In Mary Egan v Neil Morgan & Anor [2026] EWHC 2946 (BP), the High Court upheld a no order as to costs decision despite abusive litigation conduct by a litigant in person towards lawyers, judges and court staff. Misconduct is weighed principally by its effect on costs, though egregious conduct can attract a proportionate penalty regardless, and the weight it carries is for the trial judge.
Background
The proceedings began as a claim by the Respondents for damages for the Appellant’s removal of a fence, met by a counterclaim about the true line of the boundary between neighbouring properties [11], [12]. The parties had been litigating over approximately 45 square metres of land since 2016 [1].
After trial, Recorder Dagnall (the Judge) handed down a consequentials judgment (the CJ) on 6 November 2024 and made an order dated 4 March 2025. Subject to other orders, including that the Respondents pay one third of the Appellant’s costs of attendance at a hearing on 23 November 2017 on the standard basis, there was to be no order as to the costs of the proceedings [2].
The Appellant, who claimed to have spent over £1M in legal costs, appealed, seeking an order that the Respondents pay her costs of the proceedings on the indemnity basis [1], [3]. Richards J granted permission to appeal on three grounds on 28 July 2025 [4].
Costs Issues Before the Court
Ground 1, challenging the Judge’s conclusion that there was no successful party, failed [26], [27]. Ground 2A was that the Judge erred in concluding that the Respondents’ conduct could only justify a costs award in the Appellant’s favour if it increased her costs. Ground 2B, in the alternative, was that he erred in failing to conclude that it had done so [28].
Richards J had refused permission on ground 2 as originally framed, which alleged that the Judge placed insufficient weight on the Respondents’ conduct. He said he was not permitting a generalised challenge to that weight, which was an evaluative exercise for the Judge [29].
The Parties’ Positions
On ground 2A, the Appellant focused on sub-paragraphs (xxiii) and (xxiv) of paragraph 90 of the CJ [32]. She contended that the Judge had required the Respondents’ conduct to have directly increased costs before it could be taken into account [34]. On ground 2B, she relied on lengthy submissions, late evidence, extensive correspondence, numerous unmeritorious points and delay [39].
The Respondents, represented by the First Respondent in person, said there was no indication in the CJ that the Judge had adopted a causation-only approach, pointing to his treatment of the 23 November 2017 hearing [35]. They also reminded the court that an appeal court must not interfere with a costs order merely because it would have exercised the discretion differently [9].
The Court’s Decision
The approach on appeal was not in dispute. Under F&C Alternative Investments v Barthelemy, an appellate court may only interfere with a costs decision that is wrong in principle, takes into account a matter that should not have been taken into account or fails to take into account one that should, or is plainly unsustainable [8]. The Respondents did not dissent from that [9].
On conduct, the parties referred to Widlake v BAA and Walsh v Singh. Tappin J said those cases establish that the principal way of having regard to conduct is to enquire into its causative effect on increased costs, but that “misconduct may be so egregious that a costs penalty should be imposed upon the offending party regardless of causative effect, though such a penalty should be proportionate” [30].
In sub-paragraph (xxiii), the Judge addressed the First Respondent’s inappropriate invective and animosity towards the Appellant’s solicitors and counsel’s clerks. He deplored it, but observed that litigants in person often become emotionally involved and that lawyers should be appropriately thick-skinned, within limits. He did not see sufficient causative effect for the conduct to carry particular weight on the overall costs [32].
In sub-paragraph (xxiv), the Judge said that insulting or disrespectful conduct towards judges was a matter for those judges to deal with in terms of costs, and not a matter of particular weight on the overall costs. He could not see that abusive conduct towards court staff had any causative effect or why it should carry any weight [33].
Tappin J agreed with the Respondents that nothing in the CJ suggested the Judge believed conduct could sound in costs only if it caused an increase in costs. The Judge had found the First Respondent’s conduct before the DDJ on 23 November 2017 should of itself be marked with a costs order, while also being a substantial cause of the adjournment. “He clearly was aware that conduct could be sufficiently egregious as to merit a costs penalty regardless of whether it caused an increase in costs” [35].
Nor did sub-paragraph (xxiii) apply a causation-only test. Tappin J read it as a conclusion that the conduct was not enough, and had not caused enough impact on costs, to carry particular weight. The Judge had not treated conduct as incapable of sounding in costs regardless of causation, and had weighed the behaviour and its impact alongside all the other factors [36].
The same analysis applied to the behaviour towards judges in sub-paragraph (xxiv). On court staff, the Judge was entitled to his conclusions. The Appellant could point to no incident involving court staff other than the 23 November 2017 hearing, and the Judge had already made a costs order to take account of the First Respondent’s behaviour on that occasion [37].
Tappin J entirely agreed with the Appellant that abusive language towards opposing lawyers and their staff, or towards judges and court staff, is deplorable and unacceptable, but that did not make the decision wrong. The treatment of that litigation conduct disclosed nothing contrary to Widlake and Walsh, and the Judge “was best placed to assess the way in which the First Respondent had conducted himself” [38].
On ground 2B, the Judge had recorded the Appellant’s complaints about unnecessary correspondence, adjournments and points taken, and considered the submissions carefully and extensively. He was not required to refer to each matter now relied on. The submission was a generalised challenge to weight, outside the permission granted, and the appeal was dismissed [40], [41].
Practical Implications
This was a High Court decision on appeal from the County Court. A party relying on litigation conduct to shift the overall costs order should identify which limb of the Widlake and Walsh approach it relies on. Under the causation limb, that means showing which costs the conduct increased, rather than describing the conduct in general terms [30], [36].
Where the conduct is said to be egregious in itself, the submission should explain why it is serious enough to justify a penalty regardless of causative effect, and what proportionate penalty is sought [30]. Deplorable behaviour, including abuse of lawyers, judges and court staff, will not necessarily carry particular weight in the overall balance [38].
Misconduct at a particular hearing can be marked by a costs order for that hearing. Here the 23 November 2017 conduct was marked by a separate costs order, and that was the only court staff incident identified on appeal [37]. Paying parties can point to such orders when resisting a further adjustment of the overall costs.
On appeal, grounds should identify a specific error of principle, such as the application of a causation-only test, and show it from the wording of the costs judgment. A generalised complaint that conduct was given insufficient weight was refused permission here and, when advanced again under ground 2B, failed as outside the permission granted [29], [40].
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