-MacDonald [2000] 1 WLR 1311 Cited by the Appellant for the question whether the judge had exceeded the generous ambit within which a reasonable disagreement is possible.

Re Sprintroom [2019] EWCA Civ 932 Cited by the Appellant for the question whether the decision was wrong by reason of an identifiable flaw in the judge’s treatment of the question, such as a gap in logic or a failure to take into account a material factor.

Key Points

  • Litigation conduct is principally taken into account by enquiring into its causative effect on increased costs, but misconduct may be so egregious that a costs penalty should be imposed regardless of causative effect, provided the penalty is proportionate. [30]
  • A judge who finds conduct deplorable but declines to give it particular weight in the overall costs balance does not err, provided the conduct is weighed with the other factors and no rule is applied that conduct counts only if it increased costs. [36, 38]
  • A costs judgment need not refer to each particular item of conduct relied on, and the weight given to litigation conduct is an evaluative exercise for the trial judge, who is best placed to assess it. [29, 38, 40]
  • An appellate court may only interfere with a costs decision that is wrong in principle, takes into account an irrelevant matter or omits a relevant one, or is plainly unsustainable. [8]

[35] “I agree with the Respondents that there is no indication in the CJ that the Judge was approaching matters on the basis that in order for conduct to sound in costs it was necessary to show that the conduct had caused an increase in costs. The Respondents correctly point to how the Judge dealt with the costs of the 23 November 2017 hearing, as to which the Judge said in paragraph 52(i) that the First Respondent’s seriously disrespectful and unwarranted conduct before the DDJ was such as should of itself be marked with a costs order but was also a substantial cause of the adjournment. He clearly was aware that conduct could be sufficiently egregious as to merit a costs penalty regardless of whether it caused an increase in costs.”

Key Findings In The Case

  • The trial judge did not apply a rule that conduct must have increased costs before it could sound in costs; his costs order for the 23 November 2017 hearing showed he knew egregious conduct could merit a penalty regardless of causation. [35]
  • In sub-paragraph (xxiii) the trial judge weighed the First Respondent’s invective towards the Appellant’s solicitors and counsel’s clerks and concluded only that it should not be given particular weight. [36]
  • The trial judge was entitled to conclude that behaviour towards court staff had no causative effect and should carry no weight, the only identified incident being the 23 November 2017 hearing, already reflected in a costs order. [37]
  • Ground 2B amounted to a generalised challenge to the weight given to the Respondents’ conduct, outside the permission granted, and there was no basis to interfere with the order that there be no order as to costs. [40]
  • The appeal was dismissed on all grounds, including the challenge to the conclusion that there was no overall winner. [26, 27, 41]

[38] “While I entirely agree with the Appellant that the use of abusive language towards opposing lawyers and their staff, or towards judges and court staff, is deplorable and unacceptable, I do not agree that the way in which the Judge dealt with these matters means that his decision was wrong in the relevant sense. I can see nothing to suggest that he approached matters in a manner contrary to that set out in the Widlake and Walsh cases. He was best placed to assess the way in which the First Respondent had conducted himself and I can see no basis for interfering with his view that his behaviour towards opposing lawyers and their staff and judges did not merit being given particular weight (or in the case of court staff, any weight) on the question of who was to bear the overall costs.”

In Mary Egan v Neil Morgan & Anor [2026] EWHC 2946 (BP), the High Court upheld a no order as to costs decision despite abusive litigation conduct by a litigant in person towards lawyers, judges and court staff. Misconduct is weighed principally by its effect on costs, though egregious conduct can attract a proportionate penalty regardless, and the weight it carries is for the trial judge.

Background

The proceedings began as a claim by the Respondents for damages for the Appellant’s removal of a fence, met by a counterclaim about the true line of the boundary between neighbouring properties [11], [12]. The parties had been litigating over approximately 45 square metres of land since 2016 [1].

After trial, Recorder Dagnall (the Judge) handed down a consequentials judgment (the CJ) on 6 November 2024 and made an order dated 4 March 2025. Subject to other orders, including that the Respondents pay one third of the Appellant’s costs of attendance at a hearing on 23 November 2017 on the standard basis, there was to be no order as to the costs of the proceedings [2].

The Appellant, who claimed to have spent over £1M in legal costs, appealed, seeking an order that the Respondents pay her costs of the proceedings on the indemnity basis [1], [3]. Richards J granted permission to appeal on three grounds on 28 July 2025 [4].

Costs Issues Before the Court

Ground 1, challenging the Judge’s conclusion that there was no successful party, failed [26], [27]. Ground 2A was that the Judge erred in concluding that the Respondents’ conduct could only justify a costs award in the Appellant’s favour if it increased her costs. Ground 2B, in the alternative, was that he erred in failing to conclude that it had done so [28].

Richards J had refused permission on ground 2 as originally framed, which alleged that the Judge placed insufficient weight on the Respondents’ conduct. He said he was not permitting a generalised challenge to that weight, which was an evaluative exercise for the Judge [29].

The Parties’ Positions

On ground 2A, the Appellant focused on sub-paragraphs (xxiii) and (xxiv) of paragraph 90 of the CJ [32]. She contended that the Judge had required the Respondents’ conduct to have directly increased costs before it could be taken into account [34]. On ground 2B, she relied on lengthy submissions, late evidence, extensive correspondence, numerous unmeritorious points and delay [39].

The Respondents, represented by the First Respondent in person, said there was no indication in the CJ that the Judge had adopted a causation-only approach, pointing to his treatment of the 23 November 2017 hearing [35]. They also reminded the court that an appeal court must not interfere with a costs order merely because it would have exercised the discretion differently [9].

The Court’s Decision

The approach on appeal was not in dispute. Under F&C Alternative Investments v Barthelemy, an appellate court may only interfere with a costs decision that is wrong in principle, takes into account a matter that should not have been taken into account or fails to take into account one that should, or is plainly unsustainable [8]. The Respondents did not dissent from that [9].

On conduct, the parties referred to Widlake v BAA and Walsh v Singh. Tappin J said those cases establish that the principal way of having regard to conduct is to enquire into its causative effect on increased costs, but that “misconduct may be so egregious that a costs penalty should be imposed upon the offending party regardless of causative effect, though such a penalty should be proportionate” [30].

In sub-paragraph (xxiii), the Judge addressed the First Respondent’s inappropriate invective and animosity towards the Appellant’s solicitors and counsel’s clerks. He deplored it, but observed that litigants in person often become emotionally involved and that lawyers should be appropriately thick-skinned, within limits. He did not see sufficient causative effect for the conduct to carry particular weight on the overall costs [32].

In sub-paragraph (xxiv), the Judge said that insulting or disrespectful conduct towards judges was a matter for those judges to deal with in terms of costs, and not a matter of particular weight on the overall costs. He could not see that abusive conduct towards court staff had any causative effect or why it should carry any weight [33].

Tappin J agreed with the Respondents that nothing in the CJ suggested the Judge believed conduct could sound in costs only if it caused an increase in costs. The Judge had found the First Respondent’s conduct before the DDJ on 23 November 2017 should of itself be marked with a costs order, while also being a substantial cause of the adjournment. “He clearly was aware that conduct could be sufficiently egregious as to merit a costs penalty regardless of whether it caused an increase in costs” [35].

Nor did sub-paragraph (xxiii) apply a causation-only test. Tappin J read it as a conclusion that the conduct was not enough, and had not caused enough impact on costs, to carry particular weight. The Judge had not treated conduct as incapable of sounding in costs regardless of causation, and had weighed the behaviour and its impact alongside all the other factors [36].

The same analysis applied to the behaviour towards judges in sub-paragraph (xxiv). On court staff, the Judge was entitled to his conclusions. The Appellant could point to no incident involving court staff other than the 23 November 2017 hearing, and the Judge had already made a costs order to take account of the First Respondent’s behaviour on that occasion [37].

Tappin J entirely agreed with the Appellant that abusive language towards opposing lawyers and their staff, or towards judges and court staff, is deplorable and unacceptable, but that did not make the decision wrong. The treatment of that litigation conduct disclosed nothing contrary to Widlake and Walsh, and the Judge “was best placed to assess the way in which the First Respondent had conducted himself” [38].

On ground 2B, the Judge had recorded the Appellant’s complaints about unnecessary correspondence, adjournments and points taken, and considered the submissions carefully and extensively. He was not required to refer to each matter now relied on. The submission was a generalised challenge to weight, outside the permission granted, and the appeal was dismissed [40], [41].

Practical Implications

This was a High Court decision on appeal from the County Court. A party relying on litigation conduct to shift the overall costs order should identify which limb of the Widlake and Walsh approach it relies on. Under the causation limb, that means showing which costs the conduct increased, rather than describing the conduct in general terms [30], [36].

Where the conduct is said to be egregious in itself, the submission should explain why it is serious enough to justify a penalty regardless of causative effect, and what proportionate penalty is sought [30]. Deplorable behaviour, including abuse of lawyers, judges and court staff, will not necessarily carry particular weight in the overall balance [38].

Misconduct at a particular hearing can be marked by a costs order for that hearing. Here the 23 November 2017 conduct was marked by a separate costs order, and that was the only court staff incident identified on appeal [37]. Paying parties can point to such orders when resisting a further adjustment of the overall costs.

On appeal, grounds should identify a specific error of principle, such as the application of a causation-only test, and show it from the wording of the costs judgment. A generalised complaint that conduct was given insufficient weight was refused permission here and, when advanced again under ground 2B, failed as outside the permission granted [29], [40].

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